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a healthier, safer world.
Transform emerged in response to the increasingly apparent failings of 
current national and international drug policy. We draw attention to 
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Our vision
An end to the war on drugs and the establishment of an effective system 
of regulation that promotes health, peace and security, sustainable 
development and human rights
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Introduction
This is the second edition of our guide to regulating legal markets for the 
non-medical use of cannabis. It is for policy makers, drug policy reform 
advocates and affected communities all over the world who are seeing 
the question ‘Should we maintain cannabis prohibition?’ moving to ‘What will 
the regulation framework that replaces prohibition look like?’ This  guide  builds 
 on Transform’s many years exploring and promoting effective regulation 
models as alternatives to prohibition. It arrives in a very different world 
from our landmark 2009 publication After the War on Drugs: Blueprint 
for Regulation.
The cannabis regulation debate is now part of the political mainstream, 
with  multiple jurisdictions at  the  city,  state  and  country levels ,  considering, 
developing  and implementing a range  of  regulated market models 
 for  cannabis. These  include  Spain’s	 	non-profit	‘	 cannabis	 social	 clubs,	
commercial enterprises in the US and the Netherlands, and Uruguay’s 
more government-controlled model. Since the first edition of this 
guide was published, cannabis reform around the world has continued 
to accelerate. Two more US states have legalised (and many more are 
poised to follow, notably including California), Jamaica has legalised 
cannabis for industrial, medical and religious purposes, and Canada has 
joined Uruguay in legalising at a national level. This second edition of 
the guide has a number of updates - including the latest information and 
analysis from these emerging cannabis policy innovations around the 
world. For a summary of key regulation models from around the globe 
see the table on p.252.
Transform, working with other colleagues, has produced this guide to 
help those engaged in cannabis policy through the key practical challenges 
involved in developing and implementing an effective regulation approach 
 How to Regulate Cannabis:
aimed at achieving the safer, healthier world we all wish to see. A world 
the so-called ‘war on drugs’ has conspicuously failed to deliver.
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About this guide
The social, political, economic and policy landscape of the many 
jurisdictions approaching this issue vary widely, and each will need to 
tailor their policy responses and regulatory models accordingly. So rather 
than lay out a prescriptive set of regulations detailing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
model, this guide explores the major issues that need to be considered, 
and the pros and cons of a range of models and responses. It makes broad 
recommendations that are flexible enough to help those interested in 
cannabis regulation to develop an approach appropriate to their local 
circumstances.
• Section 1 provides the foundation for a regulatory approach, 
beginning with the changing political context and ending with some key 
conclusions and recommendations
• Section 2 tackles the detail of how to regulate the various 
aspects of a cannabis market, including key challenges and broad 
recommendations for best practice
• Section 3 focuses on specific cannabis-related issues that 
run parallel to wider market regulation questions, nationally and 
internationally
• Appendices include a table comparing key models for cannabis 
regulation including Uruguay, California, Washington, Colorado, The 
Netherlands and Spain
 How to Regulate Cannabis:
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Section 1
Foundations
Political context
The debate around the legalisation and regulation of cannabis has rumbled 
on ever since  the  drug was  first prohibited. But it  is finally nearing its  end 
point. Support for a punitive prohibitionist approach is waning rapidly, 
while globally, support for pragmatic reform has passed a tipping point 
in mainstream political and public opinion.
Cannabis  is  the  world’s  most  widely  used  illicit  substance.  The  United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates, probably 
conservatively, that  183  million  people use it  worldwide  each year.1 Retail 
expenditure on  the  drug  is  valued  at  between 40  and 120  billion  Euros,2 
providing a lucrative, untaxed income stream for criminal profiteers.
Nearly a century ago cannabis, along with other drugs, was identified as 
an ‘evil’, a threat to be fought in a winnable war that would completely 
eradicate the non-medical use of these substances. The experience of 
1 UNODC (2016) 2016 World Drug Report. www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_
web.pdf
2 Kilmer, B. and Pacula, R. (2009) Estimating the size of the global drug market: A demand-side approach, 
RAND Corporation. www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR711.html.
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the past 50 years demonstrates that prohibitionist policies have not, 
and cannot, achieve their stated aims.3 Worse still, as even the UNODC 
itself acknowledges,4 these policies are generating a range of disastrous 
‘unintended consequences’. Given how well documented these are, they 
can no longer really be called ‘unintended’ — they are  simply  the  negative 
consequences  of  prohibition. Indeed  the  UNODC’s  own analysis 
demonstrates that it is the drug control system itself that is ultimately 
responsible for most drug related harms — including by creating the 
financial opportunity that enables transnational organised crime groups 
to compete for power with States across the world.
However, rather than focussing on reducing harm to individuals and 
society, fighting the two perceived ‘threats’ - of  drugs  themselves and 
those who  supply them - has  often become an end  in  itself.  This has been 
accompanied by a retreat into largely self-referential and self-justifying 
rhetoric that makes meaningful evaluation, review and debate difficult, 
while positioning those who advocate for change as somehow ‘pro-drugs’. 
As a result we have had a high-level policy environment that routinely 
ignores critical scientific thinking, and health and social policy norms.
The extent of this failure has been chronicled in detail by many hundreds 
of independent and objective assessments by government committees, 
academics, and nongovernmental organisations across the world, over 
many decades.
It is not the aim of this guide to explore this critique, though it is inevitably 
woven into much of the analysis because many of the current risks and 
harms associated with cannabis and cannabis markets are directly or 
3 Werb, D. et al. (2013) The temporal relationship between drug supply indicators: an audit of international 
government surveillance systems, BMJ Open. www.bmjopen.bmj.com/content/3/9/e003077.full.
4 See: UNODC (2008) 2008 World Drug Report, p.212. www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/
WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf; Rolles, S. et al. (2012) The Alternative World Drug Report, Count the Costs 
initiative. www.countthecosts.org; Reuter, P. (2009) The unintended consequences of drug policies, 
RAND Europe, prepared for the European Commission. www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_
reports/2009/ RAND_TR706.pdf.
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indirectly due to prohibition. Aside from the harms associated with the 
mass criminalisation of cannabis users, the lack of market regulation 
under the prohibitionist model maximises the harms associated with 
cannabis use, and by default, abdicates control of the market to criminal 
entrepreneurs.
This guide begins with the premise that not only has prohibition 
failed, but also that, at least for cannabis, this is rapidly becoming the 
consensus view. As a result, the debate has moved beyond whether 
prohibition is a good idea, or whether it can be tweaked and modified to 
work. The reality is that cannabis policy and law is now being actively 
reconsidered in mainstream public, media and political debate in many 
parts of the world, and  numerous real reforms are already underway. 
Almost universally, these reforms are moving away from ‘war on drugs’ 
enforcement models, and towards less punitive approaches to users, with 
a greater emphasis on public health interventions and human rights, and 
now serious exploration of the legal regulation of cannabis production 
and availability.
At the time of writing, around 20 US states have decriminalised cannabis 
possession for personal use5 and 25  have some form of access to medical 
cannabis. In 2012, Washington and Colorado states became the first 
jurisdictions in the world to legalise and regulate cannabis production 
and supply for non-medical use (following state level ballot initiatives), 
followed in 2014 by Alaska, Oregon and the District of Columbia.  Yet 
more  US states  are set to follow suit, including California, the world’s 7th 
largest economy.  In  2013, Uruguay’s  government became the first nation 
state  to establish a legally regulated  cannabis market  (see Cannabis 
regulation around the world, p.252), followed in 2015 by Canada, the 
first G7 country to legalise. Similar developments are underway across 
the globe:
5 Enforcement responses and penalties vary from state to state, but typically, decriminalisation means no 
arrest, prison time, or criminal record for the first-time possession of a small amount of cannabis for 
personal use; In most cases these offenses are treated like a minor traffic violation.
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• Decriminalisation  of  cannabis possession is  increasingly  common,6 with 
multiple jurisdictions now also including provisions for cannabis social 
clubs and home growing (see p.65 and p.68)
• A range  of  municipal  and  state-level initiatives are challenging national 
governments to explore regulation models. For example in Mexico 
City,7 Copenhagen in Denmark,8 and more than 60 municipalities in the 
Netherlands9
• The debate  is  opening up  across  the world including in the Caribbean,10 
South Africa,11 India and Morocco12
Clearly the situation is evolving rapidly, and policy makers will need to 
monitor and  incorporate lessons learnt. Wider reforms are also being 
discussed on the international stage, as other nations, particularly in  Latin 
 America, call for  alternative  approaches to  simply prohibiting all drugs. 
In  a  joint declaration at  the 2012 UN  General  Assembly,  the presidents 
of Guatemala, Colombia and Mexico formally urged the UN to review 
the current drug control system and, “analyse all available options, including 
regulatory or market measures”. As a result of these calls, the UN held a 
General Assembly Special Session in April 2016 to review responses to 
‘the world drug problem’‘ . The  UN Secretary-General supported this process, 
6 Eastwood, N., Fox, E., and Rosmarin, A.  (2016) A quiet revolution: drug decriminalisation in practice 
across the globe, Release. http://www.release.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf/publications/A%20Quiet%20
Revolution%20-%20Decriminalisation%20Across%20the%20Globe.pdf
7 Grillo, I., North America’s Largest City Moves to Legalize Pot, TIME, 14/10/13. world.time.com/2013/10/14/
north-americas-largest-city-moves-to-legalize-pot/.
8 Stanners, P., Life after cannabis prohibition: The city announces its ambitions, Copenhagen Post, 15/03/13.
www.cphpost.dk/national/life-after-cannabis-prohibition-city-announces-its-ambitions.
9 de Graaf, P.(2013) ‘Burgemeesters werken aan manifest voor legalisering wietteelt’, Volkskrant.nl. http://
www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/3565577/2013/12/20/Burgemeestersmanifest-
voorlegalisering-wietteelt.dhtml
10 Caribbean 360, High time CARICOM discuss legalising marijuana — Gonsalves, 10/09/13. www.
caribbean360.com/index.php/news/st_vincent_news/1012640.html#axzz2i43wED5H.
11 Dolley, C., SA plan calls for study on legalising dagga, IOL News, 06/08/13. www.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/sa-plan-calls-for-study-on-legalising-dagga-1.1558530#.UmD_aBDm-Sp.
12 Karam, S., The green shoots of recovery? Morocco considers the legalisation of marijuana cultivation, 
TheIndependent, 29/0713. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-green-shoots-of-recovery-
morocco- considers-the-legalisation-of-marijuana-cultivation-8737155.html.
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urging member States to: “use these opportunities to conduct a wide-ranging and 
open debate that considers all options.”13  While this event did not ultimately 
find a way for the international drug control system to accommodate the 
growing calls from member states for reform, regulation was advocated 
in the General Assembly by nine member states, and the issue dominated 
much of the satellite discussions.  
This  high-level political  shift  was  also  reflected in  the  groundbreaking  2013 
report from the Organization of American States, which recommended 
the decriminalisation of personal drug possession and use, and noted on 
the cannabis legalisation question that, “Sooner or later, decisions in this area 
will need to be taken”.14 Most significantly, it mapped out a credible route 
through which cannabis regulation could be explored at domestic and 
UN levels15 (see Cannabis and the UN drug conventions, p.211).
This updated guide is needed, not just because the legalisation and 
regulation debate has moved from the margins to the political mainstream, 
but because it has now moved from theory to reality. We, as policy 
makers, concerned citizens, or reform advocates have a responsibility to 
make sure it is done in the right way, and achieves the aims we all seek.
Aims and principles of effective 
cannabis regulation
Clear policy principles and aims are essential both for developing policy, 
and for evaluating its impacts to facilitate future improvement. Yet these 
have often been absent in both cannabis and broader drug policy, replaced 
by vague aims like ‘sending out the right message’, or lost in simplistic ‘tough 
13 United Nations, Secretary-General’s remarks at special event on the International Day Against Drug Abuse 
and Illicit Trafficking New York, 26/06/13. www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=6935.
14 Organization of American States (2013) The Drug Problem in the Americas, p.104, www.oas.org/
documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf
15 Organization of American States, op. cit.
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on drugs’ populism: ‘Drugs are evil — therefore we must 
fight them’.
When aims have been outlined they have often 
reflected the ideological or political preoccupations 
of prohibitionists, meaning they are overly focused 
either on catching and punishing users and dealers, 
or on reducing or even eliminating use (often with 
specific reference to achieving a ‘drug-free world’) 
- the  key  aim  to  which  all  others have historically 
become subservient.16
The moral question also looms large in drug policy 
debates. A simplistic understanding of illicit drug use 
as fundamentally immoral, or even ‘evil’, provides all the justification 
many need for a punitive enforcement response. We argue there is a key 
distinction between moral judgements on individual private conduct, 
and moral policy and law making.17 Ultimately, our goal is to present 
and explore a range of policies and measures that minimise the potential 
harms and maximise the potential benefits associated with cannabis, both 
on a personal and societal level. Transform has referred to this pragmatic 
approach as the ‘ethics of effectiveness’.18
To some,  the  legal  regulation  of  cannabis  may appear radical.  But  the 
legal and historical evidence demonstrates that, in fact, it is prohibition 
that is the radical policy. The legal regulation of drug production, supply 
and use is far more in line with currently accepted ways of managing 
health and social risks in almost all other spheres of life. So, far from 
being radical, this guide simply proposes that we extend established 
16 For other individuals or political groupings, the aims of drug policy are different again — often serving 
political, populist, geopolitical or other agendas entirely. For discussion, see Rolles, S. et al (2014), Ending 
the War on Drugs: How to Win the Global Drug Policy Debate, Transform/MUCD. www.tdpf.org.uk.
17 Ibid.
18 Rolles, S. (2009) After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation, Transform. www.tdpf.org.uk.
Poster from the 1988  
UN General Assembly  
Special Session on the  
World Drug Problem
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Foundations
principles of risk management to an area where they have rarely been 
applied. The principles of effective regulation outlined in the box below 
are adapted from  those used  by  the  New  Zealand  Government, but  are 
similar to those used by most governments, and are a good starting point 
for discussion.
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How do we know regulations are fit for purpose19
Proportionality
The burden of rules and their enforcement should be proportionate to the benefits 
that are expected to result. Another way to describe this principle is to place the 
emphasis on a risk-based, cost-benefit regulatory framework and risk-based 
decision-making by regulators. This would include that a regime is effective and 
that any change has benefits that outweigh the costs of disruption.
Certainty
The regulatory system should be predictable to provide certainty to regulated 
entities, and be consistent with other policies (in this case for example — alcohol 
and tobacco regulation). However, there can be a tension between certainty and 
flexibility.
Flexibility
Regulated entities should have scope to adopt least cost and innovative 
approaches to meeting legal obligations. A regulatory regime is flexible if the 
underlying regulatory approach is principles or performance-based, and policies 
and procedures are in place to ensure that it is administered flexibly, and non- 
regulatory measures, including self-regulation, are used wherever possible.
Durability
The principle of durability is closely associated with flexibility; the regulatory 
system has the capacity to evolve to respond to new information and changing 
circumstances. Flexibility and durability can be two sides of the same coin; a 
regime that is flexible is more likely to be durable, so long as the conditions are in 
place for the regime to ‘learn’. Indicators of durability are that feedback systems 
are in place to assess how the legal/policy framework is working in practice; 
decisions are reassessed at regular intervals and when new information comes 
to hand; and the regulatory regime is up-to-date with technological change, and 
external innovation.
Transparency and Accountability
Reflected in the principle that rules development and enforcement should be 
transparent. In essence, regulators must be able to justify decisions and be subject 
19 Adapted from: New Zealand Government (2012) The Best Practice Regulation Model: Principles and 
Assessments, p.9. www.treasury.govt.nz/economy/regulation/bestpractice/bpregmodel-jul12.pdf.
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to public scrutiny. This principle also includes non-discrimination, provision for 
appeals and sound legal basis for decisions.
Capable Regulators
Means that the regulator has the people and systems necessary to operate 
an efficient and effective regulatory regime. A key indicator is that capability 
assessments occur at regular intervals, and are subject to independent input or 
review.
Appropriate Weighting of Economic Objectives
Economic objectives are given an appropriate weighting relative to other 
specified objectives. These other objectives could be related to health, safety 
or environmental protection, or consumer and investor protection. Economic 
objectives include impacts on competition, innovation, exports, compliance costs 
and trade and investment openness.
Transform has also explored the specific aims of drug policy over the 
past few years,20 and we propose the following six key aims for cannabis 
policy:
• Protecting and improving public health
• Reducing drug-related crime
• Improving security and development
• Protecting the young and vulnerable
• Protecting human rights
• Providing good value for money
Each of these key aims has sub-aims, many of which this guide explores 
in more detail. And to be useful for policy making and impact evaluation, 
aims need meaningful and measurable performance indicators attached 
to them.
The six key aims are presented in no particular order, and their ranking will 
depend	on	the	needs	and	priorities	of	a	specific	jurisdiction	˛	for	example,	
20 For more in-depth discussion see Transform’s major publications online at www.tdpf.org.uk.
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reducing the impact of illegal cannabis farming on environmentally 
sensitive areas, or reducing racial disparities in criminal justice outcomes. 
As discussed on p.43, determining the balance of conflicting priorities 
is an important factor in shaping the precise contours of any regulatory 
framework. Furthermore, any jurisdiction introducing a new framework 
for cannabis regulation will inevitably be working within a set of 
constraints specific to their locale. They will need to:
• Meet any requirements of the process that led to implementation. For 
example, the authorities implementing models in Washington and 
Colorado were bound by the wording of the ballot initiatives that 
mandated them
• Negotiate the local legal and policy environment. For example, in the US 
cannabis remains illegal at the federal level, placing major restrictions 
on	state-level	regulators	˛	no	US	state-owned	production	or	retail	is	
possible because that would require government employees to break 
federal law. In Spain, the cannabis social club model has had to comply 
with the domestic decriminalisation policy (requiring non-profit 
production and supply), and avoid breaching UN treaty commitments
• Fit with a wide range of existing laws and regulations for other drugs 
or	risky	products	or	activities	˛	such	as	those	governing	poisons,	
medicines, or driving
• Fit with cultural and political norms. For example, in the US there is 
greater hostility towards government intervention in markets than in 
many other countries
• Be realistic economically. If the regulatory requirements are too costly 
to implement, the model will be unsustainable
 27A Practical Guide
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• Be feasible politically. For example, the need to assuage hostility from 
the public, political opponents, and neighbouring countries has shaped 
the	development	of	Uruguay»s	more	restrictive	government-controlled	
regulatory model
It is important at this point to be clear that legal regulation is not a ‘silver 
bullet’ or panacea for ‘the drug problem’. It will not eliminate problematic 
or harmful cannabis use, nor will it entirely eliminate the criminal market. 
Prohibition cannot produce a drug-free world; regulatory models cannot 
produce a harm-free world. Legal regulation seeks to reduce or eliminate 
the harms created or exacerbated specifically by prohibition and the 
resulting illicit markets. It is therefore useful to distinguish between 
the aims of drug policy reform (essentially reducing or eliminating the 
harms relating to prohibition, primarily the criminalisation of users and 
the criminal trade21) and the wider aims of an effective drug policy post-
prohibition (minimising the harms relating to drug production, supply 
and use, and maximising health and wellbeing).
Approaches to cannabis policy post-prohibition will be fundamentally the 
same as policy for alcohol, tobacco and other drugs; the aims of policy 
and the regulatory tools for achieving them are identical. It will become 
increasingly important to see cannabis within the bigger picture of drug 
policy making, not isolated or in some way a ‘special case’. The ongoing 
process of establishing effective regulation models for cannabis markets 
is naturally mirrored by the process of improving regulation models for 
alcohol	and	tobacco	˛	and	it	is	of	course	both	consistent	and	logical	to	
advocate for both (see graphic and discussion below, p.29).
To meaningfully address the wider challenges of cannabis or other drug 
misuse requires improving public health education, prevention, treatment 
and recovery, as well as action on poverty, inequality, social exclusion 
and discrimination. But by implementing regulatory models based on 
21 For a detailed consideration of these policy-related harms see www.countthecosts.org
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clear and comprehensive 
policy aims and principles, 
by removing political and 
institutional obstacles, and 
by freeing up resources for 
evidence-based public health 
and social interventions, legal 
regulation can potentially create a more conducive environment for 
achieving improved drug policy outcomes in the longer term.22 So reform 
can not only reduce prohibition harms, but also create opportunities and 
benefits.
This guide focuses specifically on the market regulation dimension of 
cannabis policy. While there are clear implications and overlaps with 
prevention, education and treatment, these important policy areas are 
not dealt with in any detail.
A spectrum of policy options available
As Figure 1 23 and the table below show, there is a spectrum of legal/
policy frameworks available for regulating the production, supply 
and use  of  non-medical psychoactive  drugs -  in  this  case, cannabis.  At 
 one extreme are the criminal markets created by absolute prohibition, 
moving through less punitive prohibition models, partial/de facto/quasi-
legal supply models, legally regulated market models with various levels 
of restrictiveness, to legal/commercial free markets at the other extreme.
The question is, what kind of regulation model will most effectively 
achieve the policy aims of any given jurisdiction?
22 See Rolles, S. et al (2014), Ending the War on Drugs: How to Win the Global Drug Policy Debate, 
Transform/MUCD. www.tdpf.org.uk.
23 Adapted from an original concept by John Marks.
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At either end of this spectrum are effectively unregulated markets. The 
models advocated in this guide are based on the proposition that both 
of these options are associated with unacceptably high social and health 
costs because  those  in  control  of  the  trade - legal  or  illegal - are motivated 
 almost exclusively  by  profit.  Between these extremes exists  a range of 
options for legally regulating different aspects of the market in ways 
that can minimise the potential harms associated with cannabis use and 
cannabis markets - while  maximising  potential  benefits.
Given the reality of continuing high demand for cannabis, and the 
resilience of illicit supply in meeting this demand, the regulated market 
models found in this central part of the spectrum will best be able to 
deliver the outcomes we all seek. Contrary to the suggestion that such 
reform is ‘liberalisation’, drug market regulation is a pragmatic position 
that involves introducing strict government control into a marketplace 
where currently there is little or none.
clear and comprehensive 
policy aims and principles, 
by removing political and 
institutional obstacles, and 
by freeing up resources for 
evidence-based public health 
and social interventions, legal 
regulation can potentially create a more conducive environment for 
achieving improved drug policy outcomes in the longer term.22 So reform 
can not only reduce prohibition harms, but also create opportunities and 
benefits.
This guide focuses specifically on the market regulation dimension of 
cannabis policy. While there are clear implications and overlaps with 
prevention, education and treatment, these important policy areas are 
not dealt with in any detail.
A spectrum of policy options available
As Figure 1 23 and the table below show, there is a spectrum of legal/
policy frameworks available for regulating the production, supply 
and use  of  non-medical psychoactive  drugs -  in  this  case, cannabis.  At 
 one extreme are the criminal markets created by absolute prohibition, 
moving through less punitive prohibition models, partial/de facto/quasi-
legal supply models, legally regulated market models with various levels 
of restrictiveness, to legal/commercial free markets at the other extreme.
The question is, what kind of regulation model will most effectively 
achieve the policy aims of any given jurisdiction?
22 See Rolles, S. et al (2014), Ending the War on Drugs: How to Win the Global Drug Policy Debate, 
Transform/MUCD. www.tdpf.org.uk.
23 Adapted from an original concept by John Marks.
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It is interesting to note how many governments that strongly resist 
the legalisation and regulation of cannabis are, nonetheless, moving 
towards this graphic’s centre ground - in particular adopting less punitive 
approaches towards users, and emphasising public health interventions 
and treatment-based alternatives to incarceration. This ‘gentler prohibition’ 
approach is most prominent in recent rhetoric from the US Government, 
which claims it represents a ‘middle way’ between the ‘extremes’ of 
‘legalisation’ and a ‘war on drugs’. While this line of argument relies on 
misrepresenting the reform position with numerous straw man arguments, 
the fact there is even rhetorical movement towards the centre can be seen 
as positive change, perhaps of a prohibitionist regime on the defensive, or 
of one preparing for the inevitable concession to regulatory logic at some 
point soon.
This tussle over who occupies the pragmatic middle ground between 
advocates of ‘gentler prohibition’ and advocates of pragmatic regulation is 
likely to remain a defining feature of the debate in the coming years. The 
reality is that this tussle indicates how most people in the debate are, in 
fact, nearer to the centre, and to each other, than the polarised caricatures 
of much media debate might suggest. We hope that this guide can be a 
useful tool for constructively bringing some on the prohibitionist side of 
the fence into the debate by asking, ‘If we do move towards regulation, how 
do you think it should function?’24 We have already witnessed this kind of 
‘not if, but how’  engagement in  the  US  Federal  Government’s  response to 
the Washington and Colorado initiatives, effectively granting permission 
to proceed as long as the regulations are sufficiently strict (e.g. no sales 
to minors).25 
24 How to constructively engage with opponents in the debate is explored in Transform/MUCD’s 2014 
publication Ending the War on Drugs: How to Win the Global Drug Policy Debate, available at www.tdpf.
org.uk.
25 Cole, J. M. (2013) Memorandum for all United States Attorneys, US Department of Justice, Office of the 
Deputy Attorney General. www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
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Legal regulation of cannabis markets:  
what it is and isn’t
Historically, the drugs debate has been characterised by the imprecise or 
inconsistent use of key terms, inevitably leading to misunderstandings 
and myths about what is in reality being advocated by proponents of 
drug policy reform. For a clear sense of what the legal regulation of 
cannabis markets could look like, it is therefore necessary to clarify some 
of the terminology commonly used to describe options for reform.
In much of the debate on drug policy, ‘decriminalisation’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘legalisation’ or ‘legal regulation’. Yet these terms 
mean very different things. While it has no strict legal definition, 
decriminalisation is generally understood to refer to the removal of 
criminal sanctions for certain offences26 - usually  the  possession  of small 
quantities of currently illegal drugs for personal use. However, civil or 
administrative sanctions, such as fines or treatment assessments often 
remain. So the possession of drugs  remains  a  punishable  offence - albeit 
one that  no longer attracts a  criminal record. By  contrast, any  form of 
 legalisation and regulation necessarily entails the removal of all types 
of  penalty - criminal  or  administrative - for  production, supply  and 
possession  that takes place within the parameters of the regulatory 
framework. Activities that take place outside any regulatory framework, 
such as sales to minors, are still subject to punitive sanctions.
There is also a distinction to be made between de jure and de facto 
decriminalised or legally regulated drug control systems. Under a de jure 
model the respective policies are implemented through specific reforms to 
the law. Under a de facto model, the same policies are enacted through the 
non-enforcement of criminal laws that technically remain in place. In the 
Netherlands, for example, the possession and retail supply of cannabis is 
26 In the US, the term is sometimes used more narrowly to mean that you can no longer go to prison for a 
particular offence — but it is still deemed a criminal infraction or misdemeanour (this describes some of the 
US ‘decrim states’).
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still prohibited under law, yet is de facto legal, given it is tolerated within 
the licensing framework of the country’s cannabis ‘coffee shops’.
Finally, while they are inherently related, it is useful to differentiate 
between the terms ‘legal regulation’ and ‘legalisation’.  Legalisation is merely 
a  process -  essentially, of making  something illegal, legal. Legal regulation, 
on the other hand, is the end point of this process, referring to a system 
of rules that govern the product or behaviours in question. Consequently, 
just calling for the legalisation of cannabis alone could reasonably be 
mistaken as a proposal for precisely the sort of commercial free market 
that Transform and most drug policy reform advocates do not support. 
‘Legally regulated cannabis markets’ or ‘legalisation and regulation’ are more 
useful descriptive terms.
Summary of cannabis regulation models
•	 Combinations	of	these	policy	models	are	possible	˛	for	example,	
Uruguay and Colorado have parallel provisions for licensed retail and 
personal cultivation, and Uruguay additionally permits cannabis social 
clubs alongside licensed legal production and sales
• These models are ordered from the most to the least restrictive
• Within each model there remains considerable variation in the detail 
of the policy, and how it is or could be implemented and enforced in 
different jurisdictions 
For a comparison of specific jurisdictions’ regulation models from around the 
world see the table on p.252. 
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1  Prohibition of all production, supply and use
Penalties for violations of prohibitions can vary dramatically, from fines, formal 
warnings and cautions, through to criminal prosecutions and incarceration, and in 
extreme cases, use of the death penalty for trafficking
Examples
This has been the default system for most of the world for more than 50 years27
Pros Cons
• Argument is made that 
prevalence of use is 
reduced or contained 
through combination 
of deterrent effect and 
restricted availability. 
There is, however, little 
evidence to support 
either of these claims
• Continued prohibition in the face of high or 
growing demand incurs substantial financial costs 
throughout the criminal justice system (CJS)
• Creates and fuels a criminal market, and leads to 
mass criminalisation of users
• Government forfeits any ability to regulate key 
aspects of the market, or to generate tax revenue 
• Millions consume unregulated products of 
unknown safety and quality
27 Murkin, G., (2016) , Will drug use rise? Exploring a key concern about decriminalising or regulating drugs. 
Transform http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/will-drug-use-rise-exploring-key-concern-
about-decriminalising-or-regulating
27
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2 Legal production and supply for medical use only
Prohibition on production for non-medical use is maintained, but production and 
access for medical uses is legal, usually under a regulated prescription model. 
Available products range from herbal cannabis to cannabis preparations and 
extracts. For more on medical cannabis regulation see p.195 
Examples
25 US states,28 Canada, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Israel, Colombia,  
Chile and others
Pros Cons
• Allows patients 
access to potential 
medical benefits 
of cannabis or 
cannabis products
• Facilitates research 
into medical uses 
that may otherwise 
be hindered
• Same as model 1 above
• Potential for confusion and tensions between medical 
and non-medical regulatory systems, particularly while 
wider non-medical prohibitions remain in place
Inadequate regulation of medical models can:
• Create potential for leakage into non-medical supply 
(seen as a positive by some people)
• Lead to sub-standard medical advice for patients, and 
poor quality control of medicinal cannabis products
28 Updates on the number of states that have legalised cannabis for medical use are available here: 
medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881.
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3 Prohibition of production and supply —  
with decriminalisation of possession for personal use
Maintains prohibition on production and supply but removes criminal penalties for 
possession of small quantities for personal use. Thresholds for personal possession 
vary, as do non-criminal penalties (that usually include confiscation), and can 
additionally include fines, mandatory treatment screenings, or other penalties.  
Policy can be de facto or de jure
Examples
16 US states,29 various Latin30 and European countries31 (some cannabis only — 
some all drugs), and others around the world32
Pros Cons
• Reduces costs across 
the CJS
• Removes stigma of 
criminality from users
• Can facilitate public 
health interventions 
by redirecting CJS 
expenditure, and 
removing a barrier that 
deters problematic 
users seeking help
• Does not address harms associated with criminal 
market and may potentially facilitate some forms of 
market-related criminality
• If inadequately implemented, can lead to more 
people coming into contact with the CJS (particularly 
where enforcement budgets are linked to revenue 
from fines)
• Non-criminal sanctions may still be disproportionate. 
• Non-payment of fines may lead to criminal sanctions, 
particularly for low-income populations, potentially 
exacerbating racial disparities in law enforcement
29 Definitions of decriminalisation vary — for details on individual states see: http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/
item/states-that-have-decriminalized.
30 For updates see: www.druglawreform.info/en/country-information.
31 For updates see: www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index5174EN.html.
32 For a comprehensive summary see: Rosmarin, A. and Eastwood, N. (2016) A quiet revolution: drug 
decriminalisation in practice across the globe, Release. http://www.release.org.uk/publications/drug-
decriminalisation-2016.
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4 Prohibition of production and supply — with decriminalisation 
of possession for personal use, and some retail sales
As above, but with additional decriminalisation and licensing model for commercial 
retail sales, and/or premises for sale and consumption. Supply to retail outlets 
continues to be illegal
Examples
• Dutch ‘coffee shop’ model
• Some localised informal models in European cities, Australia and East Asia
Pros Cons
• Reduces illicit market sales and 
related problems
• Allows for regulation of outlets and 
vendors
• Allows for limited regulation of 
products
• Generates tax revenue from profits 
and staff earnings and corpoate 
profits (although not from sales taxes 
on products)
• Separates cannabis consumers from 
illicit market for more risky drugs
• The ‘backdoor problem’ — 
production and supply to the 
Dutch ‘coffee shops’ is via illicit 
market. Criminality associated 
with this market remains
• Inability to tax products which 
remain nominally illegal
• Inconsistencies between the law 
and policy practice/objectives
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5 Prohibition of production and supply — with decriminalisation 
of small-scale personal cultivation and cannabis social clubs
Extends decriminalisation of personal possession to tolerate personal cultivation 
of plants for personal use, with a maximum permissible number usually defined 
(typically between 1 and 10 plants). Has also led to membership cannabis co-ops or 
‘cannabis social clubs’ (CSCs) in which groups of users delegate their ‘allowance’ to 
a grower who then supplies the group members within a self-regulated non-profit 
co-op framework (see p.65)
Examples
• Personal cultivation is tolerated or allowed in, among other places, Belgium, Spain, 
the Netherlands, and Switzerland
• Personal cultivation and cannabis social clubs are tolerated in some regions of 
Spain, and on a smaller scale in Belgium and Switzerland (some of the emerging 
US state legal regulation models have incorporated provisions for small scale home 
cultivation, and Uruguay has additionally established a CSC model in parallel with a 
licensed retail model)
Pros Cons
• Reduces size of 
illicit trade and 
associated harms
• Removes need 
for some users to 
interact with the 
illicit market
• Difficult to enforce 
regulation of 
personal cultivation 
• Informal CSCs within a decriminalisation model lack 
legal basis or legislated regulatory framework to ensure 
best practice
• As the CSC model expands, maintaining effective 
self-regulation and non-profit ethos becomes difficult 
without more formal controls
• Some potential tax revenue from retail sales may be 
forfeited with home growing
• Restricts access to those with growing facilities or 
particular social networks and access to CSCs, so may 
discriminate against certain marginalised populations
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6 Regulated legal production and supply —  
entirely under government monopoly
Production and supply is legalised and regulated, but all aspects of the market are 
established as a government monopoly, with commercial actors prevented from 
entering the legal market.
Examples
• Government monopolies on alcohol — such as the Russian Government’s 
monopoly on vodka until 1992 — set a precedent
• Chinese Government maintains a virtual monopoly on tobacco production/retail
• Most remaining tobacco and alcohol examples involve a government monopoly on 
only part of the market — see box 7
Pros Cons
• Allows for strict regulation of 
outlets, vendors, and products
• All revenues and profits accrue 
to the government, and also 
generates tax revenue from staff 
earnings
• Profits generated by government 
monopolies have the potential to distort 
government policy priorities
• Potential for market distortions and 
negative consequences if models are 
overly restrictive or do not adequately 
meet demand (in terms of either quantity 
produced or range of products available)
• Requires enforcement against unlicensed 
sales outside the monopolistic market
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7 Regulated legal production and supply for non-medical use —  
with a mix of commercial and government monopoly elements
Legal, regulated commercial market, but with a government monopoly on certain 
elements of the market — most likely at the retail stage.
Examples
• Various examples in alcohol33 and tobacco control models
• Uruguay’s model of legal cannabis regulation
• Borland ‘Regulated Market Model’ (see p.57)
Pros Cons
• Potential benefits of commercial activity and 
competition in parts of the market
• Allows government to maintain complete 
control over aspects of the market where 
particular risks are identified, and mitigate 
problems, e.g. over-commercialisation
• Generates government revenue from 
taxation
• For monopoly elements, see 
problems above
• Risk of over-commercialisation 
where competition is allowed
• Risk of problems related to 
commercial industry lobbying
33 Examples include: ‘Systembolaget’ in Sweden, ‘Alko’ in Finland, ‘Vínbúð’ in Iceland, ‘Vinmonopolet’ in 
Norway, ‘SAQ’ in Quebec, Canada, and the ‘LCBO’ in Ontario, Canada
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8 Regulated legal production and supply for non-medical 
use — licensed producers and/or licensed vendors
Regulated commercial market model comparable to many that already exist for 
alcohol and tobacco. Detail of the licensing and regulatory framework can vary 
widely in terms of controls over products, vendors, retail outlets, marketing, and 
access to markets 
Examples
• Various alcohol and tobacco control regimes
• Colorado and Washington’s cannabis regulation models
Pros Cons
• Allows for potential benefits of commercial 
activity
• Maintains ability of government to intervene 
in key aspects of the market and reduce the 
risks of over-commercialisation
• Taxation allows a degree of government 
price control as well as revenue generation
• Risk of over-commercialisation 
(and rising use/health harms) 
if regulation of retail sales and 
marketing is inadequate
• Risk of problems related to 
commercial industry lobbying
9 Free market model
Largely unregulated legal market, or ‘supermarket model’, in which products are subject 
only to basic trading standards and product controls similar to those that exist for 
foods or beverages. Vendors may provide additional self-regulation 
Examples
• Regulation of caffeine products
Pros Cons
• Minimal regulatory 
costs
• Minimal government 
interference with 
commercial freedoms
• Competition likely to 
drive down prices for 
consumers
• Relies on self-regulation by vendors, and experience 
from unregulated alcohol and tobacco markets 
suggests profit-motivated entities are unlikely to act 
in the best interests of public health and wellbeing
• Increased risk of over-commercialisation and 
emergence of ‘big tobacco’-type industry
• Falling prices and unregulated marketing could lead 
to increased or irresponsible use and health harms
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Learning from the successes and failings 
of alcohol and tobacco regulation
Alcohol and tobacco are the most widely used legal drugs,34 and the policy 
responses around the world range from absolute prohibitions, through 
various regulation models, to unregulated free markets. As a result, they 
provide invaluable lessons for developing effective cannabis regulation 
models - a  running theme  throughout  this  guide.
While there are key similarities, there are also important differences 
between alcohol, tobacco  and cannabis -  regarding their  effects,  risks, the 
way they are used, and the evidence supporting current and proposed 
policy  interventions - which are worth  noting when  trying  to  transfer 
lessons between the policy experiences of these drugs.
One important distinction between reform of alcohol and tobacco 
regulation and attempts to regulate currently illegal drugs is that policy 
development is starting from a very different place.
A recurring issue in alcohol and tobacco policy literature is the conflict 
between public health policy and alcohol and tobacco industries as 
commercially driven entities. This raises concerns for cannabis policy and 
law reform. Commercial alcohol and tobacco producers and suppliers 
are profit-seeking entrepreneurs who see their respective markets from 
a commercial rather than a public health perspective, primarily because 
they rarely bear the secondary costs of problematic use.35 Quite  naturally, 
their primary motivation - and their legal fiduciary duty in many countries 
- is  to  generate the highest  possible  profits. This  is  most readily achieved 
by maximising consumption, both in total population and per capita 
terms, and by encouraging the initiation of new users. Public health 
34 Apart from perhaps caffeine.
35 The 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement in the US is one example of this happening. http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tobacco_Master_Settlement_Agreement.
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issues only become a concern when they threaten to affect sales, and will 
invariably be secondary to profit maximisation goals.
Both  industries  have  tried  to  concede as  little market  control to regulators 
as possible. The situation with tobacco has changed significantly in 
some countries, less so with alcohol. So for alcohol and tobacco, policy 
makers are trying to ‘reverse-engineer’ appropriate or optimal regulatory 
frameworks onto already well-established and culturally embedded legal 
commercial markets, against the resistance of well-organised, large-scale 
commercial lobbying.
By contrast, for most jurisdictions cannabis offers a blank canvas; an 
opportunity to learn from past errors, and replace criminal markets 
with regulatory models that are built on principles of public health 
and wellbeing from the outset, without a large-scale legal commercial 
industry resisting reform or distorting priorities. There are exceptions; 
most obviously the US states with more established medical cannabis 
markets, participants in which have sometimes welcomed regulation 
as necessary for their survival, yet on other occasions have opposed it 
where it threatened their commercial interests.
In Figure 1 (p.29), recent alcohol and tobacco regulation reforms mean 
moving away from the more commercial market end of the spectrum 
(on the right of the x-axis), and towards the optimal regulatory models 
in the centre. It is therefore entirely consistent to call for improved or 
increased regulation of alcohol and tobacco, as well as the legalisation 
and regulation of cannabis (and/or certain other currently illegal drugs). 
This is about applying the same evidence-led public health and harm 
reduction principles to all drugs, and developing the most appropriate 
level of regulation for each. This convergence in regulatory approaches 
between cannabis and alcohol and tobacco is already well underway, and 
will undoubtedly be a defining theme of the drug policy discourse in the 
coming years.
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Getting the balance right
A key theme to emerge from this discussion is the conflicting priorities 
that often arise as decisions are made when developing and implementing 
a cannabis regulation model for any given locale. In particular, the need 
to strike the right balance between the interests of commerce (that seeks 
to increase profits - and  so will  err  towards  promoting  use and products 
with the highest profit margins)  and public health-based regulation  (that 
seeks to  minimise  harms - and  so  will err towards moderating or reducing 
use). Depending on the way the market is structured,  policy makers 
should manage the involvement of commercial entities to harness their 
benefits - in terms of investment and innovation - while preventing or 
moderating the potential costs - most obviously in terms of negative 
public health externalities. 
This tension will need to be dealt with during the formulation of any 
model of cannabis regulation, with the overall degree of government 
intervention in the market, as well as issues such as licensing, pricing 
and taxation, all requiring negotiation and compromise. If the model is 
too restrictive - for  example, if  prices  are  too  high or  products are  not 
sufficiently  available  when sought - demand  will  not be  met through 
legal channels adequately, and opportunities for a parallel illegal trade 
will increase, with all its attendant harms. On the other hand, if the model 
is not restrictive enough, commercialisation could lead to significantly 
increased levels of use, and opportunities to intervene in the market 
and minimise potential harms may be limited or non-existent. Such 
regulatory failings are likely to have the most severe consequences for 
the most vulnerable in society.
A familiar example of the tensions between commercial and public health 
priorities, and the level of restrictiveness, is provided by tobacco pricing 
and taxation policy. Evidence shows increasing prices can help reduce use, 
particularly among young people. At the same time, however, increasing 
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prices also incentivises tobacco smuggling and counterfeiting that avoids 
tax and undercuts legitimate retail sales.
There is the potential, indeed the likelihood, that cannabis regulation 
models will be substantially more restrictive than those that currently 
exist for alcohol and tobacco. This is already the case in Washington 
and Colorado (partly because their initiatives are ‘islands’ of reform 
amid neighbouring prohibitionist states), and even more so in Uruguay. 
Some may feel this is somehow ‘unfair’, especially given the relative 
health harms of the  three  drugs. But  it  is  more useful  to  view emerging 
cannabis regulation  as  an opportunity to demonstrate best practice 
in drug control. If an evidence-based and public health-led approach 
to cannabis regulation is shown to be effective, it may have a positive 
knock-on effect by informing and accelerating improvements in alcohol 
and tobacco control, as well as creating useful precedents for other drugs 
that may be legally regulated in the future.
There  is  obviously no  perfect solution in a situation such  as this - it  is  a 
matter of balancing priorities, seeing what works, staying flexible and 
making responsible, informed choices based on a rational and ongoing 
evaluation of costs and benefits. However, to reiterate: the history of 
tobacco and alcohol control suggests that it is, initially at least, wise to 
err on the side of being overly restrictive, rather than face a struggle to 
tighten inadequate regulation after it has been implemented and become 
embedded. 
Moving forward given what we 
know, and what we don’t know
While there are vital lessons to be drawn from experiences with alcohol 
and tobacco control, as well as the rapidly growing body of evidence 
from cannabis policy innovations around the world, there remains a 
great deal we do not know about cannabis regulation. The proposition 
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of	developing	a	fully	functional	regulatory	model	˛	for	most	jurisdictions	
effectively	from	scratch	˛	is	highly	unusual	 in	social	policy	and	almost	
unique in drug policy. Any policy innovation has a degree of intrinsic 
unpredictability and will carry risks. But from what we know already, 
we can reasonably anticipate and mitigate against nearly all of these risks. 
As when developing any public policy, progress should involve informed 
experimentation, evaluation, and a willingness to be flexible and respond 
intelligently to both successes and failures. 
As discussed, the most obvious risk is that of over-commercialisation and 
the undermining of public health goals by profit-motivated commercial 
activity. This observation has informed much of our thinking in this guide 
and we make no apology for the interests of private profit not featuring 
highly on our list of priorities. We believe drug policy should serve the 
interests of public health and wellbeing, not business.  If  the  two can 
 complement  each other - and it is entirely possible they can - then fine. 
But if there is one message policy makers should take from this guide, it 
is to ensure the core regulatory decision-making power stays with the 
public health authorities, not business people or those who represent 
them. The record of self-regulation by business is at best patchy even 
for ordinary products. And drugs, even lower risk drugs such as cannabis 
- are not ordinary products. The unique challenges drugs present justifies 
a different, and greater level of government 
intervention - particularly given the novelty 
of  legal cannabis markets at this early stage, 
and our relative lack of knowledge about 
their functioning and impacts. 
There are no perfect solutions, and there 
will always be challenges to be addressed, 
not least as the policy environment changes 
with time. It is, however, also a unique 
opportunity to set the standards for a new 
If there is one message 
policy makers should 
take from this guide it 
is to ensure the core 
regulatory decision-
making power stays with 
public health authorities, 
not business people
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drug policy paradigm as we emerge from the practical and ideological 
failings of the prohibitionist era.
Key conclusions and recommendations
•     There  is  a  balance to  strike between the urgency of  implementing 
reforms and the risks of moving too hastily. The steps forward that 
any jurisdiction takes will depend on the nature of the existing market, 
policy frameworks, and social and political environment. Early adopters 
will doubtless face different challenges to those that come later. There is 
no one-size-fits-all approach, and no silver bullets
•     Relevant  authorities should establish an  independent  commission  of 
domestic and international experts to identify key issues, and make 
broad recommendations on reforming cannabis policy, and the shape 
of any new regulatory models. Expertise should come from a broad 
range of fields, including: public health, drug policy, international and 
domestic law, legal cannabis production and regulation, agriculture, 
environmental science, and monitoring and evaluation. This expert 
group can then evolve into a dedicated task force to oversee and make 
recommendations on the detail of policy and its implementation
•     Meaningful and  measurable  performance indicators should  be 
established for all aspects of the market and its functioning. Impact 
monitoring and evaluation should be adequately resourced and built 
into the  regulatory  framework from  the  outset.  Wider impacts - such 
as changes in prevalence or patterns of cannabis use (particularly 
problematic use and use among young people), levels  of  crime, 
expenditure and  revenue - should  also be evaluated on an ongoing basis. 
Such monitoring should be used to ensure  policy -  and in  particular  any 
 policy changes - are  subject to regular review, and that the flexibility 
and willingness exists to adapt approaches in light of emerging evidence
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•     There should be  adequate institutional capacity to  ensure compliance 
with regulatory frameworks, once they are established. This will require 
trained and experienced staff, management and oversight, and sufficient 
budgets for regulatory agencies. Given all the areas cannabis regulation 
will touch on, either an existing agency will need to coordinate between 
all relevant government departments, or a new umbrella body will need 
to be created
•     There is a range of reforms that can be undertaken within the 
parameters  of  existing international law - including decriminalisation 
of personal possession and use with provisions for home growing 
and cannabis social clubs (see p.65 and p.68). Such measures can be 
implemented relatively easily, and even if their positive impacts are 
more modest, they demonstrate a political will to embrace reform, do 
not carry a significant regulatory burden, and are supported by a useful 
and growing evidence base
•     When a jurisdiction is willing or able to negotiate the existing hurdles of 
international law (see Cannabis and the UN drug conventions, p.211), 
the priority at the outset should be to meet adult demand as it currently 
exists. That means a legal market that approximately mirrors the 
existing illegal market in terms of product range, price and availability. 
A level of government intervention and market control to ensure this 
is possible is a minimum requirement. Any major departures from this 
model are likely to have unpredictable, potentially negative impacts. 
Changes to the market, for whatever reason, should be introduced 
incrementally and closely evaluated
•     As a  starting  point, err on  the  side  of  more restrictive  models, and  a 
greater  level  of  government  control - then move forward on  the  basis of 
careful evaluation, aiming to move to less restrictive or interventionist 
models once new social norms and social controls around legal 
cannabis markets have been established. From a pragmatic and political 
perspective, this is preferable to the reverse scenario of needing to 
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retroactively introduce more restrictive controls due to inadequate 
regulation
•     For jurisdictions where a more  sophisticated illicit  cannabis market 
does not exist, there is no urgency to introduce an extensive menu 
of cannabis  products  and  services  at  the outset -  opt  for  functional 
retailing of a relatively limited range of quality controlled products that 
approximately mirror the current illicit market. Consider development 
of a more diverse market consisting of concentrates, edibles, and on-site 
consumption venues once the core retail market has bedded in and 
been evaluated. Edibles are easy to prepare at home, and home growing 
and cannabis social clubs can cater for more specialised demand in the 
meantime
•     A  particular focus of  restrictive  controls  should  be  at the retail end from 
the  outset -  with the  key  aim  being to  meet demand in a  way that does 
not encourage use, but is not so restrictive, or off-putting, that it creates 
avoidable opportunities for a parallel illicit trade. Retail outlets should 
be functional but unintimidating, with pharmacies offering a useful 
model. On-site consumption venues need to provide a welcoming and 
pleasant environment - but controls can  still focus on  external  signage 
and appearance, and on the point of sale within the venue
•     Where it  is  politically and legally feasible, a ban  on  all  cannabis 
marketing, advertising, branding and sponsorship should be the default 
starting point of any regulatory regime, and should be complemented 
by prevention and education measures aimed at curbing potential 
increases in harmful use. Where a comprehensive ban is not viable, 
restrictions on such activities should be as stringent as possible 
•     More intensive  government control - or even  direct  government 
control or  ownership, where feasible -  may be  required  at  retail  level, 
to eliminate or restrict commercial incentives to increase or initiate 
cannabis use, or use of more risky preparations.  Limiting the scale 
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 of  individual businesses  may help prevent the emergence of overly 
powerful commercial interests with the capacity to distort policy 
priorities
•     Moves towards  more  effective  cannabis  regulation  should  be  part 
of  a  wider process  of  reforming existing  approaches to other drugs 
- both legal and illegal. This is likely to mean increased regulation 
of alcohol and tobacco markets as a greater consensus emerges on 
what constitutes optimal drug regulation. The rationale for regulating 
cannabis will also need to be applied to some other currently illegal 
 drugs  in  the  future - this wider debate should  not  be  avoided
 
Foundations
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of regulation
a Production
Challenges
• Guaranteeing  product  quality  through appropriate  testing, evaluation 
and oversight of production processes
• Ensuring the security  of  production processes to  prevent leakage to 
unregulated illicit markets
• Managing  commercial  activity  and  links between  producers and the  
rest of the supply chain
Analysis
• There  are  a range  of  existing  legal and  quasi-legal production  models, 
operating at various scales, from which lessons can be learned
• Risks  associated with over-commercialisation are  a  concern  at  the 
production level, so producers should be included in comprehensive 
marketing controls
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• Production  limits  can  help  minimise the  risk  of  diversion to  the illicit 
market (although if set too low can incentivise illicit production to 
meet demand). Applied to individual producers they can also prevent 
the emergence of monopolies or overly large commercial entities with 
excessive lobbying power
• Home  growing  for  personal  use  is  difficult  to  regulate  and police,  but 
experience suggests will result in only relatively minor challenges. The 
majority of users will prefer the convenience of legal retail outlets
• Regulation  of  home growing should  aim to prevent  unlicensed for-profit 
sales, and prevent underage access to the crop
• Cannabis  social clubs  represent  a  small-scale, de facto legal model of 
production and supply that has been proven to operate largely non-
problematically
• Cannabis social  clubs provide  lessons  that  can  inform the  development 
of future regulatory models and, given that they do not appear to breach 
UN treaty commitments, may be a useful transitional model that policy 
makers can implement before more formal legal production systems are 
put in place. However, such clubs could equally operate alongside more 
formal production systems post-legalisation
• Expanding  domestic cultivation  in  jurisdictions that legalise  and regulate 
will have impacts on traditional producer regions and their economies. 
As well as reductions in criminality and corruption, there will inevitably 
be reductions in income and economic opportunities for some already 
marginalised populations 
 
Recommendations
• Ensuring  quality  control and the security  of  production  systems can  be 
achieved using  measures  that  are already  in  place in  several  countries’ 
existing medical cannabis markets, and US non-medical markets
• Tracking systems  that monitor  cannabis  from ‘seed to sale’ should be 
employed in order to identify any instances of diversion
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• Production  by  private  companies  is  best  managed when they are 
producing the drug for retail by separate, strictly regulated outlets that 
are not under their ownership
• Cannabis  social  clubs should be  formally regulated, and promoted  as 
 a  small-scale  combined production and supply model, due to their 
relatively closed membership policies and not-for-profit ethos
• Home growing of  cannabis  for personal  consumption should  be 
subject to age restrictions and production limits, although the inherent 
challenges associated with policing home growing mean these 
requirements will mostly act as a moderating influence, rather than a 
strict control
• The development impacts of  cannabis reforms for  traditional producer 
regions should not be  forgotten - the question of  how negative  impacts 
can be minimised must feature more prominently in the reform 
and development debate, particularly that which takes place in key 
consumer markets
There are already a significant number of well-established businesses 
producing plant-based drugs including extensive production of cannabis 
for both medical and (more recently) non-medical use, within existing 
regional, national, and global legal frameworks. These functioning models 
suggest cannabis production for non-medical use will mostly require the 
expansion and adaptation of existing regulatory controls, rather than the 
development of new ones.
While managing the production of cannabis appears relatively 
straightforward, there are still key concerns that must be taken into 
account if regulation is to be effective. As with the production of 
pharmaceutical drugs, the main aims should be to ensure the quality and 
safety of the cannabis produced, and to ensure the security of production 
systems in order to limit diversion to illicit markets. Existing regulation 
of cannabis for both medical and non-medical use offers a range of 
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examples of how these aims can be achieved, all with varying degrees of 
government involvement and success.
As noted earlier, there will often be other restrictions on what regulatory 
frameworks it is possible to implement in a given jurisdiction, in terms of 
what is acceptable socially, culturally, economically and politically. For 
example, in the US, the ongoing tensions between state-level cannabis 
legalisation initiatives and federal-level prohibition have meant that it 
was not possible to set up a state-owned production (or retail) model, 
because that would have effectively required the relevant state employees 
to violate federal law.
Licensing
The way in which cannabis production is licensed, and the mechanisms 
by which production is linked to supply, are foundational elements 
of any regulatory framework. Depending on the licensing system in 
place, production can be highly restricted, to a single or small number 
of companies or agencies, or essentially be open to any willing market 
participant that fulfils certain criteria.
The process put in place in Colorado initially required that any cannabis 
sold for non-medical use had to be grown in accordance with the state’s 
 existing model of  medical  cannabis production. That  meant that for 
the first year of the new regulatory system, production licences were 
only granted to those able to also supply the drug at retail level. This 
so-called ‘vertical integration’ means sellers and producers are part of the 
same company.  As  per  the  state’s  medical cannabis model,  outlets  were 
required to produce at least 70% of what they sell, and were forbidden 
from selling  more  than  30%  of  what they produce  to other  outlets.
Linking  production and supply operations in this way  has been justified 
on the basis that it minimises the number of transactions in the supply 
chain, simplifying regulatory oversight and making it easier to track 
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cannabis from ‘seed to sale’, thereby reducing the risk of its diversion to 
the illicit market. In reality, it still requires transfers that need tracking 
between producers and retailers, even if they are owned by the same 
company.
Vertical integration permits private commercial activity, but also (in 
theory at least) puts certain limits on competition and commercialisation 
by favouring larger, better-established businesses that have the substantial 
resources necessary to manage both production and supply.
However,  under frameworks  such as  Colorado’s,  in  which the  state acts 
as a regulator of private enterprise, rather than a market participant itself, 
vertical integration of production and supply may prove overly restrictive, 
and could have negative consequences in the long term. By giving 
preference to economies of scale, a policy of vertical integration runs 
the risk of creating an industry with substantial marketing and lobbying 
power. While having an influential industry that can competently make 
the case for effective regulation is a good thing, industry lobbying should 
not be allowed to reach a scale where it can lead to the weakening 
of regulatory controls purely to facilitate profit-making, as has been 
witnessed historically in the alcohol and tobacco industries.
Perhaps illustrating this point, one of the main driving forces behind 
the vertical  integration  requirement in  Colorado was the  state’s existing 
medical cannabis industry. The rationale behind this was that, having been 
subject to  the  70/30 rule  for several  years, and having already invested 
in the cultivation spaces and equipment needed to establish combined 
production and supply operations, medical cannabis outlets seeking to 
enter the non-medical market did not want to face competition from new 
entrants who had been unencumbered by these requirements. However, 
extending  the  70/30  rule in this way  went  beyond  levelling  the playing 
field. It actually created a major barrier for new entrants, giving existing 
medical cannabis companies a crucial year to establish themselves in the 
market.
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In direct contrast to Colorado, licensing laws in Washington were 
established with the express intention of avoiding a concentrated market 
dominated by only a few large, key players. The state has implemented 
three licensing tiers - production, processing  and  retail.  Any person or 
business may hold no more than three production and processing licences, 
and producers or processors are not allowed to hold any retail licences. 
Multiple-location licensees are also not permitted to possess more than 
33%  of  their licences in  any one county.  Washington and Colorado’s 
contrasting models will provide valuable lessons on the best way forward. 
It is notable that in 2014 the 70/30 requirement in Colorado was dropped 
and vertical integration became optional. 
In the Netherlands, too, limited licensing and the separation of production 
and  supply  are  features  of  the country’s  medical cannabis  regulations. A 
private company, Bedrocan BV, is currently the sole licensed producer 
of cannabis,36 while the national government’s Office for Medicinal 
Cannabis is the sole purchaser and has a monopoly on supply, distributing 
the cannabis through registered pharmacies.
Uruguay’s legislation also required a similar separation of production and 
supply under its regulatory framework for the non-medical use of cannabis. 
Production licences have been granted to two private companies (so far) 
which then sell the cannabis to the government as the sole purchaser at a 
fixed price, for it then to be sold via the designated pharmacies.
Whatever the potential range of cannabis producers permitted by a 
given regulatory system, the awarding of production licences should 
obviously be carried out in accordance with the basic elements of 
standard licensing procedures used in other industries. These typically 
involve, among other things, health and safety inspections of business 
premises, compliance with all the relevant environmental laws and 
36 This is only the current situation; there is no specified limit on producers, and there has previously been a 
second producer.
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regulations, and credit and criminal record checks on prospective 
licensees. With regard to criminal record checks, there will clearly be 
an important debate about what should or should not prevent someone 
from obtaining a licence. For example in the US, the potential for unjust 
racial disparities in past arrests for drug offences leading to equally unjust 
outcomes in the marijuana industry’s licensing process is already an issue. 
 
The Borland ‘Regulated Market Model’
Recent debate in response to the historic public health failings of tobacco policy 
has generated proposals for a new regulatory model that could also potentially 
be applied to cannabis or other drugs. Professor Ron Borland has proposed what 
he calls the Regulated Market Model (see Figure 2, overleaf), which is built on the 
assumption that smoked tobacco is not an ordinary consumer product.
Even when used as directed, tobacco is both highly addictive and significantly 
harmful to personal health. It follows that any commercial marketing, which aims 
to increase tobacco consumption and thus profitability, will inevitability lead to 
unacceptable increases in health harms.
Responding to this, the proposed model would maintain legal access to adults 
but eliminate any incentives for profit-motivated efforts to increase consumption. 
Under the model, there would be no scope for tobacco companies to create 
even more addictive products, or to employ marketing or other techniques to 
promote tobacco use among existing or new consumers. It would establish a 
regulatory body, a Tobacco Products Agency (TPA), to act as the bridge between 
manufacturers and retailers.
The TPA would take complete control over the product, managing the types of 
products available, their production, packaging and any potential marketing activity. 
Competitive commercial interaction would still occur at point of production, and 
point of supply. Tobacco producers would compete to supply the TPA with raw 
materials, while retailers would profit from selling tobacco products within a 
licensed vendor framework.
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By removing the opportunity for private companies to maximise tobacco use and 
thus profits, the TPA would therefore be in a position to pursue public health 
goals by managing and possibly reducing consumption (See Figure 2). Uruguay’s 
system of legal cannabis regulation is essentially based on this Regulated Market 
Model. It has the benefit of maintaining commercial competition at the production 
and retail stages, but puts a responsible government agency in control of key 
elements of the cannabis market.
Regulated Market Model
Tobacco Products Agency
• establishes tobacco as a 
controlled substance
• meets a demand
• determines packaging (generic)
• controls promotion
• sets conditions for sale
• controls price
• incentivises harm-reduced 
products (to both make and use)
Manufacturers/
importers
Distribution to 
retail agency
Users
Figure 2 Adapted from: Borland, R. (2003) A strategy for controlling the marketing of tobacco products:  
a regulated market model, Tobacco Control, Vol.12, No.4, pp.374–382.
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Quality control
Quality and safety testing protects  consumers from the health risks 
associated with adulterated or contaminated cannabis, and from the 
risks of consuming cannabis of unknown or unreliable potency. It should 
therefore be a strict licensing condition for producers.
In the US, the medical cannabis industry has historically been largely self- 
regulating when it comes to quality control and consumer safety issues, 
with mixed results. Due to the ongoing conflict between federal and state 
laws governing medical cannabis, no central authority such as the Food 
and Drug Administration or Department of Agriculture has been charged 
with ensuring that adequate testing of cannabis takes place.
Despite passing laws to legalise cannabis for medical use, most states have 
not followed up with legislation requiring testing for levels of pesticide, 
mould, bacteria or other microorganisms that can be harmful to health.37
Nevertheless, while regulation would be preferable, and seems both 
necessary and inevitable in the longer term, the relatively rapid growth 
of the medical cannabis market in states that have legalised has enabled a 
level of competition to develop, meaning that vendors whose products do 
not meet quality standards will lose customers to other, better regulated 
competitors. A significant online community of medical cannabis users 
also does its part to encourage quality control, with websites such as 
leafly.com and WeedMaps.com allowing users to post reviews of 
dispensaries and highlight instances of bad practice.
Regulators developing the non-medical cannabis markets in the US have 
made testing a more central part of the trade than it currently is in much 
of  the  country’s medical cannabis  industry. Washington’s  regulations, for 
example, oblige every licensed cannabis producer and processor to submit 
37 Some have done so, such as Massachusetts and Nevada
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representative samples of their cannabis and cannabis-infused products 
to an independent, state-accredited third-party testing laboratory on a 
schedule determined by the state liquor control board. If these samples 
do not meet standards adopted by the board, the entire lot from which 
the sample was taken must be destroyed. Producers are also required 
to make provisions for testing in order to establish the potency (THC 
concentration) of all their products, and this must be clearly marked on 
all packaging. (For more on potency, see p.114.)
Obviously any testing requirement will impose costs on producers. 
Different laboratories in the US charge different rates for their services, 
however the average price for the necessary safety and potency testing 
is in the region of several hundred dollars per sample. At the upper 
end of the price range, for example, one of the most well-established 
testing laboratories  in  California charges  $520 per  test , $120 for  THC/ 
CBD/cannabinol levels, $100 for a microbiological screen, and $300 
for a pesticide screen.38 Although these costs may seem high, they are 
easily offset by the profits producers accrue from the cannabis grown, 
and constitute a tiny percentage of total costs and turnover. Furthermore, 
testing costs are likely to decline as legal production expands and testing 
technologies evolve.
The Netherlands provides an example of more formal quality and safety 
regulation, with medical cannabis production conducted in accordance 
with European Good Agricultural Practice criteria to ensure consistent 
quality and potency. As part of this process, an independent laboratory 
also tests the cannabis for moisture content, unwanted substances such 
as heavy metals, pesticides or microorganisms, and to establish the levels 
of active ingredients. Similar testing requirements exist in Canada, where 
medical cannabis producers must ensure that testing follows technical 
38 Caulkins, J. P. et al. (2011) Design considerations for legalizing cannabis: lessons inspired by analysis 
of California’s Proposition 19, Addiction, Vol. 107, pp.865–871. http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~maccoun/ 
CaulkinsEtAl_DesignOptions_andCommentaries2012.pdf.
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specifications listed in the national Food and Drugs Act, and the limits 
they prescribe for levels of microbial and chemical content.
Such existing examples from around the world provide a useful guide 
as to the level of testing that will be required under any system of legal 
cannabis regulation. More extensive testing will, however, be required of 
any edible cannabis products that are made legally available, as they will 
need to meet additional quality and safety criteria that exist for standard 
food products.
Security
Some cannabis producers will inevitably attempt to increase profits by 
diverting part of their inventory to a parallel illicit market for untaxed 
sales that undercut licit-market prices.
Secure and properly monitored production systems can help minimise 
the risk of such activity, and should therefore be a licensing condition 
for cannabis producers, with clear penalties for violations. The high unit- 
weight value of cannabis may also make it a target for theft, necessitating 
further security measures. Although ensuring security requires what are 
essentially common sense regulatory controls, the extent of both the 
risks faced, and what measures are financially viable, will vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
For example, under a new system of medical cannabis regulation coming 
into force in Canada, when prospective producers apply for a licence 
from  the  country’s  health  department,  they  must  demonstrate that:39
• Their production site  is  indoors, and  not  in  a  private  dwelling
39 Health Canada (2012) Backgrounder — Safety and Security Requirements for Licensed Producers. http://
www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/_2012/2012-193bkc-eng.php.
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• The  production site includes  restricted-access  areas, which  would include 
all areas where a licensed activity is conducted with marihuana/ cannabis 
(i.e. lab, production room, etc.)
• Access  to  the production  site  is  controlled at  all times,  and includes  24/7 
visual monitoring systems and an intrusion detection system to detect 
unauthorised access
• Key  personnel  hold  a valid  security clearance, issued  by  the  Minister  of 
Health
• They  have provided  a  written  notification of  their  application, 
 providing details regarding the location of the production site, to 
the local police force, local fire authority and local government 
 
The requirement that production be conducted indoors may be appropriate 
in some localities, but will be overly restrictive in most. Stealing, transporting, 
drying and processing any significant number of cannabis plants will 
be less appealing than targeting processed products. More importantly, 
there is no obvious reason why outdoor growing areas, or other, movable 
facilities such as greenhouses or polytunnels, could not be adequately 
secured and monitored in order to prevent diversion. For example, 
 Washington’s  non-medical  cannabis  regulations permit outdoor growing 
facilities, provided they are properly fenced off and have surveillance 
systems in place. Furthermore, given that it does not require high-intensity 
lighting, outdoor production has the significant advantage of producing 
dramatically fewer negative environmental costs than indoor production. 
 
With regard to monitoring, Colorado has produced a comprehensive set 
of regulations requiring video surveillance of areas where production/
cultivation, weighing, packaging, and preparation for transportation all 
take place. Adding another level of oversight, producers (and retailers) must 
also use a state-created online inventory tracking programme to record the 
journey their cannabis takes from harvest to sale. The programme employs 
radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology commonly used by 
many commercial enterprises to track their products and manage their 
inventories. This more sophisticated security measure complements more 
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prosaic requirements such as minimum standards for door locks and alarms. 
 
Under any system of legal cannabis regulation, the overall level of security 
required will be determined by the extent of any problems that emerge, 
but erring on the side of caution at the outset and reviewing the situation 
once cannabis markets have been established seems the sensible course.
Production limits
Washington has taken the step of imposing a state-wide limit on the 
amount of space that can be used for cannabis production.40The limit is 
set at  2  million  square  feet  (equivalent  to  roughly 35  NFL football  fields), 
and prospective producers must apply for licences based on the planned 
size of their production operation. There are three production tiers for 
which licences can be awarded:
• Tier 1: Less than 2,000 square feet
• Tier 2: 2,000 to 10,000 square feet
• Tier 3: 10,000 to 30,000 square feet 
 
The decision to limit production in this way was taken with a number 
of aims in mind. Firstly, the intention was to minimise the risk that the 
US Federal Government would object to the new regulatory system 
being put in  place.  The  US  Department  of  Justice  had previously made 
it clear that the size of an operation would be a significant factor in 
deciding whether to initiate federal law enforcement. However, there 
are also a number of other intended benefits:
• To  reduce the financial incentive and opportunities  to  divert cannabis 
for sale into out-of-state illicit markets
40 Washington State Liquor Control Board (2013) Proposed Rules Highlights. www.liq.wa.gov/publications/
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• To  potentially  constrain  the consumption  levels  of  heavy users41
• To limit the marketing and political power of larger producers 
 
While these are all laudable aims, and production limits may prove to be an 
effective means of achieving them to at least some degree, as always there 
is the potential for undesired outcomes. If licit production is restricted to 
the point where a substantial demand is not met, profit opportunities will 
appear for illicit producers, frustrating one of the key goals of  the policy 
(this  could   be  a  particular  problem  with  the  US  states’ models if there 
is substantial purchasing by residents from neighbouring states that do 
not permit a legal supply of cannabis). In addition, although production 
limits help prevent the concentration of power among a small group 
of companies, they also ensure that production is diffuse and variable, 
which may mean an increased regulatory burden. Finally, production 
limits based on the size of growing operations may, in the absence of 
potency limits, lead producers to prioritise growing high-potency (and 
therefore high-value) cannabis, as they attempt to maximise the profits 
that can be made from their available production space. (For more on 
potency, see p.114) A THC-based production quota system may therefore 
be a more effective way of limiting production than a size-based one.42 
As with most aspects of cannabis regulation, a balance between positive 
and negative outcomes will need to be struck when designing production 
limits, and the system must include both ongoing evaluation, and the 
ability to change as new evidence emerges.
Smaller-scale production
Conducted in the absence of formal licensing systems, smaller-scale 
cannabis production occurs in a number of developing countries including 
41 The idea behind this potential effect is that by preventing over-production (and a resultant fall in prices), 
production limits will constrain the spending power – and therefore consumption levels – of heavy or 
dependent users, who are typically more price-sensitive. For more, see Kleiman, M. A. R. (2013) Alternative 
Bases for Limiting Cannabis Production, BOTEC Analysis, UCLA. www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/ 
BOTEC%20reports/5e_Alternative_Bases_for_Limiting_Production-Final.pdf.
42 For more on how such a system could work, see Kleiman, M. A. R., op. cit..
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India, Vietnam and Cambodia, where the product is grown much like 
any other medium-value herbal product. These markets, usually based 
around traditional use of lower-potency cannabis, appear to exist largely 
non-problematically in a quasi-legal policy space.
Cannabis users in Spain, too, have exploited a legal grey area of the 
country’s drug laws by establishing so-called ‘cannabis social clubs’ 
(CSCs). The clubs are relatively self-contained and self-regulating entities, 
historically operating on a not-for-profit basis to produce cannabis for 
registered club members.
   Spain’s cannabis social clubs43
• The clubs take advantage of the Spanish decriminalisation law that 
tolerates limited cultivation cannabis plants for personal use. Club 
members allocate their personal allowance to the club, which then 
grows the pooled allocation of plants and supplies club members from a 
designated venue
• Currently the clubs operate under a voluntary code of practice established 
by the European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies (ENCOD).44 
Although there has been a high level of compliance with the code from the 
country’s several hundred clubs, it has no legal standing
• Clubs are run on a not-for-profit basis and all revenue generated is 
reinvested back into the running of the clubs. However, concerns have 
been expressed about the emergence of some newer clubs that appear to 
be moving away from the original non-profit ethos45
• As with all other associations and organisations in Spain, cannabis social 
clubs are legally obliged to be listed in a local registry, with founding 
members subject to background checks
43 Murkin, G., (2016) ‘Cannabis social clubs in Spain: legalisation without commercialisation’ Transform 
http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/cannabis-social-clubs-spain-legalisation-without-
commercialisation
44 ENCOD (2011) Code of Conduct for European Cannabis Social Clubs. www.encod.org/info/CODE-OF-
CONDUCT-FOR-EUROPEAN.html.
45 Barriuso Alonso, M. (2012) Between collective organisation and commercialisation: The cannabis 
social clubs at the cross-roads. www.druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/3775-between- collective-
organisation-and-commercialisation.
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• Membership is granted only upon invitation by an existing member who 
can vouch that the individual seeking to join is already a cannabis user
• The quantity of cannabis to be cultivated is calculated based on the 
number of expected members and predicted levels of consumption
• Cultivation is overseen by sufficiently experienced volunteers or paid staff
• In some clubs, members ‘sponsor’ a specific cannabis plant, from which 
they take their supply
• Distribution is conducted on the club’s premises, where members are 
encouraged to consume within designated areas. This is to promote 
planned usage and minimise the risk of a member’s supply being re-sold 
on the illicit market or diverted to a non-member
• Daily personal allowances of, on average, 3 grams per person are set as a 
way of encouraging responsible levels of use and limiting the quantity of 
cannabis that can be taken away for consumption off-site (and possibly 
diverted to the illicit market)
• Clubs pay rent, tax, employees’ social security fees, corporate income tax, 
and in some cases VAT (at 18%) on cannabis products sold
The Dutch city of Utrecht, and a number of other municipalities, have 
been seeking to experiment with the CSC production model46 to solve 
the so-called ‘back-door problem’ in the Netherlands, whereby retail sales of 
cannabis for non-medical use are effectively  legal (the drug can leave the 
country’s  coffee shops via  the front door), but production and cultivation 
(i.e. the supply chain that leads up to the back door) remain prohibited. 
The local government has asked for an exemption from Dutch drug laws 
that would  allow  it  to establish a closed-membership  CSC consisting  of 
100 people who wish to produce the drug for personal consumption. The 
Utrecht club proposal  is intended to complement rather than replace 
the coffee shops, and is specifically aimed at eliminating criminal 
involvement in the supply chain, and avoiding the potential health risks 
posed by cannabis that has been produced without any quality controls.47
46 Bennett-Smith, M., First Cannabis Cultivation Club Reportedly Forms in Dutch City of Utrecht, 
The Huffington Post, 12/09/13. www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/11/cannabis-cultivation-club-
utrecht_n_3909025.html
47 Rolles, S., (2016) ‘Cannabis policy in the Netherlands: moving forwards not backwards’ p. 165 in ‘The 
Alternative World Drug Report 2nd Edition’ Transform www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/
alternative-world-drug-report-2nd-edition
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While the largely self-regulating nature of CSCs means there are 
variations in how they are run, the general principles on which most of 
them are based suggest this model could be a safe and pragmatic option 
for policy makers looking to make the transition to legally regulated 
cannabis markets. CSCs have the advantage of not being  prohibited 
under the UN drug treaty system,48 as they are essentially an extension 
of the decriminalisation of personal possession/cultivation. They can 
therefore potentially be put in place before more formal commercial 
markets are established in countries that while unwilling to breach their 
treaty commitments, do not want to wait for treaty reform. (For more 
details, see Cannabis and the UN drug conventions, p.211)
Given that CSCs are run on a not-for-profit basis and are bound by 
production limits that are linked to the number of members they admit, 
they have no incentive to increase consumption or initiate new users 
in the way that commercial producers or retailers do. Additionally, the 
relatively closed membership policy of many CSCs means that while 
existing cannabis users have safe access to the drug, the initiation of new 
users is restricted. While this is a potentially positive feature of the CSC 
model, care needs to be taken to ensure that this does not lead to unfair 
discrimination against non-residents or those who are not part of local 
social networks.
The CSC model of production and supply could easily be more formally 
regulated in line with the informal measures outlined above, and many 
CSCs are now calling for such increased regulation. The problem, as it 
stands, is the clubs’ quasi-legal status, which excludes them from effective 
government oversight. This would clearly no longer be an issue if the 
clubs were fully recognised by law as has now happened with CSCs in 
Uruguay, and is being explored by some Spanish regional governments.
48 The UNODC and International Narcotics Control Board have not yet stated anything to the contrary.
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Overall, the CSC model has obvious potential both as a transitional 
system of de facto legal production and supply that could operate 
within a prohibitionist framework, and as an alternative system of de 
jure legal production and supply that could be run in parallel with more 
conventional retail models. If regulated in a way that ensures a genuine 
not-for-profit approach is maintained, CSCs could help moderate the 
risks of over-commercialisation, and potentially meet demand for some 
specialist cannabis products (which might not be available through retail 
outlets) in a controlled environment.
Home growing
      Small-scale cultivation of cannabis for non-medical personal use has been 
tolerated in a number of jurisdictions as part of cannabis decriminalisation 
policies, and has proved largely unproblematic. Provisions for self- 
cultivation have specifically been included in the regulatory models for 
the non-medical use of cannabis that have been established in Colorado 
and Uruguay. A range of jurisdictions (including Colorado) have also 
allowed home growing for medical use for a number of years.
      It makes little practical or legal sense to try to enforce a complete ban on 
self-cultivation for personal use once possession for personal use is legal, 
and legal supply sources have been established. A good case, however, 
can be made for establishing a legal framework that sets parameters 
within which such home growing should be conducted. The aim of such 
a framework would be to limit production for personal use (specifically 
to prevent unlicensed commercial production and for-profit sales) and to 
prevent non-adults from accessing cannabis.
      Limits  on  the  scale  of self-cultivation , either  in  the form  of  a maximum 
number  of  cannabis plants allowed,  or an area  of ground under cultivation , 
have already been adopted (even if informally) in most jurisdictions 
that permit such activity and are a prudent measure that should be 
implemented wherever home growing is made legal. Clearly, home 
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growing should also only  be  allowed  for  those who  meet the  jurisdiction 
 in  question’s age-access threshold.
    The difficulty of policing home cultivation does, however, need to be 
emphasised. The privacy of the home is a right not lightly intruded upon 
in many countries, and there will be reluctance on the part of both the 
state and police to expend significant energies pursuing petty home 
growing violations. A similar reluctance can already be observed in the 
virtual non-enforcement of laws prohibiting domestic alcohol stills, or 
those requiring the payment of duty on home-grown tobacco in many 
countries.
    Similar to home brewing of beer, home growing of cannabis is likely 
to become largely the preserve of hobbyists and connoisseurs in the 
post-prohibition era. As the experience of the Netherlands suggests, if a 
legal retail supply is available, most users will default to the convenience 
and reliability offered by this option, rather than going to the trouble of 
growing their own supply (even if there is an initial surge of interest). In 
this scenario, home growing is likely to remain a minority pursuit and, as 
such, a relatively marginal concern for regulators and law enforcement.
      However, even small scale production limited to less than 10 plants can 
still produce quite significant quantities. A single indoor grown plant can 
easily yield 150g (5oz), and a single outdoor plant, 3 times as much. Such 
quantities still create potentially significant incentives for unlicensed for-
profit sales particularly if legal retail prices remain high - early reports 
from Colorado regulators  suggest this has been a growing challenge. 
Colorado retail prices are currently around $2-300 oz - levels at which 
a single plant can easily yield $1000.  Licensing of home growers is a 
possibility, but is likely to be both bureaucratic and widely ignored in 
the absence of vigorous enforcement, which, as noted, is not a realistic 
prospect either. Imposing a charge for a home growing licence might help 
70  How to Regulate Cannabis:
  Section 2
cover the costs of inspections and enforcement measures, but would also 
incentivise people to ignore it.
      A more pragmatic approach would involve:
• Setting  clear limits on  the scale of  cultivation  permitted,  whether  in terms 
of the number of plants (a figure of around five might be a useful starting 
point for discussion) or the size of the growing area
• Prohibiting unlicensed for-profit  sales (although  some degree of  sharing/ 
gifting of crops is inevitable)
• Establishing an  age restriction (the  same  that  exists  for access  to  retail 
supply)  for home growers, and potentially  also for access  to cannabis 
seeds
• Establishing  growers’  responsibility  to  restrict access to minors.  For 
harvested cannabis this will be the same as the responsibilities of those 
in possession of legally retailed supply (see Child resistant packaging, 
p.119), but presents a bigger challenge for cannabis that is grown outdoors. 
Guidelines could be established for cultivation in spaces not easily visible 
or accessible to children, potentially supported by a system of regulatory 
approval of outdoor growing locations
• Regulating seed markets, potentially through licensing of sales or vendors. 
Regulation could:
• Help disincentivise  the production  and use of  certain higher-
risk  cannabis strains with  high  THC:CBD  ratios (see Strength/
potency, p.114)
• Require vendors  to  have training (so  that  they  can, for example, 
advise growers on potency issues)
• Be used to enforce restrictions on sales to minors
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• Permitting the  home  production  of cannabis  edibles, resin, and 
other concentrates, in line with the constraints listed above 
 
In the absence of a licensed grower model, the enforcement of any laws 
on home growing would inevitably be mostly reactive. Some flexibility 
would be needed (for example, in dealing with the cultivation of 
seedlings in greater numbers than the limit for mature plants), with the 
key concerns being age controls and the prevention of unlicensed larger- 
scale commercial production.
Issues might also arise where multiple users choose to grow in the same 
location, for example in a shared garden, or communal indoor space. In 
this scenario guidelines could be put in place mandating the establishment 
of a more formal cannabis cooperative licence (see above) for sites over a 
certain size or number of plants.
The timing of the introduction of a home growing provision will also 
influence decisions around the regulatory model adopted. If home 
growing is introduced as an element of a decriminalisation model before 
any regulated retail production and supply is established (as has occurred 
in some parts of Europe), then it is likely to prove more popular than 
if the two models are implemented simultaneously (as has happened 
in Uruguay and Colorado). Increased popularity will correspondingly 
intensify any regulatory and enforcement burden, a situation potentially 
worsened by the greater incentive for secondary sales in the absence of 
legal retail alternatives. This might indicate a need for tighter regulation, 
perhaps even licensing of growers, although the relatively unproblematic 
nature  of  home -growing models  where  they have been  implemented, 
whether for medical or non-medical use, suggests they will pose relatively 
minor enforcement issues.
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Production of cannabis for export
Currently, the UN drug conventions prevent a legally regulated export 
trade for non-medical cannabis. However, in the longer term such a trade 
(and changes in the international treaties to allow it) is almost inevitable. 
But,  given  such  a  legal  trade  is  some years  away, this  guide will not 
speculate in detail about how it would be managed, beyond noting 
that there is already extensive experience, both good and bad, from the 
regulation of international trades in all manner of products, that can 
provide lessons on the best way forward.
One area of particular interest is the potential for long-established 
cannabis cultivation regions to continue production under a regulated 
market framework, given demand for some traditionally produced forms 
of cannabis will no doubt continue in consumer countries. If legalisation 
occurs in both producer regions and consumer markets, if international 
transit issues can be resolved, and if the products can meet established 
quality criteria, then there is the possibility that some form of export 
trade could be established. Rather like coffee, cannabis production could 
be subject to fair trade principles, and even some kind of protectionism 
along  the lines  of the EU’s  ‘Protected Designation of Origin’ (PDO), ‘Protected 
Geographical Indication’ (PGI) or ‘Traditional Speciality Guaranteed’ (TSG) 
systems49 could be applied to certain traditional forms of cannabis.
Traditional illicit cannabis production in, for example, Mexico, India, 
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Morocco and Thailand, is  still a major  industry 
that employs significant numbers of people. However, realistically, with 
markets in the developed world increasingly being served by domestic 
indoor production systems, such traditional producer regions are likely 
to witness further significant declines in their cannabis industries as more 
jurisdictions decide to implement models of legal regulation. As a result, 
 the major  positive impacts of  reform on producer regions — such as 
49 See the relevant EU detail here: http://www.ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/.
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reductions  in criminal profiteering, conflict and  instability — need to  be 
weighed against the short to medium-term reductions in GDP that some 
regions may experience, as well as the loss of economic opportunities 
that is likely to be felt by some already marginalised populations. Indeed, 
the involvement of most farmers and labourers in the illicit drug trade is 
in large part driven by ‘need not greed’, their ‘migration to illegality’ primarily 
the result of poverty and limited life prospects.
These negative consequences of reform should not be ignored, and 
measures to counteract them should, where possible, be incorporated 
by domestic and international agencies during the development of 
any new systems of legal cannabis regulation. More conventional 
development interventions will be required for those cannabis producers 
for whom employment in any legally regulated trade is not practically or 
economically viable. Lessons  can  certainly  be  learnt  from the extensive 
experience of so-called ‘alternative development’, which while failing in its 
goal of  reducing illicit  drug production, has, when done well, at  least 
demonstrated how drug crop growers can establish livelihoods outside 
of the drug trade.
Given key consumer countries played a driving role in establishing 
and maintaining the prohibition that created current patterns of illicit 
production, they should also bear some responsibility for funding the 
development interventions that the transition to legal markets will 
require. So a proportion of the ‘peace dividend’ that will arrive with the 
end of the cannabis prohibition (the criminal justice savings plus potential 
cannabis market tax income) could be earmarked for development efforts 
in former cannabis-producing regional economies.
The development consequences of global drug prohibition, the impacts 
of any shifts away from it, and how to mitigate any resulting harms, 
all need to assume greater prominence in the debate around cannabis 
law reform, which has historically tended to focus on the concerns of 
developed-world user countries.
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b Price
Challenges
• Establishing how  regulated markets  will  impact on cannabis prices,  and 
how prices can be effectively controlled
• Estimating what  the likely  impacts  of changing prices will be,  how price 
controls will affect levels and patterns of use, and what effect they will 
have on legal and illegal cannabis markets
• Using  price  controls  to  strike a  balance between  often conflicting 
priorities, such as dissuading cannabis use, reducing the size of illegal 
cannabis markets, displacing cannabis use from or to other drugs, and 
generating revenue from cannabis sales
Analysis
• There  are many ways  in  which  governments  can influence prices: 
through fixed price controls, maximum and/or minimum price controls, 
licence fees, or taxes set either at a fixed rate or at a percentage of value
• Decisions can  be  informed  by  the extensive,  if  imperfect, alcohol and 
tobacco studies literature that has examined the impacts of various 
types of price controls
• Price controls  are a flexible  regulatory  tool , one that  can respond 
relatively quickly to changing circumstances or emerging evidence, and 
also potentially be applied to certain products or in certain localities if 
specific problems or concerns arise
• The  importance  of price  regulation  in  achieving  the aims  of effective 
drug policy warrants a greater level of government intervention than 
that which may be appropriate in other markets
• Production costs for cannabis  will  fall significantly  in  a legally  regulated 
market, meaning that without price controls, retail prices are likely to 
fall significantly below illegal-market prices
• While a  substantial fall in  retail  price  is  likely to  lead to an  increase  in 
total cannabis consumption, reliable estimates of the extent of such an 
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increase are problematic as the price elasticity of demand for cannabis is 
not well established and is likely to vary between different populations 
and different locations
• If  legal-market prices are kept artificially high through government 
intervention, opportunities for a parallel illegal trade to gain a greater 
share of the overall cannabis market will increase, especially if 
production costs fall 
• Higher  prices could  also incentivise home  growing, or  displace cannabis 
use to  other  drugs — in particular alcohol or  synthetic cannabinoids
• Conversely,  lower prices  could displace use  from other drugs , including 
alcohol ,  to cannabis
• Differential price regulation   on  products could encourage  use of safer 
products, and discourage use of more risky products
• Price controls have the disadvantage (compared to taxes) of putting 
money in the hands of vendors, incentivising them to sell more
Recommendations
• At  the outset of  any  new system  of  legal cannabis regulation,  it is 
sensible and cautious to use price controls to set retail prices at or near 
those  found on  the illegal market ; more  significant variations are likely 
to have unpredictable, potentially negative impacts
• Experimentation with price regulation  will be needed,  and should 
 be accompanied by close evaluation and monitoring, as well as the 
flexibility and willingness to alter prices when necessary 
• The  impacts  of  any  price regulation  should  be  evaluated based on 
analysis of a range of variables, such as: levels of cannabis use among 
different populations, patterns of use (in terms of frequency, products 
consumed, using behaviours, and particularly harmful use), the relative 
sizes of parallel legal and illegal markets, the extent of any home 
growing, and displacement from or to the use of other drugs, including 
alcohol
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•  Impact  evaluation  and emerging evidence  should shape  the  evolution 
of regulatory frameworks over time, with local bodies determining how 
best to balance conflicting priorities
• Local experiences with alcohol and  tobacco pricing are likely  to be 
instructive and should therefore inform decisions about where to set 
cannabis prices
Price controls
Under a system of legal regulation, governments will be able to influence 
the price at which retailers can sell cannabis both by imposing fixed costs, 
such as licence fees, and by requiring them to pay the more variable 
costs entailed by satisfying various regulatory requirements, such as 
those outlined in this guide. However, regulators can also intervene more 
directly in the pricing of cannabis, through a range of well-established 
measures that are frequently adopted for other products:
• Direct price fixing: the government specifies fixed prices (which may 
or may not include tax) at which certain products must be sold
• Maximum and/or minimum prices: such prices (which may or may 
not include tax) allow a degree of market flexibility and competition, 
but within fixed parameters defined by government. They can be used 
to  prevent certain price-based forms of marketing  — such as  loss  leaders 
or  two-for-one promotions , as  well as profiteering
• Fixed per unit tax: a tax is imposed that charges a set amount per 
unit of  a given  product , for  example, per  gram.  It can  be  applied  at 
production level, retail level, or both
• Percentage sales tax: a tax is added as  a  percentage of  a  product’s 
sales price
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• Differential pricing: any of the above pricing controls can be applied 
in different ways to different products, or similar products in different 
locations
These pricing control models have all been tried at different times and in 
different places around the world for alcohol and tobacco, so there is a 
useful if imperfect literature from these sources to inform initial decision-
making.50 51  It is clear that interventions on price are a particularly useful 
policy tool, as once a price control infrastructure is established, it allows 
for relatively rapid responses to changing circumstances and emerging 
problems. Price controls are highly flexible and can potentially be targeted 
at specific products, populations of users, types of outlets or geographical 
regions associated with particular concerns. The differential application 
of price controls can also contribute to an incentive-disincentive gradient 
that can help encourage more responsible using behaviours, and the use 
of lower-risk products.
As with alcohol and tobacco, the potential risks associated with the use of 
cannabis mean it is qualitatively different from other consumer products. 
In setting cannabis prices, a level of government intervention beyond that 
which is accepted for many other products is therefore justified.
The simplest broad assumption to transfer from the experiences with 
alcohol and tobacco is that the pricing of drugs follows the same basic 
laws of supply and demand that hold for most consumer products: 
essentially, as price increases, consumption falls, and as price falls, 
consumption increases. Transferring this basic observation into policy is, 
however, far from simple.
The first key observation is that price changes will have different impacts 
on different sub-populations of users. The price elasticity of legal cannabis 
50 Wagenaar, A. C. et al. (2008) Effects of beverage alcohol price and tax levels on drinking: a meta-analysis 
of 1003 estimates from 112 studies, Addiction, Vol. 104, pp.179–190.
51 Gallus, S. et al. (2006) Price and cigarette consumption in Europe, Tobacco Control, Vol. 15, pp.114–119.
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(the degree to which demand changes with price) is, unsurprisingly, 
relatively poorly researched. One US-based estimate tentatively puts it at 
-0.54,  meaning  a 10% decrease  in price  would lead  to a  5.4% increase  in 
consumption.52 Such estimates are acknowledged to be, by their nature, 
rather speculative, since calculations of the price elasticity of a particular 
good or service are typically made with the assumption that while 
monetary price changes, all other  factors  are held constant.  Legalising 
a product that has until that point been prohibited clearly represents 
a significant change in circumstances and is likely to impact on other 
environmental variables , such  as  a  potential  change  in  availability or the 
social acceptance  of cannabis  use , that  could,  independently  of  price, 
affect levels of consumption.53
The price of cannabis in existing illegal markets is determined by the 
interplay of supply and demand in a largely unregulated marketplace. 
In Western markets the illicit cannabis production model is increasingly 
characterised by a large number of small- to medium-sized domestic 
producers. This more localised and flexible production has progressively 
displaced established models of previous decades that involved larger- 
scale production and importation from developing regions such as 
Central America, North Africa or parts of Central and South East Asia.
Compared to alcohol, the cost of either legally or illegally producing 
herbal cannabis (which requires little or no processing) has been 
relatively low as a percentage of final retail price. This means marginal 
changes in production costs can be easily absorbed and have relatively 
minor impacts on market prices. However, illegal-market cannabis prices 
are typically highly inflated, primarily as a result of the risks and costs 
involved in evading law enforcement throughout production, transit and 
sale. Straightforward profiteering is an additional factor that leads to such 
52 Kilmer, B. et al. (2010) Assessing How Marijuana Legalization in California Could Influence Marijuana 
Consumption and Public Budgets, RAND Corporation. www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP315.
html.
53 Ibid
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elevated prices. In essence, the criminal entrepreneurs who populate the 
illegal market will simply maintain prices at the highest possible level 
that consumers are willing to pay. As such, illegal-market prices can 
potentially provide guidance on the point at which legal-market prices 
should be set.
The price elasticity of demand for cannabis is likely to vary significantly 
between  individuals  and  populations.  Below are some  key observations 
on why such variations are probable:
• The  personal  economic burden of an individual’s  expenditure  on drugs, 
relative to their total disposable income, is decisive in determining the 
price elasticity of their demand. If initial prices are sufficiently low and/ 
or if use is moderate/occasional, total spend is likely to be low and 
even a dramatic change in price is likely to have only a marginal impact 
on demand. Conversely, where use is more frequent and total spend 
relative to disposable income is high, price changes are likely to have 
more significant impacts on levels of use. This is certainly the case with 
alcohol and tobacco
• This  assumption  may  be  complicated  where  dependency  is  involved, 
 as a  dependent user’s  need  to maintain their habit can make  their 
 demand less price elastic than that of other consumers. Furthermore, 
significantly increasing prices above pre-regulation levels may have 
unintended consequences for those heavy or dependent users with low 
disposable incomes. They may, for example, engage in fundraising-
related criminal activity54 or reduce their spending on food necessary 
for a healthy diet (also sometimes observed among dependent users of 
alcohol and tobacco)
54 This is a phenomenon often witnessed with heroin and cocaine users, but relatively rarely with cannabis, 
alcohol or tobacco users because total spend is comparatively much lower. The nature of cannabis 
dependency is also relatively less intense.
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• Research  into  alcohol and tobacco markets  suggests that those with 
lower  disposable  incomes , in  particular,  young  people , will generally be 
most affected by price increases that are intended to moderate levels 
of consumption (in other words, their demand is more price elastic). 
Although such price increases can have a positive impact in reducing use 
among young people, they could potentially be seen as discriminatory, 
effectively penalising those on lower incomes
• Changes  in  the  price  of  legal  cannabis  relative to  illegal  cannabis may 
lead to displacement between the two. Similarly changes in the price 
of legal cannabis relative to other products or activities (most obviously 
alcohol consumption) may also lead to displacement between the two. 
These are important but distinct issues
Impact of legal cannabis prices on the illegal market
The price of legally supplied cannabis (inclusive of any government 
interventions) will naturally have an impact on the size of any parallel 
illicit market  that  remains. A key  factor will be  the  relative  price  difference , 
in other words, the ability of the illegal trade to undercut legal prices yet 
remain sufficiently profitable.
The nearer the retail price of legal cannabis is to the cost of bringing illegal 
cannabis to market, the smaller the profit opportunity that exists for any 
parallel criminal trade. However, because the gap between production 
costs and current retail prices is so disproportionately large compared to 
more conventional product markets, even a substantially cheaper legal 
product is likely to offer opportunities for undercutting. Illicit producers 
may have one marginal advantage in not having to comply with any 
production controls that may increase relative costs for legal producers 
(depending on the intensity of regulation). Nonetheless, they will still be 
disadvantaged by the need to incorporate the risk of criminal penalties 
into their costs (depending on the intensity of enforcement), and by the 
economies of scale more readily available to legal enterprises.
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Realism is obviously needed on this front. Legal supply cannot displace 
illegal markets entirely (unless it involves effectively unregulated 
availability at or below cost price) and a parallel illegal market at some 
scale  is  an  inevitability , as  illustrated by the continuing existence of 
parallel illegal markets for alcohol and tobacco. The size of these illicit 
alcohol and tobacco markets varies significantly between jurisdictions, 
with price controls on the legal market being a  key variable. Where 
 cigarette taxes are high, for example in the UK, where tax makes up 77% 
of the packet price,55 the  incentive for smuggled products that avoid such 
charges is significant. Indeed, the latest estimates put the percentage of 
the UK market that is smuggled or counterfeit  at  9% for  cigarettes  and 
38%  for  hand-rolled tobacco.56  By contrast, where there  is very  little tax , 
for  example,  in Andorra , there is little or no smuggling into the country, 
although plenty is smuggled out to neighbouring jurisdictions. The illicit 
alcohol market is generally smaller than that for tobacco, reflecting a 
number of factors. These include the lower profit margins and levels of 
taxation for alcohol (and therefore reduced opportunities for undercutting), 
the greater value added by legal production and sales (people appear to 
be more willing to smoke counterfeit/smuggled cigarettes than drink 
illegally produced alcohol) and the greater challenges of transporting and 
storing heavy liquids compared with tobacco.
This demonstrates that the relative attractiveness of legal and illegal 
products  is  about  much  more  than  just price. Legally  regulated cannabis 
production and sale can confer various forms of added value for consumers, 
for which they will be willing to pay a premium over an illegally produced 
and supplied product. This added value includes: avoidance of illegality 
and lack of contact with criminal markets; guarantees and consistency in 
the quality and safety of the product (supported by accurate packaging 
information); the range of products available (supported by accurate 
55 Action on Smoking and Health (2013) The economics of tobacco, ASH Fact Sheet, p.2. www.ash.org.uk/
files/documents/ASH_121.pdf.
56 National Audit Office (2013) Progress in tackling tobacco smuggling. www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/10120-001-Tobacco-smuggling-Full-report.pdf.
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information on the differences provided 
by a licensed vendor); and, in the case 
of venues that permit on-site cannabis 
consumption, an appealing environment 
in which to consume.
Thus, as with tobacco pricing, a key 
challenge in designing effective cannabis 
price controls is how to reconcile 
the need to dissuade use by keeping 
prices relatively high, with the need to 
disincentivise a parallel illegal trade by keeping prices relatively low. As 
the legal trade matures, the challenge of setting a desired after-tax price 
is complicated by the predictable decline in pre-tax prices over time. 
There is no perfect solution, and a compromise between the rival costs 
has to be struck, guided by local priorities. The disproportionately large 
gap between production costs (illegal or legal) and current illegal market 
prices makes this an even greater challenge in the case of cannabis. It is, 
however, a challenge that can be reduced by using vigorous regulation 
and law enforcement to keep the costs of illicit production and sale 
relatively high and to clamp down on any diversion of legally produced 
cannabis. Emphasising the added value of legally regulated cannabis 
bought and/or consumed in safe, controlled environments is also likely 
to be a useful measure.
Evidence from the Netherlands is instructive here. The popularity of 
the Dutch ‘coffee shops’ , which  is  such  that  many  cannabis  users travel 
from other countries to visit them (see Cannabis tourism p.205) , has 
 meant that they have squeezed out most of the domestic criminal retail 
supply market. The coffee shops have achieved this majority market 
share despite maintaining prices at a level not dramatically different from 
the illicit-market prices found in adjacent countries. According to the 
EMCDDA, in 2011 the  average per-gram  price of  cannabis (resin/herbal) 
 was: € 9.7/€5.9 (imported) or €9.3  (locally  produced) in the Netherlands 
Relative attractiveness of 
legal and illegal products 
is about much more than 
just price. Legally regulated 
production and sale can 
confer various forms of 
added value for consumers, 
for which they will be willing 
to pay a premium
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 (via the coffee shops); approximately €7.5/€8 in  Belgium; and €7.2/€8.9 in 
Germany. Illicit cannabis retailers in the Netherlands have therefore not 
been able to drop prices sufficiently to outweigh the other benefits coffee 
shops offer most purchasers. It is also important to note that rates of 
cannabis use in the Netherlands remain similar to those in neighbouring 
countries.
Displacement effects of relative price changes
The availability and costs of potential substitute drugs, or substitute 
recreational activities, will also be a factor in determining the net impact 
of post-regulation legal cannabis pricing (inclusive of government 
interventions). That displacement of use from other drugs to cannabis 
(if the relative price of cannabis falls), or from cannabis to other drugs 
(if the relative price increases) will occur is a reasonable assumption, but 
one that has historically been poorly researched. Consequently, the 
extent of any such potential impact can only be guessed at within fairly 
wide margins of error.
The most obvious and potentially significant area for such an effect is 
probably displacement between alcohol and cannabis, as their patterns 
of use and effects are relatively similar, and indeed, often overlap 
directly. While there has been some speculation that an increase in 
cannabis use (whether related to a price fall, some other impact of legal 
regulation, or some entirely unrelated variable) would be likely to lead to 
a fall in alcohol use, the existence or extent of any such effect is not well 
established, and is hard to test.57 58 59 There are examples of cannabis and 
alcohol use rising and falling at the same time (therefore not providing 
support for a displacement hypothesis), and, in the US at least, more 
57 Cameron, L. and Williams, J. (2001) Cannabis, Alcohol and Cigarettes: Substitutes or Complements?, The 
Economic Record, Vol. 77, No. 236, pp.19–34.
58 Chaloupka, F. J. and Laixuthai, A. (1997) Do Youths Substitute Alcohol and Marijuana? Some Econometric 
Evidence, Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 23, No.3, pp.253–276.
59 Pacula, R. L. (1998) Does increasing the beer tax reduce marijuana consumption?, Journal of Health 
Economics, Vol. 17, No.5, pp.557–585
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recent patterns of cannabis use rising while alcohol use falls (evidence 
that might support the hypothesis).60
Epidemiological evidence needs to be supported by studies of individual 
behaviours, and there are clearly many variables other than price that 
influence decisions to use one drug over another. The reality of cannabis 
and alcohol frequently being used together complicates the picture 
further: are they ‘complements’ or ‘substitutes’? Caution is certainly needed 
before jumping to conclusions about simplistic causality. If, however, a 
price- or policy-related increase in cannabis use could be convincingly 
demonstrated to be linked to a corresponding fall in alcohol consumption, 
then there is real potential for a net public health gain on the basis that 
the relative harms of cannabis use are generally accepted to be far lower 
than those of alcohol.61
This proposition , that an  increase in  cannabis use  could  produce  a public 
health gain  if  it was  compensated  by  a fall in  alcohol use, is obviously 
a contentious and counterintuitive position for many. Given the current 
lack of solid evidence to support it, it is not yet an assumption that can 
reasonably form a  key part of  policy decision-making at this stage. But 
at least as a plausible theory, it is something that should be the subject 
of more rigorous study as opportunities to influence both alcohol and 
cannabis pricing and availability simultaneously increase. This emerging 
evidence can inform future thinking on how to influence and reduce 
drug-related health harms more broadly.
There is, of course, also the possibility that government interventions 
that increased cannabis prices above current market levels would lead 
to displacement  in  the  opposite  direction , with  cannabis  use  falling  and 
60 Johnston, L. D. et al. (2012) Monitoring the Future National Survey Results on Drug Use, 1975-2011: 
Volume I, Secondary school students, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of 
Michigan, p.159. http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/mtf-vol1_2011.pdf.
61 Nutt, D. et al. (2007) Development of a rational scale to assess the harm of drugs of potential misuse, The 
Lancet, Vol.369, No.9566, pp.24–30.
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alcohol use increasing. However, if legal retail prices are set too high 
at the outset (higher than current illicit market prices) the more likely 
outcome, as explored above, is that a significant proportion of demand 
will simply continue to be  met via illicit supply, the  economics of which, 
in terms of profitability, will be largely unchanged (or potentially even 
improved). Two other displacement possibilities are also worth noting 
here. One is that increased cannabis prices might incentivise home 
growing. Whether  this  is a good  or  bad thing is  unclear , but even the 
worst-case scenario would hardly be disastrous. Another possibility is 
that increased price might also cause displacement to drugs other than 
alcohol. The net impact of any increased use of other drugs would 
depend on  their  relative risks , but  likely  candidates  for  displacement 
would include some synthetic cannabinoids (see p.191) and other NPS 
whose risks are relatively unknown.
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c Tax
Challenge
• Effectively  integrating  taxation policy into  pricing  regulation  in  a  way 
that  maximises  tax  revenue, while  supporting - and  not undermining - 
other policy aims
Analysis
• Tax  policy  is  closely linked with  pricing policy
• Various  possible  tax  mechanisms  exist:  tax on  unit  weight,  on  active 
content, or on sales value
• Tax revenue  will  be  available  not  only from cannabis  sales,  but  also 
from production, industry-related earnings, and other sources such as 
licence fees, and standard value added taxes (VAT)
• Potential tax revenue will vary significantly  depending on the  nature 
and size of  the  market and  regulatory/tax regime  adopted - predicting 
tax revenue is therefore problematic
• If  prices  are  to  be  maintained at  or  near current market levels, a 
substantial tax burden will eventually be be required to prevent 
inordinate profits (unless  sales are  regulated under  a  state monopoly) - 
but higher taxes also create incentives for diversion, tax avoidance, and 
fuel illegal markets
• Tax revenue also  has  the  potential  to  distort  government priorities
Recommendations
• A  system  based on taxation of  both  production  and sales - with THC 
content  by  weight being the  taxable unit - is  a  sensible  starting  point for 
products whose THC content is reliably measurable, but the detail of 
such decisions would need to be incorporated into wider pricing policy 
considerations, and fit within the needs of local political environments 
and existing tax frameworks
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• Maximising  tax  revenue should  not  be  a  key  driver of  policy - tax 
revenue should be seen more as a welcome additional benefit
• Ring fencing  cannabis  tax  revenue  for  drug  treatment, prevention 
 or other social programmes is a politically attractive proposition 
but is problematic; public health interventions should be 
funded according to need and not be dependent on sales 
 
Economic pressures faced by governments around the world have 
drawn increasing attention to the potential financial impacts of legally 
regulating cannabis. The logic being that the move could not only 
create savings in the criminal justice system, but additionally provide 
a much-needed boost in tax revenue for regional and national budgets. 
Indeed, the campaigns to legally regulate cannabis in several US states 
explicitly highlighted the potential fiscal benefits of such a move. 
Tax options
1 Ad Valorem sales tax
Tax added as a fixed % of retail price
Pros
• Easy to understand and administer
Cons
• May incentivise diversion and tax avoidance between production and retail
2 Fixed-rate tax on unit weight
Tax added at farm gate rather than at retail stage
Pros
• Easy to administer
Cons
• Potentially incentivises selling more potent varieties that retail at higher prices
88  How to Regulate Cannabis:
  Section 2
3 Fixed-rate tax on active content
Tax based on THC content by weight
Pros
• Avoids incentivising sales of higher-potency strains
Cons
• More technically difficult to administer
4 Progressive tax
Tax that increases according to potency, or another risk variable (can be either fixed-
rate or value added)
Pros
• May help dissuade use of more potent varieties or more risky products
Cons
• More complex and technically difficult to administer
5 Licence fees
Effectively a tax on licensees to at least cover bureaucratic costs
Pros
• Offers an initial funding stream for regulators that is not dependent on sales
6 Local tax
Municipal- or county-level tax to cover any localised cost burdens associated with 
trade
Pros
• Can help cover specific localised regulatory burdens or costs
Cons
• May incentivise diversion, or geographically displace markets
7 Deny tax deductions for advertising/marketing expenses62
Pros
• Targets efforts to increase demand
• Allows tax deductions for product costs
62 Oglesby, P., (2015) ‘How Bob Dole got America addicted to marijuana taxes’ Brookings https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/12/18/how-bob-dole-got-america-addicted-to-marijuana-taxes/
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Cons
• Could penalize some innocuous sales activity like ads listing hours of opening and 
location
The scale of any sales tax revenue would be dependent on a number of 
variables:
• The price  of  products  and  rate  of  taxation in  the  new legal market
• The total  size  of  the  market and  levels  of  consumption of  different 
products (which may change post-prohibition)
• The proportion  of  the  market that  is  taxable - parallel  illicit  markets are 
untaxed, home cultivation would generate marginal if any tax revenue, 
and tax breaks for medical cannabis - especially if they go to ‘healthy 
pretenders’63
• Tax evasion - in  the  form of  diversion  from legal production  channels 
before tax is collected for the purpose of illegal ‘off the books’ sales
• Tax avoidance - exploitation of  legal loopholes  to reduce taxes payable
• The intensity of tax law enforcement
These variables are naturally interlinked. For example, higher taxes are 
likely to push up prices, incentivising tax evasion and avoidance, home 
cultivation, and a parallel illicit trade, in turn shrinking the taxable market 
and reducing potential taxable income. There are also various possible 
 impacts  of  price  changes  on  alcohol  use — which has  separate tax 
 revenue implications.  These  potentially  complex interactions —  and the 
 wide  variety  of  potential  regulatory  models  and  tax  regimes —  mean 
predictions about likely levels of tax revenue can only be made within 
very wide margins of error.
Such  predictions will be more robust in a few years’  time,  when  the  first 
non-medical cannabis models have bedded in. In the absence of more 
concrete data, there is a real risk of exaggerating the potential tax revenue 
generated by any system of legal cannabis regulation. Nevertheless, 
63 Oglesby, P., (2015) ‘Supplemental Thoughts About Revenue from Marijuana in Vermont’ Center for New 
Revenue http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2551029
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reference can certainly be made to some of the research and tax revenue 
estimates that have so far been produced. This body of evidence indicates 
that revenues could potentially be very significant:
Tax revenue research and estimates
• In 2008, Dutch coffee shops paid €400 million ($520 million) in taxes on 
revenues from gross sales of over €2 billion ($2.6 billion)64
• California’s medical cannabis industry generates between $58 — $105 
million in annual sales tax revenue65
• If one million of Spain’s existing cannabis users obtained their supply 
through cannabis social clubs, the jobs created would generate 
approximately €155 million in social security contributions, €54 million in 
income tax and around €100 million in VAT66
• Legally regulated cannabis in England and Wales could generate tax 
revenue in the range of £0.4 billion — £0.9 billion annually67
• If legally regulated at the federal level in the US, estimates of total  tax 
revenue from cannabis have ranged from  $8.7 billion68 to $28 billion69
While potential sales tax revenue has received most attention from policy 
makers and researchers, tax revenue can be generated at various points 
in a legally regulated cannabis market. For example, revenue can be 
generated by taxes imposed at production/wholesale level, corporation 
taxes paid on profits, business taxes paid on the use of premises, and 
income taxes paid by those employed in the legal cannabis trade.
64 Grund, J-P. and Breeksema, J. (2013) Coffee Shops and Compromise: Separated Illicit Drug Markets in the 
Netherlands, Global Drug Policy Program, Open Society Foundations, p.52. www.opensocietyfoundations. 
org/sites/default/files/Coffee%20Shops%20and%20Compromise-final.pdf.
65 California Board of Equalization (2013) News Release: BOE to Sponsor Legislation to Exempt Hospice 
Patients from Sales Taxes on Medical Marijuana. www.boe.ca.gov/news/2013/28-13-H.pdf.
66 Barriuso Alonso, M. (2011) Cannabis social clubs in Spain: A normalizing alternative underway, 
Transnational Institute, p.6. www.druglawreform.info/images/stories/documents/dlr9.pdf.
67 Pudney, S. et al. (2013) Licensing and regulation of the cannabis market in England and Wales: Towards a 
cost-benefit analysis, Institute for Social and Economic Research, vi. https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/d/153.
68 Miron, J. A. and Waldock, K. (2010) The budgetary impact of ending drug prohibition, Cato Institute. www.
cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/DrugProhibitionWP.pdf
69 Ekins, G., Henchman, J., (2016) ‘Marijuana Legalization and Taxes: Federal Revenue Impact’ Tax Foundation 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/marijuana-legalization-and-taxes-federal-revenue-impact
 91A Practical Guide
The practical detail of regulation
Given that almost all proceeds from the global cannabis trade currently 
accrue to organised criminals, legal regulation clearly offers an opportunity 
for governments to collect what is currently foregone revenue. The 
argument, often heard, that tax revenue will not cover the social and 
health costs of cannabis use is somewhat meaningless in this context as 
some tax revenue is clearly preferable to none at all.
A range of other considerations may also need to be taken into account 
when deciding on the right combination of taxes to employ and how 
high they should be set. For example:
• Cannabis is  relatively compact compared  to  alcohol  and tobacco, 
so smuggling and tax avoidance is comparatively easy. Taxing at 
production stage could help avoid this70
• If tax was  administered on  herbal  cannabis  at  a  flat rate  by  weight  it 
would create an incentive to produce higher-potency cannabis, which 
retails for  higher prices.  Administering  tax  by  potency - for simplicity, 
by THC  content - would avoid this risk (see  Strength/potency p.114). A 
THC potency-based system might be more of an administrative burden. 
Under any proposed systems, weight produced and sold, and potency, 
should already be subject to regular independent monitoring
A system based on taxation of both production and sales, with THC 
content by weight being the taxable unit, is a sensible starting point, 
but the detail of such decisions would need to be incorporated into 
wider pricing policy considerations, and fit within the needs of local 
political environments and existing tax frameworks. A state monopoly 
on production, sales, or both, would simplify tax and pricing matters 
substantially, and potentially allow sellers of legal product to respond 
nimbly to the illegal market.
70 Caulkins et al. (2013) Marijuana legalization – what everyone needs to know, p.156.
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While tax revenue is certainly a significant potential benefit of reform, it 
should not be a primary motive behind any transition towards systems 
of legal cannabis regulation. It is the improvement of public health and 
community safety that should be the driver of such a policy shift. The 
likely increase in tax revenue should be seen above all as a means of 
funding  the necessary regulatory frameworks  for  cannabis - anything 
more than this should be considered a welcome bonus.71
Experiences with alcohol and tobacco show how generating substantial 
tax revenue can potentially distort or have a negative impact on public 
health priorities. Other political lessons from alcohol and tobacco taxation 
should also not be  ignored, such  as  the public’s  inevitable  hostility to any 
tax increases, the lobbying power of large-scale production and supply 
industries, and the difficulties in intervening in such industries given their 
employment of a significant number of potential voters.
The often-mooted idea that tax revenue from cannabis could be redirected 
into drug services , such as prevention, education and treatment/ recovery 
- is  one that  has  obvious populist appeal. Such a  plan  was included in 
 Washington’s  ballot  initiative for  the  legalisation  of  cannabis, which 
 earmarked  60% of the  revenue generated by cannabis sales  taxes to 
prevention, education, research and health care.72  Importantly, funds 
are also dedicated to monitoring and independent, periodic cost-benefit 
evaluation of the impacts of the law. Similarly, Colorado’s Amendment 
64 ballot initiative to legalize recreational marijuana earmarked the first 
$40 million of state excise tax revenue for public school construction, 
71 Beyond any financial benefit stemming from increased tax revenue, there will naturally be resource 
savings across the criminal justice system, however these are not likely to accrue to the same government 
departments responsible for regulating cannabis markets, and the process of potentially redirecting such 
resources may not be quick or easy.
72 See: Washington State Legislature (2013) RCW 69.50.540 Marijuana excise taxes – Disbursements http://
apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=69.50.540.
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with other marijuana tax revenues reserved to fund public education 
campaigns, health-related services, and public safety initiatives.73 
While they are undoubtedly useful in ‘selling’ a particular reform to the 
electorate, caution should be exercised with regard to including such 
provisions in any plans for systems of  legal cannabis  regulation.  Levels 
of effective monitoring and evaluation, and ongoing service provision, 
should be determined by need and evidence of efficacy, and not vary 
according to cannabis tax revenue. Expenditure that is conditional on this 
revenue should only be additional to any spending that would otherwise 
have occurred.
d Preparation (and method of consumption)
Challenges 
• Regulating  the  availability  of  different preparations  of  cannabis  in  such 
a way that meets demand for the drug and therefore minimises the 
market opportunities for criminal suppliers
• Promoting the use of  lower-risk  cannabis  products and consumption 
behaviours in the longer term
Analysis 
• Cannabis is  available  in  a  range  of  preparations  and can  be consumed in 
a range of different ways
• The  risks  associated  with  cannabis  use are  significantly  influenced  by 
preparation, dosage, and method of consumption, which are all closely 
linked  to  potency - see  Methods of consumption, p.97)
73 Johns, T. (2015) State and Local Government Review http://slg.sagepub.com/content/47/3/193. abstract 
quoted in http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2016/01/06/colorados-implementation-of-legal-marijuana-
policies-has-been-a-patchwork-of-regulation-against-a-backdrop-of-diverse-public-opinion/
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• Differing regulation according to  the  preparations  of  cannabis that  are 
made legally available can influence patterns of use. For example, by 
making more risky products less available, and less risky products 
relatively more available, certain potential harms and harmful using 
behaviours can be minimised
• Key  considerations  are  the  potential risks to lung health  from  inhaled 
cannabis smoke (particularly if mixed with tobacco), and the ability of 
users to be informed about and to control the dosage of active cannabis 
ingredients - both in terms of  total  consumed and  speed  of onset of 
effects
• The smoking  of  herbal cannabis,  in  joints  or  pipes, remains the most 
popular method of consumption throughout most of the world, because 
it is simple, cheap, portable, sociable, and allows users to control dosage 
relatively easily
• Encouraging users  to  consume cannabis through methods other than 
smoking is a long-term challenge, but if achieved would reduce the risks 
to  lung health  associated  with  smoking - particularly  where  cannabis  is 
mixed with tobacco
• Edible cannabis  preparations  do  not  involve  risks to  lung  health, but do 
have a much slower onset of effects and therefore pose some greater 
risks relating to dosage control, and can have longer lasting effects
• Vaporisers - which  create  vapour from herbal  cannabis, rather than 
smoke from  burning - offer  a  more user-friendly inhaling experience, 
reduce lung health risks, and offer a similar level of dosage control to 
smoked cannabis
• E-cigarettes technology, used to vaporise an extracted cannabis oil 
(rather than herbal cannabis), is likely to be an increasingly popular and 
lower-risk alternative method of consumption to  smoking. Lessons  need 
to  be  learnt from problems with regulating nicotine  e-cigarettes - which 
 are  not  well  catered  for  by  either tobacco regulation or medical nicotine-
replacement product regulation
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Recommendations 
• Non-smoked cannabis inhalation using vaporisers and e-cigarette 
technology should be encouraged as an alternative to smoking, as they 
dramatically reduce the risks associated with smoking, particularly 
smoking cannabis mixed with tobacco.  Bans on  sales of pre-rolled joints, 
mandating  the  provision of vaporisers in cannabis consumption venues, 
or even establishing ‘vape-only’ consumption venues, are some examples 
of how this transition might be encouraged
• More  research is  needed  into the  use  of  vaporisers, and some  form  of 
testing and standardisation would be  useful , potentially associated with 
an official ‘quality tested/approved’ mark or logo on products
• More research  into the relative risks of emerging cannabis  concentrates 
such as  butane hash  oil (BHO) and consumption  through ‘dabbing’ is 
needed
• A greater policy and research focus is needed on the use of cannabis 
oil as e-cigarette technology inevitably becomes increasingly popular, 
given  that  they combine the lower risks of non-smoked inhalation 
with a more accessible and user-friendly product. Dedicated regulatory 
controls will be needed for such devices and the products sold for use 
with them - with important lessons to be learnt from challenges with 
e-cigarette regulation
• Decisions about which products  to make available  from the  outset of 
any system of legal cannabis regulation should be guided in large part 
by  matching the nature of  existing illegal  consumption . While  an  exact 
match between the products available on the new legal and former 
illegal markets is not necessary, the more significant the discrepancy, the 
more likely unpredictable and potentially negative market distortions 
become
• Attempts  to  influence patterns of use by  regulating  different products  in 
different ways should be gradual and guided by careful monitoring and 
evaluation
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Preparations
Cannabis comes in a range of preparations. These include:
• Herbal cannabis	˛	a	wide	range		of	cannabis		strains		are	available,	
varying in  quality and THC and CBD  content , from  low- to high- 
potency (see p.114).74 Herbal cannabis is usually dried after picking and 
can be smoked, vaporised, eaten (most commonly incorporated into 
food or beverages), or processed into a range of other products (see 
below)
• Cannabis resin and other concentrates	˛	resin		is		a		solid	cannabis	
preparation most commonly made from elements of the plant that 
contain the highest concentration of active ingredients. There is a wide 
variety of resin products, ranging from traditional rolled or pressed 
resins made from the manually collected cannabis trichomes, through 
to more processed products made using solvents (these include more 
potent, but less common, cannabis oil and ‘wax’). Although resin is 
generally more potent than herbal cannabis (in terms of THC % by 
weight) and correspondingly more expensive, resin potency can vary 
significantly. There are some lower-potency resins, such as the mass-
market resin produced in North Africa and consumed in much of 
southern Europe. This is often bulked up with non-cannabis adulterants. 
The most potent  resins and oils, especially  those made using  the  latest 
 hi-tech  extraction  process , can  be  extremely  potent, some  with  a  THC 
 concentration  of  over  80% such as butane hash  oil  (‘BHO’,  made 
 using  the  extraction solvent  butane).  These  highly potent cannabis 
concentrates are sometimes consumed via a process known as ‘dabbing’, 
whereby the user touches the concentrate onto a heated surface and 
inhales its vapours,75 but can also be used more conveniently in pocket 
74 For example, at the time of writing, leafly.com provides information on 2007 different strains: www.leafly.
com/explore.
75 BHO and ‘dabbing’ remain a predominantly North American phenomenon so far – see: Black, B., To Dab or 
not to Dab?, High Times, 02/10/13. www.hightimes.com/read/dab-or-not-dab.
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vaporisers similar to e-cigarettes. More typical resins can be smoked 
on their own in a pipe, smoked with tobacco in a joint, vaporised (less 
commonly), eaten on their own, or cooked into a food product. Oils are 
usually smoked or eaten in foods
• Cannabis edibles	˛		herbal		cannabis		can		be		eaten		in		its	unprocessed	
form, but more commonly the active ingredients, which are fat-
soluble, are dissolved in oils or butter, and consumed in a huge range 
of prepared foods. Popular edibles in the Netherlands and in medical 
cannabis dispensaries in the US include cakes, biscuits and brownies, 
although preparations, unsurprisingly, vary across the world according 
to local cultures. A variety of cannabis-based beverages made with the 
infused oils or tinctures (and infusion in alcohol) are also available76
• Other cannabis preparations ˛		many		novel		products		have		been	
developed in recent years for medical cannabis users. These include 
cannabis tinctures (including Sativex, a whole-plant cannabis tincture 
mouth spray, the first such product to be licensed as a medicine), 
sublingual tablets or strips, and a wide array of teas, tonics and sodas 
that mostly contain cannabis tinctures of differing strengths and 
applications. These products do have psychoactive effects but are 
not widely used non-medically. However, such developments  will 
potentially be transferable to non-medical products in the future 
Methods of consumption
Cannabis can be consumed in a variety of ways, each associated with 
different effects and risks. 
 
76 Cannabis can be added to hot water to make cannabis tea or other drinks, but because its active ingredients 
are not water-soluble it is an inefficient method of use. Teas are therefore usually made with tinctures or 
cannabis-infused oils.
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Smoking
In most of the world, by far the most popular method of consuming 
cannabis (whether resin or herbal) is by smoking it, either in some form 
of pipe, or in a ‘joint’ (a hand-rolled cannabis cigarette) containing either 
pure herbal cannabis, or herbal/resin cannabis mixed with tobacco (or less 
often, some other herbal mix). The reason for the popularity of smoking 
is unsurprising ˛	  it  is quick,  easy, and inexpensive. The rapid onset of 
the drug effect is both desirable in itself and also offers a high degree 
of dosage control. Smoking also offers a sociable, shared experience in 
the preparation and sharing of the pipe or joint, which in various forms 
has become culturally embedded, even ritualised, in a range of social 
environments ˛	  in  much  the same way  as  many  alcohol  consumption 
behaviours.
The burning of the cannabis (and anything it is mixed with) results in the 
creation of a range of combustion products (such as tars, carbon monoxide, 
toluene and benzene)77 and while, contrary to ‘reefer madness’ mythology, 
cannabis smoke appears to be less risky than tobacco smoke,78 79  it is 
reasonable to assume that inhalation of smoke of any kind increases risks 
to throat and lung health.80
When cannabis is smoked mixed with tobacco, as is often the case in 
much of the world, it makes the ongoing debate over the relative risks 
of smoking cannabis and tobacco separately rather academic. However, 
the smoking of cannabis and tobacco together presents often under- 
77 For a comprehensive list of the chemical components of cannabis smoke, see: Moir, D. et al. (2008) A 
comparison of mainstream and sidestream marijuana and tobacco cigarette smoke produced under two 
machine smoking conditions, Chemical Research in Toxicology, Vol.21, No.2, pp.494–502.
78 Rooke, S. E. et al. (2013) Health outcomes associated with long-term regular cannabis and tobacco 
smoking, Addictive Behaviours, Vol.38, No.6, pp.2207–2213.
79 Pletcher, M. J. et al. (2012) Association Between Marijuana Exposure and Pulmonary Function Over 20 
Years, Vol.307, No.2, pp.173–181.
80 While the carcinogenic potential of cannabis smoke remains contentious (but appears to be modest and 
certainly considerably less than that of tobacco smoke), smoke from combustion of any herbal products 
can undoubtedly irritate the airways and is associated with increased health risks
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acknowledged but serious health risks.81  Because  of the  high addictive 
potential of smoked tobacco, the smoking of mixed cannabis and 
tobacco joints can be an initiator of long-term tobacco use (which is 
unquestionably associated with serious health harms that may continue 
independently of any cannabis use), and can also mean that users crave 
joints  for their  nicotine content , and therefore  end up  smoking  more 
cannabis, or smoke it more frequently, than they otherwise would.
Smoking through a water pipe or ‘bong’ is widely perceived to be 
somehow  less  risky  than  other forms  of smoking. But, rather  like the 
supposed benefits of filters on cigarettes, there is no good evidence to 
support this supposition. Even if the smoking experience is more pleasant 
because the smoke is marginally cooled by the water, it is essentially 
the same smoke.82 Some research has suggested that because the water 
absorbs THC more effectively than it does tars, it will actually increase 
the tar-to-THC ratio, meaning users inhale more than they otherwise 
would with a joint.83
Vaporising
Herbal vaporisers
The active ingredients in cannabis can also be released and inhaled in 
a vapour form, avoiding most of the toxic components of the smoke 
produced by actual burning in pipes or joints, such as tars and carbon 
monoxide. This is achieved using some form of ‘vaporiser’, a  piece  of 
equipment that heats cannabis (usually in herbal form) to a temperature 
hot enough to release the volatile cannabinoids (from any redundant 
81 This is probably because most cannabis research is US-based, where smoking cannabis with tobacco is 
uncommon relative to other regions such as Europe, where it is the norm
82 Gieringer, D. (1996) Marijuana waterpipe and vaporizer study, MAPS Bulletin, Vol.6, No.3, pp.53–66. www.
maps.org/news-letters/v06n3/06359mj1.html.
83 Ibid.
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plant material) as a vapour, but not so hot that it actually combusts to 
create smoke, which contains an array of additional toxic components.
There are many such devices now commercially available that produce 
this heated vapour in different ways. These include: conduction-style 
vaporisers, which heat the cannabis on a hot plate in a contained air 
space; ‘forced-air’ vaporisers, which fill a detachable balloon from which 
the vapour is then inhaled; and ‘heat wands’, which are used with more 
conventional water pipes in place of a flame or lighter.
While such vaporisers have been growing in popularity since the 1990s, 
the extent  of  their  use  has been limited due to their high price relative 
to conventional pipes (vaporisers often cost $100 or more, with the top- 
of-the-range ‘volcano’ forced- air models costing over $300), and due to 
their bulky designs, which make 
them somewhat impractical for use 
outside the home. Newer pocket-
sized models and ‘pen’ vaporisers 
have emerged on the market more 
recently ˛ and in a rapidly growing 
and competitive market have 
rapidly become more sophisticated 
and cheaper. The effectiveness of 
some of these products in creating 
vapour rather than smoke has been 
questioned; some  are clearly  better 
than others.
Published research on vaporisers (mostly 
carried out in the context of medical uses of 
cannabis) has convincingly demonstrated that 
vaporised  cannabis delivers similar levels 
of the active ingredients in cannabis to the 
user as smoked cannabis does, but without 
‘o.pen’ brand cannabis ‘e-cigarette’
Weedhype.com
A ‘volcano’ forced air vaporiser and bag
lelandkim.com
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most of the harmful elements that are found in smoke.84 85 86 In doing 
so, vaporising reduces the respiratory symptoms87 and risks associated 
with smoking. This research also indicates that the inhalation experience 
is generally preferred by users because the vapour is cooler, less harsh, 
and so more pleasant to inhale. However, there have been relatively 
few studies in this area, most of which have focused on the physical 
outputs of vaporisers and a small sample of user reactions to them, rather 
than epidemiological studies of actual health impacts. Additionally, in a 
rapidly expanding market of vaporiser products, relatively few have been 
subjected to rigorous independent analysis, with mainly just the more 
expensive ‘forced-air’- type being assessed. There is a clear need for more 
research and testing to support some sort of quality assurance framework 
if health professionals, regulators and consumers are to make informed 
decisions.
‘E-cigarette’ vaporisers
A more recent development is the adaptation of electronic cigarette or 
‘e-cigarette’ technology, developed as a safer way of consuming nicotine 
than smoking  tobacco, for  use  with cannabis  products. Like cannabis 
vaporisers, e-cigarette technology produces a vapour containing the 
active drug content rather than smoke from burning, although they 
work in a very different way. Instead of using heat to extract the volatile 
content from plant matter into a vapour, they use a pre-prepared solution, 
which is then turned into a vapour in a battery-powered atomisation 
chamber upon inhalation by the user. Nicotine e-cigarettes have proved 
far more popular than previous nicotine substitution products such as 
84 Abrams, D. et al. (2007) Vaporization as a smokeless cannabis delivery system: a pilot study, Clinical 
Pharmacology & Therapeutics, Vol.82, pp.572–578. www.maps.org/media/vaporizer_epub.pdf.
85 Earlywine M. and Barnwell, S. (2007) Decreased respiratory symptoms in cannabis users, Harm Reduction 
Journal, Vol. 4, No. 11. www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-7517-4-11.pdf.
86 Hazekamp A. et al. (2006) Evaluation of a vaporizing device (Volcano) for the pulmonary administration of 
tetrahydrocannabinol, Journal of Pharmacological Science, Vol.95, pp.1308–1317.
87 Although they are not eliminated: coughing can still result from inhalation, for example. With some devices, 
vapour can be additionally passed through water to cool it and reduce potential respiratory irritation
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gum or patches, because not only are they widely acknowledged to be 
substantially safer than smoking, they also  closely replicate the  experience 
of  smoking in terms of holding the  cigarette  and  inhalation , without the 
 more  anti social impacts of cigarette smoke.
For reasons that mirror the attraction of e-cigarettes for smokers, the 
use of extracted cannabis oils with e-cigarette technology has become 
increasingly popular as a method of cannabis consumption, most notably 
in US legal cannabis jurisdictions. These products  have been variously 
called ‘e-joints’, ‘canna-vapes’ or, the less catchy ‘Electronic Cannabis 
Delivery Systems’  (ECDS). They offer a user-friendly product that is 
safer (and many claim more pleasant) than smoking joints or pipes, they 
are relatively cheap (with many types of e-cigarette retailing at under 
$10), and they are more convenient than herbal cannabis vaporisers, as 
e-cigarette technology using cannabis oil does not need to be refilled 
with herbal cannabis after each use. It seems reasonable to speculate 
that the rapidly growing popularity of e-cigarette technology for 
cannabis consumption is set to continue (particularly in legal cannabis 
jurisdictions) and could soon displace smoked cannabis as the dominant 
form of consumption (excluding edibles). The benefits of such a shift 
would seem to be a positive from a public health perspective given the 
relative risks of smoking and vaporising. It is also possible, however, that 
the convenience of the products could potentially encourage increased 
consumption, and that they could also facilitate clandestine use (as they 
are much easier to use without detection than smoked cannabis).   
There are important lessons that should be learnt from the emergence 
of the nicotine e-cigarette market. Its rapid expansion has caught 
medical authorities and regulators off guard, as the products are not 
covered by regulatory frameworks for either cigarettes or for medicines/
pharmaceuticals. As a result, even if the substitution of smoked cigarettes 
for e-cigarettes is widely agreed to be beneficial for public health, the 
products that are being sold have been inadequately monitored and 
regulated in most jurisdictions. 
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The overarching problem here is that such products clearly do not fit 
neatly within existing tobacco regulation frameworks, but are also not 
strictly  speaking  medical  products ,  they  are  novel  products  that  require 
their own regulatory framework that draws on key elements of both. 
This has obvious relevance to future cannabis regulation policy; it should 
not be assumed that any existing regulatory structures will be able to 
cater for novel cannabis-based products or technologies (see conclusions 
below). Questions  are already  being asked  about the emerging cannabis 
e-cigarette-style vaporisers on the US medical cannabis scene: ‘What 
solvents do the oil/solutions contain?’, ‘What is the potency of the vapour?’ and 
so on. Current indications are that, in the absence of an appropriate 
regulatory framework, answers to these questions are inadequate.
Eating — edibles/beverages
As noted above, cannabis can be eaten in herbal or resin form or in a 
variety of preparations, with the active ingredients then absorbed through 
the lining of the stomach and digestive tract. Since the active ingredients 
in cannabis are fat-soluble or can be prepared in a tincture (i.e. extracted 
into alcohol), they can then easily be added into almost any form of food 
or beverage. Unlike inhaling cannabis smoke or vapour, which causes 
the drug to enter the blood via the lungs, providing an almost immediate 
effect, when eaten, the effects of cannabis take much longer to  be  felt; 
anything  from 20  minutes  to  2  hours  or  more, depending on the nature 
of the edible and whether it is ingested on an empty stomach. The effects 
of eating cannabis will also tend to be longer lasting than when smoke/
inhaled.
This means that cannabis edibles present something of a balance of costs/
benefits when weighed against smoked/inhaled cannabis. While avoiding 
respiratory risks entirely, edibles are intrinsically harder to dose control 
than smoking. Particularly in the absence of clear and reliable content 
labelling it is hard to judge how strong a particular edible will be without 
the inconvenience of trying a partial portion of it first and waiting a 
104  How to Regulate Cannabis:
  Section 2
reasonable period of time , potentially as much  as  two hours  to  be  sure 
(this is a sensible harm reduction tip for any edibles use). Individuals may 
also react differently or unpredictably to the same product at different 
times. Adjusting dosage upwards if deemed inadequate is therefore a 
slow process; users must wait to ensure they have received the desired 
dose from the ingested product before taking anymore.  Impatience 
and uncertainty around how long to wait mean the likelihood of a user 
consuming more than they want to, and potentially having unwanted 
negative or distressing effects is increased, even if the risk of any long-
term health harms from such ‘overdose’ episodes remains small. Hence 
regulating the potency and contents, and labelling of any legally produced 
and sold edibles is obviously a key issue.88 (For more information, see 
Strength/potency, p.114 and Packaging information, p.125)
Recommendations
A running theme through this guide is how varying levels of regulation 
on different cannabis products, and how they are consumed, can help 
shape consumption behaviours in a positive way, encouraging the use of 
safer products and of safer methods of consumption.
Even if the often heated debate about the extent of the risks of cannabis 
use is unlikely to subside soon, as described above, there are a number 
of observations about the nature of the relationship between risks and 
cannabis preparation and/or method of use that can be made with 
confidence:
• There is a dosage/risk  relationship , i.e.  the  more you consume  the 
greater the risks
• User knowledge and ability to control dosage are important risk 
variables
88 See: Washington State Liquor Control Board Marijuana Regulation WAC 314-55-095 (serving sizes), 314-
55-104 (extraction requirements), and 314-55-105 (packaging and labeling). http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/ 
initiative_502_proposed_rules.
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• The  speed  of  onset  of  effects  varies  between  methods  of  use  and 
impacts on the nature of the experience, and ability to control dosage
• The lung health risks associated with smoking cannabis are reduced 
significantly by avoiding mixing with tobacco, and by inhaling 
vaporised cannabis rather than cannabis smoke. Such risks are 
eliminated entirely by consuming edible cannabis preparations or 
using other non-inhaled preparations
Priorities for regulators should therefore be:
• Deciding which preparations to licence for sale
How to address this question will largely depend on the overarching 
regulatory framework that has been adopted (see Summary of 
cannabis regulation models, p.32). More commercially-oriented 
market models are likely to permit the sale of most products and 
preparations by default, albeit with certain potency limits imposed (see 
Strength/potency, p.114). They may then deploy regulatory powers to 
reactively prohibit the sale of certain risky products or types of product, 
as deemed appropriate, on a case-by-case basis (see, for example, the 
Washington and Colorado regulatory models, p.254).
More regulated or state-controlled models are likely to reverse this 
approach, adopting a more cautious and simpler regulatory system 
involving a default ban on sales of products that have not been 
specifically licensed (see, for example,  Uruguay’s  model, p.254).
Ultimately, decisions will need to be guided by the nature of the 
existing illicit market. In most jurisdictions the types of illegal cannabis 
available are  fairly  limited, often restricted  to  a  two-tier  market  featuring 
 cheaper, less-potent outdoor-grown herbal cannabis (often including 
leaves, seeds and sticks) and more expensive, and more potent, indoor-
grown herbal cannabis (usually just the flowering tops or buds of the 
cannabis plant). Where resin is the most widely used form of cannabis, 
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there is often a  similar two-tiered market. By  contrast, the medical 
cannabis markets in some US states, such as Colorado and California, as 
well as the Dutch coffee shops, have exposed a broad base of consumers 
to more sophisticated markets before the arrival of a non-medical 
legalisation. These include not only an extensive selection of different 
‘premium’ herbal cannabis varieties, but also a range of processed products 
including various concentrates and edibles. Where such a product range 
is already available, and a market already established, putting in place a 
more restricted product range for non-medical use may prove challenging 
and probably undesirable, although not impossible. 
In places where there is a limited variety of cannabis products available 
on the illicit market, we recommend that, initially at least, any new legal 
market should not offer a significantly greater product range. In such cases, 
this will probably mean allowing only a relatively restricted range of 
herbal cannabis varieties (covering lower-, medium- and higher-potency 
products) and/or resins (See Strength/ potency, p.107). The rationale 
here would be to not change the nature of the market too dramatically or 
too fast, so as to avoid unpredictable impacts on patterns of use.
The range of products can then be expanded over time, rather than moving, 
almost ‘overnight’, from the kind of limited two-tier illegal markets familiar 
in most jurisdictions to the kind of product range that has evolved in 
the Netherlands and in some US medical cannabis dispensaries over a 
number of years. Even under a regulatory framework that only permits 
a more restricted product range, cannabis users seeking specific ‘premium’ 
cannabis strains that are unavailable via licensed retailers would still, in 
principle, be able to access them if, as we are proposing, home growing is 
also permitted , perhaps  alongside small-scale cannabis  social clubs.
There is also no obvious or urgent need to make cannabis edibles available 
for retail at the outset of any regulatory system (medical cannabis edibles 
are a separate issue). Cooking with herbal cannabis is very simple and 
anyone who wished to prepare edibles with purchased herbal cannabis 
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could easily do so. Given this freedom, it 
might be sensible to avoid the inherent 
complexities of regulating edibles for 
retail sale, at least initially. This is 
an area that can always be revisited 
at a later stage, when the regulatory 
framework for herbal cannabis is better 
established (see Strength/potency, p.114 
and Packaging, p.125). Regulation of 
edibles is an area that Washington89 and Colorado have been  exploring90 
and the lessons learnt from these experiences will no doubt prove useful 
for regulators.
The same rationale could be used to restrict or prohibit retail sales of 
some cannabis  concentrates, certainly  the  more  potent  types  produced 
 with CO2 or solvent extraction methods. Again, whether this is 
appropriate will depend on the nature of the existing market and the 
extent of demand, but if such products are not already in widespread 
use, and there are legitimate concerns that the retail availability of more 
potent products could increase certain risks, there is no urgency to make 
them available at the outset of any regulatory system.
Regulators may wish to consider first establishing a functional herbal 
cannabis market that meets the majority of demand, and then exploring 
the regulation of production and retail for edibles and concentrates at a 
later stage. This would not have to represent a permanent or complete 
ban on either: edibles would be effectively accessible in the home, 
and, alongside more exotic strains of cannabis and concentrates, could 
potentially be accessed via  the more controlled environment of cannabis 
social clubs.
89 See Washington State Liquor Control Board Marijuana Regulation WAC 314-55-095 (serving sizes), 
314-55-104 (extraction requirements), 314-55-105 (packaging and labeling) http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/
initiative_502_ proposed_rules.
90 See discussion here: www.samefacts.com/2013/03/drug-policy/defining-a-serving-of-cannabis/.
The rationale here would 
be to not change the 
nature of the market 
too dramatically or 
too fast, so as to avoid 
unpredictable impacts on 
patterns of use
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• Discourage smoking of cannabis (particularly when mixed 
with tobacco) and encourage safer methods of consumption
Some ways this could potentially be achieved include:
• Prohibiting licensed  vendors  from  selling  pre-rolled  joints  containing 
a cannabis and tobacco mix (particularly an issue for European 
markets), or more restrictively, limiting retail sales to unprepared 
loose herbal cannabis, at least to begin with
• Establishing  licensed  premises  for  sale  and  on-site  consumption 
that permit the use of vaporisers while still restricting or forbidding 
smoking in line with local laws. (It should, however, be noted that 
the issue of how or if the use of vaporisers/e-cigarette technology 
will be affected by no-smoking legislation has yet to be grappled 
with in most jurisdictions)
• Providing  adequate  harm reduction  information  at  point  of  sale,  on 
packaging, and via vendors
• Regulation of vaporisers that use herbal cannabis
The relevant national-level regulatory bodies should put in place 
appropriate regulation governing the use of vaporisers (for more on the role 
of national bodies in regulating cannabis, see p.172). Attempts to prevent 
sales of cannabis paraphernalia have not proved practical in the past, but 
regulation could sensibly involve an independent testing procedure for 
different models, with clear performance parameters established through 
vapour content analysis. Meeting the agreed standards could then result 
in a particular model being awarded a ‘quality mark’ logo, potentially 
then linked to approval for sale from certain outlets or for use in licensed 
venues.
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• Regulation of e-cigarette-type vaporisers
Regulation of e-cigarette-type vaporisers will need to cover not only 
the devices and how they function (linked to quality control standards 
as with herbal  cannabis  vaporisers - see above),  but  also  the  content  of 
 the solution or extracts sold for use with them, as well as how they are 
marketed. This is especially the case if the vaporiser and the cannabis 
product are ‘tied’, i.e. only a specific cartridge can be used with a particular 
vaporiser, or, in the case of the disposable variety, only a certain number 
of puffs can be taken before it must be discarded. This is a relatively 
new area of regulation and research that is already regrettably under-
developed for widely available nicotine e-cigarette products. It is one 
that will naturally require more focused work by future regulators of 
cannabis, particularly given the trajectory of a market in  which demand 
is likely to increase rapidly in the coming years. We suggest it is an area 
of regulatory research and development that should be prioritised - but 
offer the following as a starting point.
How to regulate electronic cannabis delivery systems91
The aims of cannabis e-cigarette (electronic cannabis delivery systems – 
or ECDS) regulation should be firstly to ensure that ECDS are as safe as 
possible without compromising their appeal as alternatives to smoking; 
and secondly, to ensure that they are not marketed in a way that increases 
total population harm, including through recruitment of young people or 
non-cannabis smokers who would not otherwise smoke.
The aim of regulators should be to achieve a ‘sweet spot’ of regulatory 
intervention that builds confidence among consumers and removes rogue 
operators and defective products from the market, but does not impose 
costs, burdens and restrictions that preference more risky products or 
91 This section was produced based on the work of Clive Bates - graphic used with permission
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methods of consumption, crush the smaller players, radically change the 
products available or obstruct innovation.  This relationship is illustrated 
in the graphic below.
 
 
 
Elements of an appropriate regulatory regime
ECDS are sold as recreational consumer products – generally as alternatives 
to smoked cannabis. This is the appropriate regulatory approach. General 
consumer regulation should apply, with some specific technical quality 
control standards set for cannabis e-liquids and vaping devices, defined 
labelling requirements, with enhanced marketing controls reflecting the 
adult nature of the product, and proper communication of risks and 
benefits.
The most elegant way to regulate ECDS is to set performance standards, 
which would then become embedded as industry norms. The first 
standards have appeared in the UK for Electronic Nicotine Delivery 
Systems (ENDS) under the auspices of British Standards Institute (BSI)92 
92 BSI PAS 54115: (2015) Vaping products, including electronic cigarettes, e-liquids, e-shisha and directly-
related products - Manufacture, importation, testing and labelling - Guide http://shop.bsigroup.com/
ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030303130
Figure 3
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and in France under the equivalent body, AFNOR.93 These documents 
set standards and testing regimes for various aspects of e-cigarette design 
and e-liquid composition and containers. Standards like these may 
emerge as European (CEN) standards and eventually as international 
(ISO) standards – and provide a useful model for equivalent regulatory 
standards for ECDS.
A reasonable and proportionate regulatory regime should cover the 
elements explored below – operating in conjunction with the wider 
cannabis regulatory framework. It may develop over time and there is no 
need to try to reach a final regulatory regime in one attempt. Generally, 
the approach is to identify particular sources of risk and set standards that 
mitigate the risks.
Standards for liquids/ oils
 
The regulatory standard should ensure high quality ingredients are 
used and that substances known or likely to cause harm are not. The 
constituents of the liquid should match the description, and any warnings 
needed should be specified.
Requirements for liquids
This would set pharmaceutical grade standards for the major ingredient 
(and food grade standards for flavourings – if used).  It would specify 
any prohibited or restricted ingredients, known to be carcinogenic, 
mutagenic, repro-toxic (CMR) or respiratory sensitisers. It would set 
limits for microbial activity and provide guidance on allergens. It would 
93 AFNOR (France) (2015) Electronic cigarettes and e-liquids Part 1:Requirements and test methods for 
e-cigarettes  XP D90-300-1 March 2015 and Part 2: Requirements and test methods for e-cigarette liquid XP 
D90-300-2 http://www.boutique.afnor.org/norme/xp-d90-300-2/cigarettes-electroniques-et-e-liquides-
partie-2-exigences-et-methodes-d-essai-relatives-aux-cigarettes-e-liquides-/article/823265/fa059566
112  How to Regulate Cannabis:
  Section 2
concentrate on the liquids rather than attempt to measure vapour 
components, which may vary with the way the product is used.
Prohibited substances
As well as a general requirement to exclude CMR and respiratory 
sensitisers, they should be an explicit ‘black list’ of banned substances. The 
purpose would be to build industry-wide confidence among consumers. 
Requirements for containers – refill bottles or cartridges
This would cover materials, leak-proofing, sealing caps – and make use of 
established standards for containers. Pre-filled and disposable ECDS and 
cartridges should all be in child resistant re-closable packaging compliant 
with international standards94
Information requirements
The standard should specify what information the cannabis e-liquid 
manufacturer needs to provide with the liquid (on the label, packaging or 
in a leaflet – see p. 126).
Standardised test methods
These would include analytical techniques for measuring liquids, 
identifying contaminants and determining potency. These standards may 
be primarily addressed at testing laboratories for importers or in-house 
analytical facilities at cannabis e-liquid manufacturers.
94 Specifically: EN 862:2005,  ISO 13127:2012 and ISO 8317:2003
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Standards for vapour devices
The priority is to ensure the devices are safe to use, that any risks to the 
user are minimised and that appropriate information is provided to the 
user.
 Mechanical risks  
 
Control of risks linked to filling or leakage, sharp edges, components 
that form part of the mouthpiece, structural integrity.
 Thermal risks  
 
Maximum temperature permitted for different materials on the exterior 
of the product.
 Chemical risks  
 
For example, materials that should not be used in the mouthpiece or 
substances that may leach toxins from the device into the liquid where 
these are in contact.
 Electrical risks  
 
Regulation could specify a safe charging regime and ensure that chargers 
and batteries are compatible. Ideally regulation would ensure that 
chargers were interchangeable. The challenges of electrical safety and 
lithium-ion batteries have been faced for many and varied devices. Here 
there is an opportunity to adopt international standards:
• IEC 60335-1 (safety of household appliances);
• IEC 60335-2-29 (safety of battery chargers);
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• IEC 62133 (safety of portable batteries);
• IEC 61558 (safety of AC adaptors);
• IEC 61000 series; and
• EN 55022 & EN 55024 (for USB chargers & cables)
Information requirements  
 
This would include details of the product and contact information for 
responsible supplier, technical specifications (power range, capacity 
etc), and any information about refilling.  It could also detail any 
requirements for the operating manual, including a requirement that it 
is maintained online, and any warnings that should be given.
e Strength/potency
Challenges
• Ensuring potency is  regulated,  and  reliably  and consistently  monitored 
in any retail products
• Ensuring  that  consumers are informed  about  the  potency  of  what they 
are consuming, its potential effects,  and how to minimise or avoid risks
• Minimising  the  potential  risks  associated  with  high-potency  cannabis 
and concentrates 
 
Analysis
• There  is  some confusion  around what  cannabis  potency means
• The concept  of ‘potency’ with regard to cannabis products is not exactly 
equivalent to that for alcohol:
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• Cannabis has  more  than  one active  ingredient  and  the  ratio  of  active 
contents is an important variable of both risk and subjective effects
• The amount of  active  content consumed  from  a  given  amount of 
smoked/inhaled cannabis can vary significantly (for example, in 
terms of the number, depth and length of inhalations)
• Auto-titration  with inhaled cannabis means  that  potency  issues  are 
less  of  a  concern - most  users  are  able  to  moderate  and control  use 
to achieve their desired level of intoxication, although this becomes 
more difficult as potency rises, and higher potency tends to increase 
total THC consumption
• Unknown or unpredictable  strength/potency  is  a  risk  of  unregulated 
 illegal  cannabis  that can be largely eliminated in an effectively regulated 
market
• Effective  testing  and monitoring  is  needed - but  can potentially  be  an 
expensive and onerous regulatory burden
• There are  additional  issues  to  consider with the potency of  edible 
cannabis products, and how this should be assessed and labelled on any 
retail products 
 
Recommendations
• The strength  and  potency  of  THC and  CBD content should  be 
tested  and  monitored  for  all retail  products - there  should  be  routine 
independent monitoring at production and retail stages of the market, 
supported by random retail purchase monitoring
• The  production  or  sale  of  cannabis  products  whose strength/potency 
varies significantly from its stated level or the level required by 
regulation, should be considered a serious licensing violation
• Product packaging and points of sale in on-site consumption venues 
should ensure that consumers have access to full and accurate 
information about  the strength/potency of  what they are  purchasing - 
expressed  in terms of  THC  and  CBD  content  (for more on Packaging, 
see p.125) 
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• Licensed vendors  should be required to undergo training  in strength/ 
potency-related health issues, so that they can inform and advise 
customers effectively (for more on Vendors, see p.133)
• Upper  limits  on  THC potency  could  be  considered  for  retail  herbal 
cannabis, but a combination of accurate/clear labelling, responsible 
retailing, and consumer education around potency issues and risk 
is a preferable option. Encouraging production and consumption of 
products/strains with safer  THC:CBD  ratios  would be a  useful  part  of 
this approach
• Limits  on  sales  of  high-potency concentrates  are a  more reasonable 
proposition - although  establishing  thresholds  may be  somewhat 
arbitrary and difficult to enforce
• Controls on total  THC and  CBD content by  weight  are a  more  practical 
proposition for edibles if they are sold as single edible units
There is a certain amount of confusion around the concept of cannabis 
potency - both  what  it  means in  technical  terms, and  what  its  implications 
are for the risks associated with the use of different cannabis products 
consumed in different ways. People are familiar with the concept of 
alcohol strength, expressed in percentage of alcohol content, and how 
this relates directly to the effects and risks of how much they consume. 
The situation is less straightforward with cannabis, and cannot be directly 
compared for a number of reasons.
Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol and cannabidiol Ben Mills
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Cannabis potency95 is usually measured in terms of the percentage of 
its key psychoactive ingredient, Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol96 (Δ9-THC or 
simply THC), but  THC is  only one  of  over 80  different  cannabinoids 
found in  the  cannabis  plant,  key  among  these  being  cannabidiol  (CBD). 
Because  CBD interacts  with  and modifies  the  effects  of  THC, the  ratio 
of the two is critical not only as it shapes the nature of the subjective 
cannabis experience  (CBD is thought to  have  a  more sedative  effect),  but 
also because CBD is thought to have  anti-psychotic properties,  potentially 
reducing the risks of psychotic episodes or psychotic illness related to 
cannabis use.97 The many other cannabinoids present in cannabis are 
less well understood but their relative proportions may also have subtle 
influences on the variable effects (and possibly risks) of different strains.
Lower-strength, outdoor-grown  cannabis tends to be  less than 10% THC, 
while indoor-grown, ‘premium’ cannabis varieties are predominantly in 
the 10-20%  range. The potency  of lower-quality  and  premium-grade 
resin has historically been roughly the same as this in European markets, 
although newer techniques such as butane or carbon dioxide extractions 
have produced  oils  and other concentrates , such  as  butane  hash  oil  (BHO, 
the semi-solid forms sometimes known as ‘wax’ or ‘glass’) ,  that have 
extremely  high potencies, some reaching  concentrations  of over  80% 
THC.
Another factor that complicates our understanding of cannabis potency 
is that the level of  intoxication and the speed of onset  of effects , which 
will determine  the  subjective experience, depend  in  large part on the 
particular preparation, method of consumption, and using behaviours.
95 The term ‘potency’ is used here in preference to other terms sometimes used interchangeably, such as 
‘strength’ or ‘purity’.
96 Also known by its International Non-Proprietary Name as ‘dronabinol’.
97 Zuardi, A. W. (2006) Cannabidiol, a Cannabis sativa constituent, as an antipsychotic drug, Brazilian 
Journal of Medical and Biological Research, Vol.39, No.4, pp.421–429.
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A  given amount  of cannabis  can  be smoked in  different ways , in  terms 
of how many inhalations the user takes, how deep the inhalations are 
and  how  long they  are  held  in the  lungs , so  the  amount  of  active  content 
that different individuals actually absorb can vary quite considerably. 
With smoked or vaporised cannabis, the onset of the effects is very rapid, 
meaning that users are able to dose control relatively easily. If they have 
not reached the desired effect, they will continue. If they have reached it, 
they can stop. On this basis, potency would seem to be less of a concern 
for inhaled  cannabis  use indeed  higher-potency  cannabis could mean 
fewer inhalations to achieve the same effect, thereby reducing respiratory 
risks. However, while such ‘auto-titration’ dose control behaviour is the 
norm,98 higher-potency cannabis can still potentially lead to higher 
total consumption and correspondingly pose greater risks. With more 
potent varieties a large dose of active content can be received in a single 
inhalation, and the larger such individual doses are, the harder it becomes 
to fine tune dosage control,99 meaning the potential to consume more 
than planned or desired is increased. This is particularly the case for 
novice users.
This risk of consuming more than planned (with potentially negative or 
undesirable effects) will be amplified when the potency of the cannabis 
being consumed is unknown. However, this problem can be reduced or 
effectively eliminated in a properly regulated system in which:
• Buyers  are able to choose  from  a  range of clearly  labelled  products of 
different potencies (see Packaging, p.125)
• Buyers are able to  take guidance from  licensed,  trained  vendors (see 
Vendors, p.133)
• There  is  relevant  information  on  dosage, effects  and  safer  use at point of 
sale and on all packaging
98 Mikuriya, T. H. and Aldrich, M. R. (1988) Cannabis 1988: Old Drug, New Dangers. The Potency 
Question,Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, Vol.20, No.1, pp.47–55.
99 Caulkins, S. et al. (2012) Marijuana legalization – what everyone needs to know, Oxford University Press, 
p.11.
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In many parts of the world smoked cannabis is also often mixed with 
tobacco, effectively diluting its potency to levels below those that 
would be experienced if it were smoked pure, much in the same way 
that spirits can be diluted with mixers to various degrees. While this 
may reduce some of the above risks relating to high-potency cannabis, 
any benefits are probably more than outweighed by the risks associated 
with smoked tobacco (see Smoking, p.98).
The increasing average potency of illegal cannabis is a genuine observed 
phenomenon in the US100 (and has been seen to a lesser extent in 
Europe), although what appears to be a modest incremental change in 
average potency has provoked many exaggerated ‘reefer madness’-style 
claims that have little basis in reality.101 102 In Western markets at least, 
the increasing market dominance of indoor-grown ‘premium’ cannabis, 
combined with likely actual increases in its potency (through selective 
breeding and developments in intensive growing technologies), has 
probably pushed average potency up to between two to three times 
what it was in the 60s and 70s. Such averages do, however, disguise 
a great deal of variety within markets and between different localities. 
There was of course very potent cannabis (particularly in resin form) 
available in  the  60s and 70s,  so  the suggestion that what is being 
consumed today is a completely different drug is misleading: the 
observed trend is primarily due to there being a greater proportion of 
more potent varieties on the market.   
100 Mehmedic, Z. et al. (2010) Potency Trends of D9-THC and Other Cannabinoids in Confiscated Cannabis 
Preparations from 1993 to 2008, Journal of Forensic Sciences, Vol.55, No.5, pp.1209-1217. http://home. 
olemiss.edu/~suman/potancy%20paper%202010.pdf.
101 For example, John Walters, then US Drug Czar, said: “Parents are often unaware that today’s marijuana 
is different from that of a generation ago, with potency levels 10 to 20 times stronger than the marijuana 
with which they were familiar.” The Myth of “Harmless” Marijuana, The Washington Post, May 1, 2002. 
ww.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/05/01/AR2006051500683.html
102 King, L. (2008) Understanding cannabis potency and monitoring cannabis products in Europe, Chapter 14, 
A cannabis reader: global issues and local experiences, EMCDDA. www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/ 
monographs/cannabis.
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The emergence of high potency 
concentrates like BHO is a new 
phenomenon, currently largely 
contained within North America, so 
relatively little is known about its 
prevalence and impacts. But aside from 
these concentrates, if there is some 
truth in the ‘it’s not what we smoked in 
the 60s’ claims, it is due to the arguably 
more concerning trend towards higher 
ratios  of  THC  to CBD  in  intensively 
 farmed higher-potency  cannabis - with 
CBD content  often  falling  to  near  zero 
 as  THC levels  have  crept up.  This  change  in  the THC:CBD ratio is  results 
 both  from selective breeding that prioritises high THC content (which 
commands a higher price), as well some of the newer intensive growing 
techniques deployed to maximise turnover from a given grow space 
that can reduce CBD content. The fact that outdoor-grown cannabis 
seems likely to have higher CBD  ratios  may have  implications  for any 
 proposed limits on outdoor growing in the future.
The data on increasing potency is not especially reliable (based primarily 
on seizures which may not necessarily be a representative sample of 
markets) and conclusions are widely disputed. It is certainly the case, 
however, that both the general trend towards increasing potency of 
herbal cannabis and the  parallel trend  towards increasing THC  to  CBD 
 ratios  are  not  merely demand-driven, but are primarily manifestations 
of criminal-market economics. There is an echo here of how, under US 
alcohol prohibition, the market shifted towards stronger spirits that 
provided significantly higher profits per unit weight for bootleggers. 
When alcohol prohibition ended, the market naturally shifted back 
towards sales of beers and wines. In many US and European markets 
it is now becoming hard to obtain  anything  except the more potent 
There is an echo here of 
how, under US alcohol 
prohibition, the market 
shifted towards stronger 
spirits that provided 
significantly higher profits 
per unit weight for the 
bootleggers. When alcohol 
prohibition ended, the 
market naturally shifted back 
towards beers and wines
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varieties , even when  users would prefer something milder if given the 
choice.103 
Recommendations
• Ensuring the THC and CBD content of all retail cannabis 
products is routinely tested
Although potency testing and monitoring of cannabis products can be 
relatively expensive (see Production, p.51), a reasonable level is not an 
excessive burden. Routine testing should be built into any regulatory 
framework, supported by random test purchasing, and be undertaken or 
commissioned independently by the regulating authorities. The intensity 
of testing required will become clear from levels of compliance but should 
err on the side of more rather than less at the outset. The production and 
in particular sale of products that diverge significantly from their stated 
potency should be considered a serious licence violation. Allowable error 
margins and penalties for violations should be clearly established.
• Ensuring consumers are aware of the potency of all retail 
cannabis products — and their related risks
All retail products should be clearly labelled with potency information 
covering THC  and  CBD content.104 This  should  be  supported with 
 related information  on  risks, potentially with  a simplified numerical (e.g. 
1-5) strength guide (see Packaging information, p.125). More detailed 
standardised information on cannabis potency and related risks should 
also be made prominently available at point of sale in all retail outlets. 
103 It has been suggested that this narrowing of the cannabis market may even be partly responsible for the fall 
in cannabis use observed across Europe in the past decade, as many do not care for the higher-potency 
products or have negative experiences with them as novice users.
104 More sophisticated testing and labelling of other cannabinoids and terpenes would be desirable (but as an 
option for retailers rather than legal requirement) and is provided by some of the more sophisticated legal 
medical and non-medical outlets in the US.
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Vendors should be trained to give advice on potency and related risk 
issues (see p.133).
• Controlling the potency of retail products
Having an upper limit on the THC content of retail herbal or resin/oil 
cannabis for non-medical use could be seen as a sensible precautionary 
measure, but is problematic for number of reasons, particularly in a 
more  open  market model.  Beyond  what many consumers  may  view  as 
an unfair or unnecessary imposition, the most obvious practical issues 
are exactly where such a threshold would be set and how it could be 
enforced.
In 2012  the  Dutch government proposed a  prohibition  on  sales  of  herbal 
cannabis  over  15% THC,  although  this move  has  yet  to  be approved  and 
has been opposed by almost every government office (including the police, 
prosecutors, and forensic service) that would be involved in enforcing 
the limit.105 Even if most consumers are unlikely to be concerned by an 
upper limit at or near this level (which would still be considered strong 
herbal cannabis by most) the fact is that any such limit is inevitably quite 
arbitrary, and as such could lead to arbitrary enforcement outcomes. 
This is especially the case given the improving but still imperfect nature 
of both potency control among growers (even with the most carefully 
cultivated cannabis there will be a certain amount of potency variation 
between crops, and even within any given crop or sample) and potency 
testing technology.
If the aim is to encourage the use of safer, lower-potency products as a 
way of moderating risks, then a more sensible approach would appear to 
be a combination of:
105 Blickman, T., Restrictive government cannabis policies are defied by local initiatives and court rulings, 
Transnational institute, 04/10/13. www.druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/4960-majority-of-the-dutch- 
favour-cannabis-legalisation.
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• Strict product testing and labelling requirements that ensure buyers know 
exactly what they are consuming, and enable them to make informed 
choices
• Consumer education about potency-related issues/risks, supported  by 
packaging and point of sale info, and training requirements for vendors
• Responsible  retailing,  which  could  be encouraged through  licensing 
requirements for vendor training in how to provide potency and risk 
advice to purchasers
• Variable  tax  rates (or other price controls),  which  could be  employed 
 in order  to encourage the use of less potent products, as is done with 
alcohol in many countries
If limiting the potency of retail cannabis under a relatively open market 
model is problematic, under a more regulated market model such as that 
found in Uruguay it is less of a challenge, as the regulatory authorities 
licence producers to provide the specified products that will be available 
for sale. Even in this more restricted scenario, as noted in the previous 
section on preparations, cannabis ‘connoisseurs’, or those who desire 
higher-potency strains, can still be catered for either by provisions on 
home growing or cannabis social clubs (see p.65).
Restrictions on sales of high-potency concentrates are a more reasonable 
proposition if such products are shown to be associated with significantly 
increased risks, but again such restrictions face the challenges of where 
any potency threshold should be drawn and how it would be enforced. 
One possibility would be to permit retail sales of herbal cannabis only, 
and limit access to concentrates to the more controlled environment 
of membership-based cannabis social clubs. However, some of the 
newer production techniques for concentrates (such as CO2 and butane 
extractions) are quite dangerous in inexperienced hands, so licensed 
production and availability is probably preferable if the alternative 
is risky home production. As discussed in the previous section, such 
decisions will be significantly shaped by the nature of existing demand 
and patterns of use. Certainly if there is little or no existing demand for 
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high-potency concentrates, establishing a framework for making them 
available is likely to be something regulators will naturally want to avoid 
(although some advocates for medical cannabis access have made the 
case that concentrates may have specific medical utility).
If potency threshold limits are adopted for either herbal cannabis or resin/ 
concentrates , and  it  seems  inevitable that some jurisdictions will  choose 
to do so , it will  be  important  to  make  sure they  are set  high enough to 
cater for the large majority of existing demand in a given jurisdiction. 
If they are set too low it will simply create an opportunity for illicit 
producers to meet the unsatisfied demand. There will need to be the 
flexibility to adjust (or abandon) such thresholds in response to evidence 
of their impacts and effectiveness.
Enforcement of any limits will also require a reasonable amount of 
tolerance, to allow for the imprecision of growers, and testing technology . 
Any  sanctions  for threshold violations will  also need  to be  proportionate. 
Such limits would sensibly be regarded more as a good practice guide 
for retailers or as a moderating influence on the potency of the products 
they sell. The aim should be to curb certain risky behaviours and prevent 
potency levels creeping up further, rather than to create a new form of 
prohibition that will needlessly penalise existing users or vendors in the 
future.
A  different  approach would be  needed  for edibles, with THC  and CBD 
content by weight being clearly labelled on standardised single servings of 
any given edible product. What constitutes an edible unit for an individual 
should  be clearly defined and an upper limit  on  THC  and  CBD content 
per unit should also be established. However, because the proportions 
of THC and CBD  by weight  will mean  little to  users  more familiar  with 
potency expressed as a percentage, developing an easily understandable 
numerical, colour-coded or traffic light-type scale to indicate potency 
would be sensible.
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There  is  a parallel  issue around possible regulation of THC:CBD ratios. 
Attempting to establish an enforceable ratio limit would be even more 
problematic than THC content thresholds, not least as the scientific basis 
for judgements about the risks of any given THC:CBD ratio is not well 
established. For more restrictive regulatory models, it makes sense to 
 ensure  that  licensed herbal or resin cannabis  products all include  a  CBD 
‘buffer’- with a range of 2-4% suggested as a starting point (albeit based on 
the limited available research). For less restrictive market models this will 
primarily need to be dealt with through clear product labelling, consumer 
education, and responsible retailing, all informed by the emerging body 
of knowledge on this particular question.
f Packaging
Challenges
• Ensuring  packaging is  child resistant to  help minimise  risk  of  accidental 
child ingestion and poisonings
• Ensuring  key  product  content,  risk  and  advice  information  is  available 
on the packaging
• Ensuring packaging  serves to preserve the freshness and quality of the 
product
• Ensuring  packaging  design  is not used to encourage use
Analysis 
• Established  packaging  technology  for food  and pharmaceuticals can be 
easily adapted to meet the needs of cannabis packaging
• The small but real  risk of accidental child ingestion and poisoning  can 
be minimised through use of child resistant packaging
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• Child resistant plastic  containers  offer an  adequate  level  of  protection 
for the majority of cannabis products, are relatively inexpensive and 
meet other packaging requirements
• Tamper-proofing  measures could  be  included in  packaging  design  if 
deemed necessary
• As  with alcohol, tobacco and  pharmaceuticals,  packaging  provides  an 
ideal vehicle to display key product and safety information
• Packaging design  and  branding  can  be  used  to  make  products  more  or 
less attractive and encourage or discourage use
Recommendations 
• All take-out  retail  cannabis products  should be sold  in  opaque  resealable 
 child-resistant  plastic  containers with additional  tamper-proofing 
measures included on products if deemed necessary
• Home-grown  cannabis  should also  be  required  to  be  stored in child 
resistant packaging
• Information on packaging should  be  modelled  on  established  norms  for 
pharmaceutical drugs and recent lessons from tobacco packaging, with 
additional information and messages as appropriate
• The contents and prominence of packaging information should be 
determined by the appropriate public health authority and be legally 
enforced
• By  default,  packaging  should be standardised and non  branded
• Packaging  regulations  should be clearly  outlined in law  and  properly 
enforced
Child resistant packaging
There is a risk of accidental ingestion of cannabis products by children, 
particularly under-fives. The medical literature suggests this is a real 
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risk106 but that such incidents are rare, certainly when compared to more 
conventional poisonings. Accidental ingestions of cannabis by children 
have risen in Colorado post-legalisation, although in real terms, the 
numbers remain low – for under-9s, the number rose from 19 in 2011, 
to 45 in 2014, all of whom made full recoveries (for perspective, the 
equivalent 2014107 numbers for under-5 pediatric exposures to painkillers 
were 2,178, and 1,422 for cleaning products108). The reduced stigma 
associated with attending A&E post-legalisation may also go some way 
to explaining this trend.
There does, however, appear to be an increased risk with certain more 
concentrated preparations and, in particular, cannabis edibles that 
are more attractive to children and infants, such as cakes, brownies or 
sweets.109
Even if this risk is relatively small, measures that could reduce it should 
be adopted. We recommend that established ‘child resistant’ re-sealable 
opaque plastic containers (as used for medicines, some foods and domestic 
products) should be used by  default  for  all  retail  cannabis  products (even 
for herbal cannabis, which presents a lower-risk as it is not palatable to 
infants). This is a sensible precaution, and has the added political benefit 
of demonstrating a strong commitment to child safety. Such containers 
are mass-produced and inexpensive (costing only a few cents each) and 
therefore have little impact on total cost for either purchaser or retailer.
106  There are relatively few studies, most being case studies describing infant hospitalisations, sometimes 
involving coma. No deaths are recorded.
107 Barker, E. A. et al. (2015) ‘Marijuana Exposures Reported to the Rocky Mountain Poison and Drug Center’. 
https://cste.confex.com/cste/2015/videogateway.cgi/id/826?recordingid=826
108 Rocky Mountain Poison and Drug Center (2014) ‘Colorado 2014 Annual Report’. http://rmpdc.org/
Portals/23/docs/Colorado-Annual-Report-2014-Poison-Center.pdf?ver=2015-06-02-134623-980
109 A 2013 paper describes a marked increase (from zero to 14) in emergency admissions for cannabis ingestion 
in under-12s in Colorado before and after 2009. Of the 14, half were for cannabis edibles. See: Wang, G. S. 
et al. (2013) Pediatric Marijuana Exposures in a Medical Marijuana State, JAMA Pediatrics, Vol.167, No.7, 
pp.630–633.
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The risk of children accidentally ingesting 
cannabis-infused food products is another 
argument for restricting sales of edibles, at 
least in the early stages of any new regulatory 
model. Prohibiting edibles for take-out , as 
 opposed  to  on-site  consumption  in  a  licensed 
venue ,  might be a reasonable compromise 
as a starting point, but permitting sales of 
products that obviously resemble sweets, 
such as lollies, gummi-bears or chocolates 
(particularly in packaging that resembles 
conventional candy products), is an exceptionally bad idea, and should 
be avoided. People who wish to consume edibles would of course be 
able prepare them at home with ease, using herbal or resin cannabis 
(and potentially concentrates or tinctures), so such a restriction should 
not be viewed as overly stringent. If, however, edibles are to be made 
available for take-out retail, any risks can, as mentioned, be minimised 
by the use of resealable child resistant plastic containers. Labelling on 
 such packaging would need  to  have prominent warnings about potential 
risks of child ingestion, and the responsibility of the purchaser to prevent 
it (see below).
Home-grown cannabis, and obviously any home-made cannabis edibles, 
should also be stored in child resistant containers. Although legally 
mandating or enforcing specific rules would be problematic, failure 
to abide by storage guidelines might be taken into consideration by 
enforcement or prosecutors if accidental child (or indeed adult) ingestion 
occurred. This is probably more  an  issue  for intelligently  targeted 
education , highlighting potential risks and encouraging responsible 
storage in the home.
Child resistant packaging 
is most obviously a 
priority in the case 
of cannabis-infused 
food products, as their 
familiar appearance 
and taste increase the 
risk that they may be 
consumed by children
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Tamper-proofing
Effective packaging can help to ensure quality, reduce the possibilities 
for tampering, and allow the purchaser or user to know if tampering has 
occurred. Established product packaging types used for pharmaceutical 
drugs can easily be adapted for use with cannabis products.
For example, existing medical-style containers featuring sufficiently 
secure seal mechanisms could be appropriate. Such mechanisms include 
breakable caps or inner seals of thermal plastic or foil over the mouth of 
the container. Packaging of this kind is already utilised by many suppliers 
in the medical cannabis industry and could be more widely deployed as 
needed.
Information on packaging, and packaging design
Experience with alcohol and tobacco packaging provides useful guidance 
here, mostly on how not to proceed. Over the past century, the design 
priorities of alcohol and tobacco packaging have been shaped by 
commercial interests. Reverse-engineering appropriate packaging that 
carries clear information on the risks of these two drugs has proved 
problematic, with voluntary efforts by the respective industries woefully 
inadequate, and legislators reluctant to mandate changes (see p.40). This 
situation has at  least  begun  to  change with tobacco packaging  in  recent 
years -  firstly with the appearance of prominent health warnings, and 
more recently with the adoption of plain packaging in some countries.
Branding  and  design of  packaging  plays a key role in the appeal of a product. 
Alcohol and tobacco packaging is evidence of this, having been created 
with the specific intention of encouraging initiation of use, increasing 
use, and ensuring brand loyalties. Design can act as a marketing device 
by making the product more eye-catching and attractive, which in turn 
helps facilitate product placement in a range of media and associations 
with certain desirable qualities or aspirant lifestyles for target markets.
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Recent years have witnessed 
growing calls from medical 
authorities for such marketing 
practices to be restricted, 
particularly for tobacco 
products, in line with already 
widely established controls on 
other forms of marketing (see 
Marketing, p.159). Research clearly 
demonstrates how design and 
branding influence purchasing behaviours 
in ways designed to encourage increased 
initiation and use.110 Claims to the contrary 
from the tobacco industry defy not only 
the vast body of expert research and 
opinion, but common sense: why would 
the industry invest in such marketing and 
so passionately object to plain packaging if 
not for commercial self-interest? In 2012, 
Australia  became the  first country in the 
world to introduce plain packaging for 
tobacco products, and a number of other 
 jurisdictions, including Scotland,  England 
 and Wales, Norway, Ireland, France, the European Union, India, Canada, 
New Zealand and  Turkey  are  contemplating or implementing  similar 
moves.
We propose that the design of packaging for cannabis products, and the 
information it carries, be more closely modelled on established norms 
for pharmaceutical drugs, with unbranded packaging, devoid of logos or 
any form of marketing-led design. Packaging design should be functional, 
110 Moodie C. et al. (2012) Plain tobacco packaging: a systematic review’, Public Health Research Consortium. 
http://phrc.lshtm.ac.uk/papers/PHRC_006_Final_Report.pdf.
US medical cannabis drink packaging
Drinkcannacola.com
Packaging for medical cannabis in the 
Netherlands
mspotillas.wordpress.com
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restricted to only providing product and safety information on labelling 
(edibles having to additionally comply with local food and beverage 
labelling rules). The specific design content and prominence of packaging 
information should be determined by the appropriate public health 
authority and be legally mandated.
The detail will vary between jurisdictions, but in the box below we have 
proposed a guide to what packaging information should include. Clearly 
the volume of health, risk, and harm reduction information listed cannot 
fit on a single product package label. Solutions to this could involve one 
or more of the following:
• Rotating a  series  of  key  messages on package  labelling  (in a similar way 
to the health messages on cigarette packaging). Certain core safety 
information , such  as  reminders  to  keep  out  of  reach  of  children  or  not 
drive  under  the  influence of cannabis , should, however,  always  be 
included on packaging
• Inserts  similar  to  those  found in  most  pharmaceutical products  could 
be used, with a single folded piece of paper with detailed product 
information inserted into even the smallest containers. A standardised 
insert, which would be inexpensive to produce, could be mandated 
for inclusion with all retail cannabis products for reference whenever 
needed
• A web-link  to  an  appropriate  online  resource could  be  prominently 
signposted  on the  packaging.  A  QR  code could  also  be  included  for 
smartphone users
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Packaging information
CONTENTS DESCRIPTION
Preparation
• Herbal cannabis — with details on variety/strain 
• Resin/oil/other concentrate — details 
• Description of edible product, and cannabis used in its preparation                           
          (other ingredients should be listed separately, in line with existing                                   
          trades description rules for foods and beverages)
Potency information
• For  herbal and resin cannabis — THC and CBD content as a                                                
         percentage 
• For edibles — THC and CBD content by weight in each standardised                       
         edible unit 
• A simple numeric potency scale (1-5 or 1-10) so that the strength of                             
         products is made as clear as possible
Best before/use before dates
• While more of a priority for edibles (standard food rules would apply),      
          these should be included on all cannabis products as they can degrade         
          over time
HEALTH/RISK/HARM REDUCTION INFORMATION
Key effects and side effects
• Positive and negative effects 
• Effects at different dosages 
• Likely different effects on different users (age, experienced or novice                    
          users, body-mass)
General risks
• Dependence 
• Respiratory health 
• Mental health 
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• Motivation 
• For people with existing medical conditions
Secondary  risks
• Impaired driving, operating machinery and workplace competence 
• Pregnancy 
• Accidental child ingestion
Harm reduction: how to minimise risk
• Safer methods of consumption 
• Safer products and preparations 
• How to moderate use 
• Poly-drug use issues
Contraindications
• Risks of consumption with other non-medical drug use or use with                             
          prescribed or non-prescribed medications
Where to get help and advice
• Links/contacts to relevant service providers
g Vendors
Challenges 
• Ensuring  licensing  requirements for  vendors  support  the  aims of  policy
• Ensuring  any  commercial  priorities of  vendors do not  undermine  key 
functions of a vendor regulatory regime including purchaser access 
control, access to accurate product and health information, and 
minimisation of social and health harms
• Ensuring  adequate  enforcement of  vendor  regulation
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Analysis 
• Vendors  can be  required to adhere  to and  enforce  restrictions  on  sales 
relating to age, intoxication or other criteria
• Vendors in  retail-only  outlets  can  be  a key  means of educating  users 
about risks of different products, harm minimisation, responsible use, 
and where to get help or further information
• Vendors working in  venues that permit on-site  consumption have 
additional responsibilities necessitating additional training requirements 
for dealing with customers who require care or monitoring
• Experience  with tobacco  and  particularly  alcohol suggests  voluntary 
codes of practice for responsible service training are inadequate and not 
universally adopted
• Experience with  tobacco  and alcohol demonstrates that commercial 
pressures will lead to vendors failing to meet their responsibilities 
voluntarily, so adequate enforcement is crucial
• Having  vendors carry  partial responsibility for the behaviour  of  their 
customers (for example, for antisocial behaviour, or driving under the 
influence of cannabis), may help reduce potential social harms
Recommendations 
• Basic training  requirements , covering  cannabis  use  and health, how to 
engage with users, as well as legal regulatory requirements and how 
to  enforce  them , should  be  mandated  by  regulatory authorities  for  all 
vendors, with additional requirements for vendors in venues that permit 
on-site consumption
• Vendor requirements  should be  adequately  enforced  to  ensure  they  are 
 universally adhered to
• Failure  to  meet  requirements  should  be  dealt  with  using  a  hierarchy  of 
penalties including fines and withdrawal of licence
• Systems  for partial  shared responsibility  of  vendors  and customers  for 
any cannabis-related social hams should be explored
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Vendors are the  public’s  first  point  of  contact with any legally  regulated 
cannabis market. They are effectively gatekeepers of access to the drug, 
and must therefore be subject to policies, laws and training that help 
ensure cannabis is made available in as safe and responsible a manner as 
possible.
The requirements that will need to be met by cannabis vendors will, 
for the most part, mirror those that are currently applied to vendors of 
alcohol or tobacco, although lessons from the successes and shortcomings 
of these regulations should allow a more robust and effective system to 
be established from the outset. So the main aims of cannabis vendor 
regulation should be:
• To promote  health  and wellbeing,  and  minimise  harms  to  consumers 
and the wider public
• To protect  children  and  young people  from cannabis-related risks
• To prevent crime, antisocial  behaviour and public  disorder
The specific measures that must be taken in order to achieve these aims 
will depend on the type of outlet in which the vendor is operating. (See 
Outlets p.151). Public disorder problems, for example, will be more 
common in venues that permit on-site consumption rather than retail-
only establishments, and will therefore require additional health and 
safety issues to be taken into account. Nevertheless, what follows is a 
discussion of the main regulatory challenges for cannabis vending and 
general proposals for how to address them.
The following section on purchasers and end-users covers the specifics of 
some of the regulations vendors will be required to adhere to and enforce.
Socially responsible service training
Vendors are well placed to help minimise any negative social or health 
impacts resulting from cannabis consumption, and should be required 
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to do so. This requirement should extend to vendors of tobacco and 
alcohol, who have traditionally been subject to minimal regulation. In 
the majority of countries, tobacco can, for example, be sold by unlicensed 
vendors through outlets that also sell products aimed at children.
The primary  responsibility  of  vendors  of  cannabis ,  and vendors  of  these 
other, currently legal drugs ,  should be  to  ensure regulatory  regimes 
are  adhered  to ,  by, for  example,  enforcing  age  restrictions  or  refusing 
sales to those who are intoxicated. Vendors should also act as a source 
of accurate, credible information and advice to customers on a range of 
issues, such as safer consumption methods, the risks of driving under the 
influence of cannabis, and where individuals can seek help or advice if 
they, or the vendor, have concerns about their cannabis use. Information 
provided by vendors will complement that provided by other sources, 
such as packaging and point-of-sale displays (see Packaging, p.125 and 
Marketing, p.159)
Training programmes that educate both servers and management about 
the importance of responsible vending, and how it can be achieved, 
should therefore form a central element of any regulatory framework 
governing those who sell cannabis. Such programmes can be voluntary. 
For example, in many jurisdictions, the alcohol industry has ‘responsible 
retailer’ codes  that  recommend staff  training.  But  we  would suggest 
 these be  both  standardised,  with  content  determined  by  regulators  and 
public health authorities, and made mandatory for all front line staff  as  a 
condition of any vendor licensing agreements.
Responsible beverage  service  (RBS) training  provides  a  useful template  for 
how cannabis vendors can be encouraged to serve responsibly. Effective 
RBS  training  seeks to:
• Put  in  place  appropriate  attitudes  towards  alcohol  consumption  by 
teaching vendors about its social and physical effects
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• Teach techniques  for  checking  identification,  recognising  signs  of  over 
consumption, and refusing service if necessary
• Make  management  and  service  staff  aware  of the penalties  for 
violations of the law
Equivalent training requirements for employees of outlets for the sale 
of cannabis should do the same. Colorado, for example, has made 
provisions for such training, as well as awarding a ‘responsible vendor 
designation’, valid for two years from the date of issuance, to cannabis 
retailers that satisfactorily complete a training programme approved by 
the state licensing authority.111
More rigorous training for vendors operating in venues that permit on- 
site consumption will also be appropriate, as they are more likely to 
encounter intoxicated customers who may require monitoring or care.
Training that teaches a working knowledge of the effects of different 
cannabis products, and methods of use, should also be required, along 
with training in basic first aid and how to deal with people who have 
overindulged and are consequently in distress or at risk.
Such training has typically been seen as impractical for pub or bar staff, 
who are often low-paid and working on a temporary or informal basis. 
This reality should not, however, prevent at least basic training being 
mandated for cannabis retail staff.
While determining the content of cannabis vendor training programmes 
is relatively straightforward, ensuring that vendors go on to implement 
the requirements of such programmes presents more of a challenge. 
Under a commercial model of cannabis regulation, the profit motivation 
of vendors will naturally create a tendency against restricting access and 
111 Colorado Senate Bill 13-283, p.2. www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources/Leg/EnablingBills/
SB13-283.pdf.
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towards maximising sales. However, this is essentially a carrot and stick 
issue: on the one hand, a culture should be encouraged whereby vendors 
understand that it is in their long-term interests to follow the regulations, 
and on the other, public resources should be put into educating vendors 
and customers about regulations and then enforcing them effectively. 
Non-profit  retail models,  such  as  cannabis  social  clubs  or  state  monopoly 
supply models, are  less  likely  to  experience  such  conflicts  of  interest  as 
the incentive to increase sales is reduced or eliminated.
The importance of enforcing cannabis vending regulations can be 
inferred from research into alcohol, which shows that compliance with 
the  requirements  of  RBS training programmes  is  highest in places  where 
the regulatory environment is perceived to be strict.112 As is the case 
with alcohol, compliance with socially responsible cannabis vending 
regulations will therefore depend on the extent to which vendors 
believe penalties will be imposed, which in turn requires active, visible 
enforcement, such as regular checks on serving practices.
Shared responsibility between vendor and consumer
As a further way of ensuring responsible vendor conduct, licensing 
agreements could also include elements of shared responsibility between 
provider and consumer. The provider could be held partially liable for 
consumers’  behaviour. This  would  encourage vendors ,  and  in  particular, 
consumption venue proprietors , to monitor the environment where 
cannabis is used, and restrict sales based on the behaviour of consumers.
Proprietors could be held partly responsible for socially destructive 
incidents such as automobile accidents related to driving under the 
influence of cannabis (DUIC) or localised anti-social behaviour, with this 
responsibility extending for a specified period of time after cannabis is 
112 Mosher et al. (2002) State Laws Mandating or Promoting Training Programs for Alcohol Servers and 
Establishment Managers: An Assessment of Statutory and Administrative Procedures, Journal of Public 
Health Policy, Vol.23, No.1, pp.90–113.
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consumed. Sanctions could include fines or even licence revocations for 
those who repeatedly make irresponsible sales. The consumer would not 
be absolved of responsibility for such incidents; a clearly defined balance 
based on how liability should be shared would need to be formalised or 
judged on a case by case basis by enforcers. This is admittedly a potentially 
tricky area of regulation to establish and police, but precedents relating 
to alcohol vending do exist in Canada, the US and elsewhere, and there 
is good evidence that such liability laws are effective at preventing and 
reducing alcohol-related harms.113 This provides reasonable grounds for 
assuming that cannabis-related harms could be minimised through similar 
legislation , and this  approach  should  at  least  warrant  experimentation.
Online vendors
Given the trajectory of retailing generally, and the fact that some people 
(for health or geographical reasons) may not  be able to easily access 
traditional face-to-face vendors, it seems inevitable that some form of 
online market with home deliveries will need to exist. Given this reality 
it is therefore preferable to bring online markets  within a regulated 
framework from the outset, to prevent unregulated informal online 
markets filling the void - as indeed they already are in some countries. 
We suggest that, as far as possible, any such online retailing should seek 
to maintain the key benefits of face-to-face vending outlined above. 
Whilst this option requires more careful development, key elements 
could include:
• Appropriate methods for age verification at the point of purchase  
• Requiring online customers to answer a series of short standardised 
tick-box questions to confirm they understand the health implications of 
cannabis use. 
113 Rammohan, V. et al. (2011) Effects of Dram Shop Liability and Enhanced Over Service Law Enforcement 
Initiatives on Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Related Harms: Two Community Guide Systematic 
Reviews, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, Vol.41, No.3, pp.334–343.
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• As part of these questions, customers would be asked if they would like 
to talk to a trained individual about cannabis or their cannabis use
• Requiring licensed online outlets to employ trained health advisors 
who can engage with customers through an online chat facility when 
customers say that this is something they feel they would benefit from  
• Potentially having a licensed/registered buyer scheme to allow access to 
online sales, or membership of a CSC that included a delivery service.
• Online vendors should be subject to the same licensing process as shops 
and CSCs.  Individual online businesses could also have licensing limits 
on total volume of sales
h Purchasers
Challenges 
• Determining the  optimum age threshold  for access  to  a  legal  cannabis 
 supply
• Putting  in  place  effective  systems for enforcing  age  access  controls
• Preventing  excessive  bulk  purchases of  cannabis  for  re-sale  on  the  illicit 
market or to minors
• Determining appropriate  public  locations  where  cannabis  can  be 
consumed
Analysis 
• Age limits  on  access  to  legal  cannabis  are  important and  alcohol  and 
tobacco controls demonstrate they can be effective, if imperfect. Where 
to set the age threshold is a key question: too high and an illegal market 
is incentivised, too low and use may rise among vulnerable populations
• Enforcement  of age  limits  is  a key  factor  in  their  effectiveness
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• Any sales  rations  imposed  on  purchasers  will  need to be  set  high 
enough to avoid encouraging additional purchases from the illicit 
market, but low enough to restrict bulk buying for secondary sales
• Limits on  sales  are  potentially  useful  in  political  terms,  demonstrating 
that regulation has been designed with the aim of promoting 
responsible levels of cannabis consumption
• While  purchaser licensing  systems may  be  politically  useful,  they  are 
likely to be treated with suspicion, as many people will not wish to 
have evidence of their cannabis use recorded in a central database
• Experience from alcohol  and,  in  particular,  tobacco  regulation  suggests 
that restrictions on where cannabis can be consumed will be helpful in 
promoting socially responsible use
Recommendations 
• While an  essential  component  of  any  regulatory  system,  age  restrictions 
on cannabis sales can only be part of the solution to underage misuse 
and should therefore be complemented by evidence-based prevention 
and harm reduction programmes
• Given that  age  restrictions on  alcohol  and  tobacco sales have historically 
been poorly enforced, the same restrictions on cannabis sales should 
be  supported  by  a  more  stringent  system  for  monitoring  vendors’ 
compliance with the law. In line with this approach, age restrictions on 
alcohol and tobacco should also be more proactively enforced
• Penalties for  underage  sales  of  cannabis  should  be  equivalent  to  those 
currently in place for such sales of alcohol and tobacco
• Sales limits  should  be  trialled  but  could  be  relaxed  or  removed once 
legal cannabis markets expand and the incentive to bulk-buy for re-sale 
in illicit markets diminishes
• Controls over  permitted  locations  for smoking cannabis  should 
mirror  those  that currently exist for public tobacco smoking in many 
jurisdictions
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• Vaporiser  technology could allow  cannabis  users  to consume  the drug  in 
indoor areas, given that, unlike smoking, it does not pose risks to third 
parties
Age restrictions on sales
Restricting or preventing access to cannabis by non-adults should be a 
key element of any regulatory model for cannabis. Any rights of access 
to psychoactive drugs and freedom of choice over drug-taking decisions 
should only be granted to consenting adults. This is partly because of the 
more general concerns regarding child vs. adult rights and responsibilities. 
More importantly, the specific short- and long-term health risks 
associated with cannabis use are significantly higher for children: the 
younger the user, the greater the risks. This combination of legal principle 
and public health management legitimises a strict age control policy. In 
practical terms, stringent restrictions on young people’s	access	to	drugs	˛	
while	inevitably	imperfect	˛	are	more	feasible	and	easier	to	police	than	
population-wide prohibitions. Generally speaking, children are subject to 
a range of social and state controls that adults are not. More specifically, 
drug restrictions for minors command the near universal adult support 
that population-wide prohibitions conspicuously do not. 
Furthermore, while markets created by any prohibition will always 
attract criminal interest, the non-adult market for drugs is a small fraction 
of the total adult market. So, enforcement resources can be brought to 
bear on it with far more efficiency, and correspondingly greater chances 
of success.
One ironic and unintended side effect of prohibition is to often make 
illegal drug markets, controlled by profit-seeking criminal entrepreneurs 
unconstrained by age restrictions, easier for young people to buy from 
than legally regulated markets for, say, alcohol or tobacco, which 
obviously enforce such controls.
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Of course, there is an important 
debate around what age constitutes 
adulthood and/or an acceptable age-
access threshold. Different countries 
have adopted different thresholds for 
tobacco and alcohol, generally ranging 
from 14 to 21 for  purchase  or  access  to 
 licensed  premises.  Where this threshold should lie for a given drug product 
will depend on a range of pragmatic choices. These decisions should be 
informed by objective risk assessments, evaluated by individual states 
or local licensing authorities, and balanced in accordance with their own 
priorities. As with all areas of regulatory policy, there needs to be some 
flexibility allowed in response to changing circumstances or emerging 
evidence.
In the UK, for example, the age of access for tobacco purchase was raised 
from 16  to  18  in  2007,  while  in  the  US  there is  a  growing  debate  over 
whether  the  alcohol  age  threshold  of  21  is too  high.  Indeed,  the  Amethyst 
Initiative,114  which  is  supported by  135  chancellors  and  presidents  of  US 
universities  and  colleges, argues that  the  21  limit  has  created  “a culture of 
dangerous, clandestine ‘binge-drinking’ — often conducted off-campus” and that 
“by choosing to use fake IDs, students make ethical compromises that erode respect 
for the law.” Even within a legal regulatory framework, inappropriate 
prohibitions evidently have the potential to create negative unintended 
consequences. Even if well intentioned they can potentially undermine, 
rather than augment, social controls and responsible norms around drugs 
and drug use.
In US states that have legalised cannabis  the  threshold  has also  been  set 
 at  21.  Many felt this was too high for reasons similar to those argued by 
the Amethyst Initiative. However, it would have been politically difficult 
to set the age restriction below that for alcohol. In Uruguay the age 
114 www.theamethystinitiative.org
Restricting or preventing 
access to cannabis by 
non-adults should be a key 
element of any regulatory 
model for cannabis
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threshold  has  been set at 18, the same as  it  is  in  the  Netherlands’  cannabis 
coffee shops.  An  age threshold  at  or  near 18 would  seem  to  be  realistic 
starting  point , although  this  decision  inevitably  needs  to  be  considered in 
the local cultural context.
Preventing underage sales
It is clear that age limits need to be properly enforced if they are to be 
effective. In the UK, for example, where ‘binge drinking’ among young 
people has been a growing problem, there has been a widespread lack of 
age restriction enforcement, with Alcohol Concern reporting that: “10–
15% of licensed premises are found to persistently sell alcohol to the under-aged 
yet only 0.5% of licensed premises are called up for review.”
As with alcohol and tobacco, a combination of vigorously enforced vendor 
licensing requirements (for both front-of-house staff and management), 
combined with vending staff training, can mitigate against negligence 
or ‘turning a blind eye’ to underage sales of cannabis. The threat of a 
personal, on-the-spot fine for a member of staff who makes a sale that 
violates age restrictions would help to encourage vigilance and ensure 
purchasers’ ages  are  verified.  In  the  UK,  for  example,  underage  sales  of 
alcohol  are  punishable  by  an  £80  fine  to  the  member  of  staff  in  question, 
as well as a possible £5,000 fine and licence review for the proprietor or 
licensee. Persistently  selling alcohol  to  minors , which  is  defined  as  two 
or more underage  sales  in a  period  of  three  consecutive  months ,   can 
result in a maximum fine of £20,000 and suspension or revocation of 
licence. Penalties for underage sales of cannabis should, at the very least, 
be brought in line with those currently in place for alcohol or tobacco 
in the country or jurisdiction in question. A hierarchy of penalties with 
sales to younger customers incurring more severe sanctions would also 
be appropriate to reflect the increasing seriousness of the violation as the 
age of purchaser decreased. Sales below a certain age threshold, perhaps 
around  14,  could  potentially  graduate  into  prosecutable  offences.
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Given that such regimes are so often either inadequate, or inadequately 
enforced for alcohol and tobacco, it may be necessary to put in place a 
more vigorous penalty system and also for policy makers to revisit alcohol 
and tobacco policies to ensure there is greater consistency, and to move 
policy towards best practice across the board. Some resources currently 
employed in the enforcement of prohibition could be transferred to more 
proactively  police  vendors’  compliance  with  age restriction  regulations. 
Compliance can be  easily  checked  using  test  purchasing , and  the  level 
of compliance will give a clear indication of how much enforcement is 
needed. From the outset it seems sensible to err on the side of caution, and 
initially carry out frequent checks and impose heavier penalties in order 
to clearly establish norms. If a high level of compliance is established 
from the outset, this enforcement regime can then be lightened in the 
future.
Training for vendors should include information on acceptable forms 
of identification and how to ask for it in a non-confrontational manner. 
Schemes such as  the  UK’s  ‘Challenge 25’ can be implemented in order 
to allow staff a greater margin of error when challenging customers for 
proof of age. Under the scheme, staff are encouraged to request ID for 
anyone who appears to be under the age of 25, even though the age 
restriction on the purchase of alcohol  and tobacco  is 18.  Posters and 
labels alerting customers that such a policy is in place, or at least that ID 
will be requested, should be displayed in outlets to reduce the likelihood 
of a hostile response when an individual is asked to show proof of age.
To remind vendors of the need to perform age checks, most modern 
electronic tills can be programmed to display an on-screen prompt when 
age-restricted products are scanned at the checkout. In outlets with the 
requisite technology, sales of cannabis could trigger such prompts, which 
would ask whether an ID has been checked and allow staff to select a 
reason why a sale is accepted or refused from a list of options.
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Secondary supply of legitimately obtained cannabis to non-adults will 
also require appropriate enforcement and sanctions, potentially with 
severity graded depending on distance in age from the legal threshold. 
Again, penalties should be at least in keeping with those that already exist 
for the transfer of alcohol or tobacco to minors.
The limitations of age controls
Legal age controls are inevitably imperfect, and can only be part of 
the solution when reducing drug-related harms to young people. They 
are able to limit availability when properly implemented, but not to 
eliminate it. Effective regulation and access controls must be supported 
by concerted prevention efforts. These should include evidence-based, 
targeted drug education that balances the need to encourage healthy 
lifestyles, including abstinence, while not ignoring the need for risk 
reduction and, perhaps more importantly, investment in social capital.
Young people ,  particularly  those  most  at  risk in marginal  or  vulnerable 
populations , should  be  provided  with  meaningful  alternatives  to  drug 
use. The SMART programme in the US, which works on public housing 
estates, has found that providing youth clubs has a real impact on 
reducing drug use, dealing and overall criminal activity in both young 
people and adults.115 It is also worth noting that the Netherlands and 
Sweden regularly  top  the  United  Nations  Children’s  Fund (UNICEF)  child 
well-being table116 and have relatively low levels of drug misuse (despite 
very different policy approaches), while the US and UK invariably sit at 
or near the bottom, and have relatively high levels of misuse and a lower 
age of misusers.
115 Schinke, S. P. et al. (1991) Effects of boys and girls clubs and alcohol and other drug use and related 
problems in public housing, Office of Substance Abuse Prevention, US Department of Health and Human 
Services
116 UNICEF (2007) Child poverty in perspective: An overview of child well-being in rich countries, Innocenti 
Report Card 7, p.4
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While steps to restrict access and reduce drug use among young people 
are important, it is also essential to recognise that some young people 
will still access and take drugs. It is vital that they should be able to access 
appropriate treatment and harm reduction programmes without fear.
How to deal with minors who are found in possession, found attempting 
to procure, or more seriously, who supply cannabis to other minors 
also requires consideration. Guidelines will need to be clearly defined 
between law enforcers, prosecutors, social services and other relevant 
authorities. Again, consistency in how comparable offences involving 
alcohol and tobacco  are  dealt  with  should  be  ensured ,  even  if this  means 
increasing the level of interventions currently in place.
Rationing sales
Imposing limits on the amount any individual can buy or possess has been 
a common element in cannabis regulation to date. In the Netherlands, an 
individual can only buy 5 grams from any outlet (reduced from an earlier 
limit of  30 grams) - although in  theory  there  is  nothing stopping  them 
making multiple purchases from different establishments. In Uruguay, 
users are limited to 40 grams per month, controlled via a registration 
scheme (see below). In Washington, sales limits per transaction are: one 
ounce  of  cannabis, 16  ounces  of  cannabis-infused  solids,  and  72  ounces of 
cannabis-infused liquids. Colorado also restricts the volume of purchases 
to one ounce per transaction for state residents, and a quarter of an ounce 
for non-residents.
Such rationing controls are unlikely to have a significant impact on 
moderating use. The limits are already relatively generous, and those 
determined to procure more are likely to resort to secondary sales of 
legitimately bought cannabis, turn to the parallel illicit trade, or grow 
their own. Rationing is likely to be more useful in preventing large-scale 
wholesale purchasing for illegal re-sale on secondary markets, either 
outside of the legal jurisdiction, to those who do not have licensed access 
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(including minors), or outside of licensed 
channels. Such rationing controls are widely 
used for duty-free alcohol and tobacco, 
although rarely in domestic retail.
In principle, the rationing of sales is a 
relatively minor imposition that may 
have some practical and political benefits, 
certainly at the outset of any regulatory 
system and especially if there are issues with bordering jurisdictions 
where cannabis prohibition is still enforced. Clearly, there is a balance 
to be struck in making sure the limits are not set so low that significant 
demand is unmet and illicit supply is encouraged, and not set so high that 
it facilitates problematic secondary sales.
Purchaser licences/membership schemes
A system for licensing or registering cannabis users presents the 
opportunity to more strictly control availability. It enables the relevant 
authorities to restrict access to certain populations (for example by age, 
location of residence, or some training requirement) and potentially 
allows monitoring of the volume and frequency of cannabis purchases in 
order to enforce sales rationing.
Uruguay’s Government  has  chosen  to  adopt  such  a  registration scheme 
(commencing 2016), with the aims of limiting access to Uruguayan 
residents over 18 and restricting the volume of individual cannabis 
purchases to 40 grams per month. In order to enforce this limit, those 
who wish to buy cannabis from authorised pharmacies are required to 
register with  the  country’s  dedicated  regulatory  authority.  Reassurances 
have been given that the system will use anonymised registration cards, 
the anonymity guaranteed under an existing domestic law put in place 
to oversee government databases. The understandable concern is that 
individuals may be wary of registering as drug users on a centralised 
Rationing is likely to be 
more useful in preventing 
large-scale wholesale 
purchasing of, say, kilos 
of cannabis, that could 
then be illegally sold on 
to secondary markets
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government-controlled database, the contents of which could in theory 
leak to employers, or be exploited by future governments that oppose 
legal cannabis regulation. Beyond these obvious privacy concerns, a 
purchaser licensing scheme linked to a centralised database is potentially 
bureaucratic and expensive.
That said, it is important to consider the political context of the Uruguayan 
decision to adopt this approach. This is the first ever nationwide regulatory 
system for the production and supply of cannabis, and so proceeding 
with caution is understandable given that the eyes of the world are upon 
them. More immediately, there has been political pressure from their far 
larger  neighbouring  countries,  Brazil  and  Argentina,  over concerns  about 
cross-border leakage and ‘cannabis tourism’ (see p.205). The success of 
the scheme remains to be seen; it may prove impractical and need to be 
modified in the future, but the government will be monitoring all aspects 
of the regulatory model closely, so it will at least be a useful experiment 
that they and other countries can learn from. Taking this cautious 
approach may also have  facilitated  the  passage  of  the  country’s  Cannabis 
Regulation  Bill by assuaging some local political concerns.
Importantly, the Uruguayan model also 
permits self-cultivation, and allows for 
the formation of cannabis social clubs (see 
p.65). This means that individuals who 
want access to a legal supply of cannabis 
but are wary of the registration scheme do 
at least have other options. The Spanish-
style membership-based club model will 
represent a more attractive system for many. 
Access is restricted and rationing is enforced, 
but details of members are held locally and 
securely by the club management rather 
than by a centralised government authority.
It is both reasonable 
and practical for new 
regulatory models 
to include, from the 
outset, restrictions 
on cannabis use that 
are consistent with 
those already in place 
for public tobacco 
smoking
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Proof of residency with purchase
Another option available is to make purchases residents-only by 
requiring appropriate ID, both to reduce leakage to jurisdictions that have 
not chosen to legally regulate cannabis, and to reduce cannabis-related 
tourism (see Cannabis tourism, p.205).
Permitted locations for use
Alcohol and tobacco licensing regimes have established clear precedents 
for defining and controlling permitted substance use locations. A range of 
flexible controls exist for both, including:
• Licensed premises  for  consumption  of  alcohol
• Bans  on  smoking  in  indoor  public  spaces,  and  designated  outdoor 
smoking areas, gardens, or smoking booths
• Zoning laws restricting  alcohol  use  and  smoking  in  specified  public  and 
private spaces
The functions of these restrictions differ. Smoking restrictions are usually 
justified on the basis of the environmental or secondary health impacts of 
smoke;117 public alcohol consumption is more often restricted for public 
order reasons, and to a lesser extent, litter issues. These restrictions are 
sometimes centrally, sometimes regionally, defined and driven. They are 
enforced to different degrees, usually through fines, and because they 
enjoy broad popular support, are generally well observed. Experience 
suggests that when effectively exercised such regulation can foster new 
social norms, ensuring that less onerous enforcement is needed as time 
passes.
There is a risk, however, that overly stringent controls  could  have  negative 
 impacts . Banning all use of cannabis in public spaces, such as parks, for 
117 Although most public health benefits probably accrue from wider impacts on reducing levels of use.
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example, has the potential to lead to 
unnecessary and counterproductive 
sanctions or criminalisation. Zoning 
restrictions in outdoor spaces will need to 
be carefully considered to balance what is 
acceptable to users, the wider community, 
and law enforcers.
In the Netherlands, cannabis smoking 
is allowed indoors in coffee shops, 
while  tobacco  smoking  is  banned , an 
 inconsistency  created  by  the  order in 
 which  these  controls  were  introduced. 
 But  it  is  both  reasonable  and practical for new regulatory models to include, 
from the outset, restrictions on cannabis smoking that are consistent with 
those already in place for public tobacco smoking.
Vaporisers , which do not generate smoke and are not associated with 
specific smoke-related cannabis risks , could be  exempted from no-smoking 
ordinances. One possible compromise may be to allow vaporisers to be 
used indoors, but to restrict cannabis smoking to outdoor terrace areas 
or possibly specially ventilated spaces, as is often permitted by existing 
tobacco smoking controls. The use of vaporisers or cannabis e-cigarettes 
indoors will also need to be consistent with regulation of where nicotine 
e-cigarettes can be used. Currently few such controls exist, as the exhaled 
vapour is not considered antisocial or risky to third parties.
i Outlets
 
Challenges 
• Creating  safe,  controlled  environments  in  which  people  can  purchase 
and consume cannabis
No smoking cannabis in public —  
sign in Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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• Establishing a  level  of  availability  via  outlets  that  meets  demand and 
reduces illicit-market supply, while at the same time preventing over- 
availability and subsequent potential increases in use
• Preventing outlets  from  promoting  consumption  through  advertising, 
signage or product displays
Analysis 
• Evidence from alcohol  and  tobacco retail  clearly  shows  how controls 
on the location, appearance and opening hours of outlets can impact on 
levels of consumption and using behaviours
• Evidence  from cannabis  coffee  shops  in  the  Netherlands  should  allay 
fears that the presence of commercial cannabis outlets will generate 
public disorder or lead to irresponsible consumption
Recommendations 
• The  appearance  of  retail-only  outlets  should  be  functional  rather  than 
promotional. Outlets that permit on-site consumption should be 
allowed more scope to establish themselves as enjoyable destination 
venues where cannabis  can  be  used , even  if  external  appearance  and 
 point-of-sale displays are still controlled
• While potentially  overly  cautious,  preventing  the  establishment  of 
cannabis outlets near locations of public concern, such as schools, may 
be politically useful to demonstrate that any new regulatory framework 
is being carefully and responsibly implemented
• Where  possible,  outlets  should  be  limited  to  only  selling  cannabis 
products (specifically, no other drugs) and should enforce age 
restrictions on entry
• Licensing and responsibility  for  regulatory  oversight  should  sit  with 
equivalent agencies and tiers of government that currently deal with 
alcohol and tobacco outlets
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Outlets can be retail-only, or for retail and on-site consumption, such 
as the  Netherlands’ ‘ coffee shops’  (which  also  allow purchase  for take- 
away). These two types of outlets have common and distinct regulatory 
challenges, which are explored below. A third option is to have a mail 
order delivery model that does not require any outlets.
The decision as to which, or which combination, of these to opt for 
when developing a new regulatory model will depend on the local 
cultural and political context. A cautious starting point would be to opt 
for strictly regulated retail-only outlets, exploring the options for retail 
and consumption venues at a later stage. A delivery-only model with 
no  physical  outlets  would  in  some  ways  be  even more  cautious but the 
removal of the vendor in a gatekeeping role makes it a less attractive 
proposition.
Location and outlet density
The  concentration  of  legal  cannabis  outlets , whether  retail-only  sites  or 
venues  combining  retail  and consumption , within a  given  geographical 
area can be regulated using local licensing authorities and zoning laws. 
Evidence on alcohol outlet density shows that a greater concentration 
of outlets can be associated with increased alcohol use, misuse and 
related harms.118 119 Hence there is clearly the potential for controlling the 
location of cannabis outlets and outlet density to positively influence and 
moderate patterns of use.
Restrictions on outlet density would aim to help prevent over-availability, 
rather than achieve under-availability or zero local availability, which 
would  be  likely  to  incentivise  illicit  markets  to  meet  demand.  Washington’s 
118 Popova, S. et al. (2009) Hours and days of sale and density of alcohol outlets: impacts on alcohol 
consumption and damage: a systematic review, Alcohol and Alcoholism, Vol.44, No.5, pp.500–516. www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19734159?dopt=Abstract&holding=f1000,f1000m,isrctn.
119 National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors (2006) Current Research on Alcohol Policy 
and State Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) Systems, p.5.
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first set of regulations, for example, has limited both the total number of 
outlets  to  334  stores,  and  issued licenses  that  distribute  them  across the 
state according to population consumption data. This approach is borne 
out by experience from the Netherlands, where in municipalities with 
zero or a low density of cannabis coffee shops, users are more likely to 
turn to the unregulated illegal market for their supply.120 Furthermore, 
proximity to coffee shops does not seem to be linked to the prevalence or 
intensity of cannabis use, or to the use of other illegal drugs.121
Despite this finding, restrictions could be placed around specific sites of 
public concern including schools or other places where young people 
gather. The impact of such controls for alcohol and tobacco sales is not 
particularly well established, but it can certainly serve to reassure the 
public that care is being taken in the rolling out of any legal regulatory 
framework. Again, in the Netherlands, coffee shops are not permitted 
within a 250-metre radius of schools, and local governments have the 
power to decide whether to accept them in their area. Some US states also 
enforce restrictions on the proximity of medical cannabis dispensaries 
and new cannabis stores to schools.
Appearance and signage
As explored below in the section on marketing controls, there is a well-
established link between exposure to alcohol and tobacco marketing, 
branding and advertising and increased use of those drugs. It is reasonable 
to assume similar marketing would drive an expansion in use of cannabis. 
Appearance and signage for outlets is a key element of marketing for any 
product, so it is important that some aspects of the appearance of cannabis 
outlets, as well as the signage used to identify them, be functional rather 
than promotional.
120 EMCDDA (2008) A cannabis reader: global issues and local experiences, p.150. www.emcdda.europa.eu/
attachements.cfm/att_53355_EN_emcdda-cannabis-mon-full-2vols-web.pdf.
121 Ibid
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Standardised descriptions, signs or symbols can be used to denote cannabis 
retail outlets, and restrictions or bans on storefront advertising put in 
place, to minimise the possibility of impulse purchases. Dutch coffee 
shops are subject to such restrictions, forbidding advertising or making 
explicit external references to cannabis. Instead, Rastafari imagery, palm 
leaf images, and the words ‘coffee shop’ have become the default signage. 
Similarly, Washington State permits only one sign, no larger than 1600 
square inches, identifying the  outlet’s  business  or  trade  name.
Restrictions on the internal appearance 
of cannabis outlets can be used to similar 
effect, however these should be relaxed for 
venues that permit on-site consumption. 
One of the primary aims of legal regulation 
is to reduce the vast size of the illicit 
market. If such venues are overly austere, 
cannabis users will have little incentive to 
transfer their custom from illicit dealers 
to safer, controlled environments. One of 
the main attractions of the Dutch ‘coffee 
shops’, for instance, is that they are a 
pleasant environment to relax in. Hence 
restrictions on the internal appearance of 
on-site consumption venues should aim 
to prevent the promotion of cannabis 
products, rather than aiming to make 
them plain and unappealing. Making 
retail-only outlets more generic and 
functional, on the other hand, is less 
likely to deter people from using them, 
as customers will be purchasing cannabis 
for consumption elsewhere.
Official green and white sticker in the 
windows of Dutch coffee shops indicates 
they are licensed
It is important that 
some aspects of 
the appearance of 
cannabis outlets be 
functional rather than 
promotional
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The extensive body of knowledge acquired from tobacco regulation 
clearly demonstrates that retail environments can significantly influence 
use.122 123 124There is, for example, evidence that exposure to in-store, 
point-of-sale displays of tobacco products undermines impulse control 
among adult smokers and leads to an increased uptake in smoking among 
children and adolescents.125 126 This is unsurprising given that in many 
jurisdict ions the tobacco industry itself is allowed to dictate how outlets 
display tobacco products. The use of so-called ‘power walls’ , vast  rows 
of tobacco products that are virtually unmissable due to their placement 
behind checkout  areas , is  clearly  aimed at  maximising  consumption 
by encouraging spontaneous purchases, and again shows how, in the 
absence of effective regulation, commercial interests will trump public 
health priorities.
However, several countries are beginning to put public health first in this 
area, recognising the need to regulate in-store tobacco displays, without 
actually prohibiting access or sales. Finland, Iceland, the UK and Australia 
have either implemented, or are in the process of implementing, a ban 
on such in store displays, meaning outlets are required to store tobacco 
products in opaque cabinets or below the counter, from where they can 
only be shown upon request by an adult customer. While not necessarily 
appropriate in every scenario, the most cautious form of cannabis 
regulation would probably adopt a similar approach with cannabis 
products  kept out of sight of potential customers until requested. Again, 
unlike conventional profit-motivated retail, the idea would be to make 
122 Wakefield M. et al. (2008) The effect of retail cigarette pack displays on impulse purchase, Addiction, 
Vol.103, No.2, pp.322–328.
123 Carter O.B. et al. (2009) The effect of retail cigarette pack displays on unplanned purchases: results from 
immediate post-purchase interviews, Tobacco Control, Vol.18, No.3, pp.218-221.
124 Germain D. et al. (2010) Smoker sensitivity to retail tobacco displays and quitting: a cohort study, 
Addiction, Vol.105, No.1, pp.159–163.
125 Paynter J. and Edwards R. (2009) The impact of tobacco promotion at the point of sale: a systematic 
review, Nicotine and Tobacco Research, Vol.11, No.1, pp.25–35.
126 Lovato C. et al. (2011) Impact of tobacco advertising and promotion on increasing adolescent smoking 
behaviours, The Cochrane Collaboration. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD003439.
pub2/abstract.
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the retail experience functional rather than promotional. This kind of 
restriction is particularly crucial in a scenario, such as pharmacy sales, 
where other products are being sold, or age restrictions are not applied 
for entry into the retail space. It is less important (although still desirable) 
in a cannabis-only retail venue or retail and consumption venue, as both 
could enforce age access controls on entry. If a ban on cannabis product 
displays is deemed overly prohibitive, regulation should at least act as 
a moderating influence, with displays required to be discreet, free from 
promotional messaging, and the products presented in standardised plain 
packages or containers (see Packaging, p.125).
Opening hours
There is consistent evidence from alcohol regulation that restrictions on 
the days and hours of sale are an effective tool for moderating certain 
alcohol-related harms. 127 Local licensing  authorities  should  impose  similar 
 restrictions  on cannabis outlets. In determining the days and hours during 
which such outlets are permitted to trade, the key consideration should 
be to achieve an appropriate level of availability (for more, see Getting 
the balance right, p.43).
Sales of other drugs
Outlets should, initially at least, be limited to the sale and consumption 
of cannabis products only. In the Netherlands, and in US legalisation 
states, a prohibition on the sale of all other drugs, including alcohol, is 
a non-negotiable licence condition. Similarly, existing bans on smoking 
tobacco in indoor or enclosed spaces should remain in force.
Although at present many people, particularly in Europe, smoke cannabis 
mixed with tobacco, such a policy would go some way towards more 
127 World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, Evidence for the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of interventions to reduce alcohol-related harm, pp.68–69. www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0020/43319/E92823.pdf.
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clearly delineating the markets for the two drugs. A greater separation 
of these markets has the potential to promote new social norms related 
to cannabis smoking, encouraging safer forms of consumption that 
would lead to public health gains. It may also help prevent excessive 
commercialisation of the legal cannabis industry, as tobacco companies 
would have less of a foothold in a burgeoning sector.
Responsibility for regulatory oversight
In keeping with existing hierarchies of regulatory control for alcohol 
and tobacco, cannabis outlets should be primarily overseen by licensing 
authorities, which are typically a tier of local government charged with 
managing and enforcing a series of centrally determined regulations, and 
by implication, broader international law. Similar frameworks are already 
well established in a number of countries.
In the UK, for example, each licensing authority must review entertainment 
licences every three years and consult with the chief of police, fire 
authority, representatives of the licensees and representatives from local 
businesses and residents. In the US, alcohol policy is largely managed 
by the individual states, which control manufacture, distribution and 
sale within their own borders, while the federal government regulates 
importation and interstate transportation. Similarly, individual states 
in the US and Australia have very different approaches to enforcement 
of personal  cannabis  use , ranging  from de-facto decriminalisation (or 
civil penalties) to punitive criminal sanctions. The federal/state power 
dynamic generally sees responsibility for most serious crimes falling to 
federal government with flexibility over less serious crimes and civil 
offences falling to state authorities.
A clearly defined range of proportionate sanctions for licence infringements 
should include a sliding scale of fines, loss of licence, and even criminal 
penalties. Licensees could also be held partially or wholly liable for 
how their customers behave - punishable  examples  include antisocial 
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behaviour, noise, littering and drug impaired driving (see: Institutions 
for regulating cannabis markets, p.169. and Vendors, p.133).
Challenges 
• Preventing  the  promotion  of  cannabis  and  cannabis  use by commercial 
interests
• Negotiating political  and  legal  obstacles  to  the  implementation  of 
adequate marketing restrictions
Analysis 
• Experience with  alcohol  and  tobacco  demonstrates  the  capacity  for 
marketing activities to influence levels and patterns of drug use
• If the  overarching  regulatory  framework  for  cannabis  allows  private 
companies to dominate the trade, attempts to restrict marketing 
activities are likely to be met with significant resistance
• Evidence  from tobacco  regulation  suggests  that partial  bans which 
prohibit only  certain  forms  of   marketing , rather  than  a comprehensive 
ban  that  covers  all  marketing  activities ,  are  unlikely  to  be  effective  in 
reducing the potential harms associated with cannabis use
• When  subject  to  partial bans  on  marketing,  tobacco  companies 
 maintain their level of promotional spending, simply diverting more 
money to those (often more subtle) marketing activities that are 
permitted. Partial bans should therefore be expected to lead to similar 
behaviour from private companies involved in the cannabis trade
Recommendations 
• A ban  on  all  forms  of cannabis  advertising,  promotion  and  sponsorship 
should be the default starting point for any regulatory system
j Marketing
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• Article 13 of  the  World  Health  Organization’s  Framework  Convention 
on Tobacco Control provides a comprehensive blueprint for how to 
eliminate tobacco marketing that could easily be applied to cannabis
Advertising, promotion and sponsorship form the front line of most 
industries’ efforts to maintain and increase their customer bases. 
Historically, the alcohol and tobacco industries have been no different, 
using a variety of marketing techniques to maximise consumption of 
their products and, consequently, their profits. Although recent decades 
have seen varying degrees of success in curbing the use of such techniques 
by these two legal drug industries (markedly more progress being made 
with tobacco than alcohol), these successes have been hard-won, with 
industry fighting against them at every turn.
Governments seeking to enforce adequate restrictions on cannabis 
marketing may face similar challenges from big business. However, 
unlike with alcohol and tobacco, we have a clean slate: if non-medical 
cannabis is regulated strictly enough from the outset, an ongoing conflict 
 in  this  area  becomes less  likely , policy 
 makers  will  not  have  to struggle to control 
a powerful and well-established industry 
seeking to aggressively  promote  its  products. 
 Lessons  on  the  potential  risks  in  this area 
can be learnt from the the irresponsible 
and inadequately regulated marketing of 
medical cannabis products seen in some US 
states, and more recently the (fortunately 
thwarted) attempt at regulatory capture 
of an emerging industry by commercial 
interests in Ohio, USA.128 
128 Rolles, S., 2015, Legalisation in Ohio - Let’s make this the last time we mess it up ‘http://www.tdpf.org.uk/
blog/legalisation-ohio-lets-make-last-time-we-mess-it
Marketing perhaps 
most clearly highlights 
the tension between 
the aim of reducing the 
health and social harms 
associated with drug use 
and the aims of private 
interests operating in a 
commercial marketplace
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Marketing has been one of the key battlegrounds between governments 
and alcohol and tobacco companies, and perhaps most clearly highlights 
the tension between the aim of reducing the health and social harms 
associated with drug use and the aims of private interests operating in a 
commercial marketplace. Policy makers considering the type of controls 
that should be placed on the marketing of legal cannabis products must 
be aware of these conflicting aims, and recognise the importance of 
marketing restrictions to the overall effectiveness of any system of legal 
cannabis regulation. 
Lessons from the regulation of tobacco marketing
The World Health Organization (WHO) has stated that the elimination 
of all forms of tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS) is 
essential for meaningful tobacco control. It is considered a goal so critical 
that Article  13 of the WHO Framework  Convention  on  Tobacco  Control 
(FCTC) ,  which  requires  all  Parties  to  establish  a  comprehensive  TAPS 
ban ,  is  one  of  only  two provisions in  the  treaty  that  includes  a  mandatory 
timeframe for implementation.129 The history of tobacco marketing, and 
the evidence of its effects, provides ample support for such a prohibition.
For much of the 20th century, TAPS was subject to minimal regulation. 
The tobacco industry was allowed to advertise through all forms of media, 
and developed increasingly sophisticated techniques to promote its 
products. Direct and indirect marketing through sponsorship of sporting 
and music events, as well as product placement in films and television 
shows, helped to associate use of the drug with desirable situations or 
environments, and served to improve the public image of the companies 
that produced it. And as health concerns began to be raised over tobacco 
use, the industry employed marketing ‘spin’ to brand a range of cigarettes 
‘mild’ or ‘light’ to give the false impression that they were safer.
129 World Health Organization (2003) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2003/9241591013.pdf.
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Tobacco marketing
The considerable freedom afforded to tobacco companies in promoting 
their products is strongly linked to the increase in the rate of tobacco 
use  that  continued  in  most  Western  nations  until  roughly  the  mid-1960s. 
There is, for example, conclusive evidence that TAPS is an effective 
method of recruiting new smokers,130 a fact that has been recognised by 
the US Surgeon General, who has stated categorically that “there is a causal 
relationship between advertising and promotional efforts of the tobacco companies 
and the initiation and progression of tobacco use among young people.”131
Even after greater restrictions were imposed on TAPS, it is still believed 
to have been one of the key drivers of tobacco use and related harms. 
One estimate  is  that, in  the  US, between 1988  and  1998,  TAPS  alone 
was responsible  for  generating  approximately 193,000  additional  adult 
smokers  and  46,400  smoking-attributable deaths  per  year,  resulting  in 
annual medical, productivity and mortality-related costs of as much as 
$33.3 billion.132
Clearly the safety of cannabis relative to tobacco means that these health, 
social and financial costs are of a magnitude far greater than those that 
might result from cannabis advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
(CAPS), yet such estimates highlight how, even when the marketing of a 
legal drug for non-medical use is subject to restrictions, it can still produce 
serious and avoidable harms. Hence the WHO states that while total bans 
on all forms of TAPS can reduce smoking prevalence (and by implication 
130 Lovato C. et al. (2011) Impact of tobacco advertising and promotion on increasing adolescent smoking 
behaviours, The Cochrane Collaboration. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD003439.
pub2/abstract.
131 National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (US), Office on Smoking and Health 
(2012), Preventing Tobacco Use Among Youth and Young Adults: A Report of the Surgeon General. www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK99239/.
132 Emery, S. et al. (1999) The social costs of tobacco advertising and promotions, Nicotine and Tobacco 
Research, Vol.1, Suppl.2, S83–S91. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11768191.
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smoking-related harms), 
partial bans “have little or no 
effect”.133
Partial bans typically 
do not cover indirect 
forms of marketing such 
as sponsorship, and 
 evidence  shows  they 
 do  not  reduce  tobacco 
 companies’ expenditure 
on promotional activities. 
Instead, overall spending 
on TAPS remains the same, 
with more money simply 
being diverted into those 
forms of marketing that remain legal.134
Taken together, experience from the regulation of TAPS indicates that 
the unrestricted marketing of cannabis is likely to be accompanied by 
an expansion in consumption and associated harms (the possibility of 
a displacement effect on alcohol use is discussed on p.83). Furthermore, 
while legal constraints in some countries may mean that partial marketing 
bans are the only feasible regulatory response, they are unlikely to 
adequately reduce the public health and safety burden, however small, 
that cannabis use poses. Where existing legal frameworks could allow 
it, a comprehensive CAPS ban represents the optimal form of control. 
133 World Health Organization (2013) WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic, 2013: Enforcing 
bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, p.27. http://apps.who.int/iris/ 
bitstream/10665/85380/1/9789241505871_eng.pdf.
134 US Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute (2008) 
The role of the media in promoting and reducing tobacco use (Tobacco Control Monograph), No.19. 
www.cancercontrol.cancer.gov/brp/tcrb/monographs/19/index.html.
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Lessons from the regulation of alcohol marketing
While considerable success has been achieved in limiting tobacco 
marketing, with many countries imposing bans on television 
advertisements and sponsorship of events, the alcohol industry has been 
left relatively free to promote its products across all media. The result is 
that exposure to marketing of a seriously risky drug, is in many places, 
simply a fact of everyday life. Such a high level of exposure, and its 
necessary public health implications, should serve as a warning to policy 
makers contemplating allowing cannabis to be promoted in a similarly 
laissez-faire manner.
• In  England,  football  fans  see  around two references  to  alcoholic  brands 
every  minute  when  they  watch  a  match on  TV in  addition  to  the formal 
advertising during commercial breaks135
• Alcohol  marketing  campaigns  are  increasingly  being  conducted  via 
social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, which are 
disproportionately used by young people136 and on which marketing is 
generally less regulated 
• One  study  estimates  that 10-15-year-olds in  the UK  see  10% more 
alcohol advertising on TV than their parents do. And when it comes to 
the specific sector of ‘alcopops’ (sweetened alcoholic drinks marketed to 
appeal to children and young people), they see 50% more137 
135 Graham, A. and Adams, J. (2013) Alcohol Marketing in Televised English Professional Football: A 
Frequency Analysis, Alcohol and Alcoholism. http://alcalc.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/10/
alcalc.agt140.full.
136 Winpenny, E. (2012) Assessment of Young People’s Exposure to Alcohol Marketing in Audiovisual and 
Online Media, RAND Corporation/European Commission. www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/
EP51136.html.
137 Ibid
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Article 13 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control —  
a template for cannabis
For policy makers operating in legal and political contexts that allow it, 
Article  13  of  the  FCTC  could  essentially  be  adapted  for  cannabis  merely 
by switching the words. Following the recommendations it contains, a 
comprehensive CAPS ban would therefore cover:
• All advertising  and  promotion,  as  well  as  sponsorship,  without 
exemption
• Direct and  indirect  advertising,  promotion  and  sponsorship
• Acts that  aim  at  promotion  and  acts  that  have  or  are  likely  to  have  a 
promotional effect
• Promotion of  cannabis  products  and  the  use  of  cannabis
• Contributions of  any  kind  to  any  event,  activity  or  individual
• Advertising and promotion of cannabis brand names and all corporate 
promotion
• Traditional media (print, television and radio) and all media platforms, 
including internet, mobile
More specifically, in addition to prohibiting the more obvious forms of 
cannabis marketing, this would entail a ban or restrictions on:
• Retail cannabis displays	˛	see	Outlets p.151.
• ‘Brand stretching’ and ‘brand sharing’	˛	These		two		practices		could	
occur when a cannabis brand name, logo, or other identifying feature is 
connected or shared with another non-cannabis product or service
• Corporate social responsibility	˛	Alcohol		and	tobacco	companies,	
for example, often make contributions to charitable causes or promote 
‘socially responsible’ elements of their business practices in order to 
improve their public profile. This is sponsorship that indirectly 
promotes such companies and their products. Cannabis companies 
should therefore be forbidden from engaging in similar activities
 How to Regulate Cannabis:
• Depictions of cannabis in entertainment media ˛	Both		fictional	
and non-fictional forms of entertainment that feature cannabis products 
or their use should be required to certify that no benefits have been 
received for such depictions. Classification systems for film, television 
or other forms of media should also take cannabis depictions into 
account
• Cannabis industry-funded journalistic, academic or artistic 
work that promotes cannabis use or cannabis products	˛	
While  a  comprehensive  ban  such  as  that  stipulated  by  Article  13  of  the 
FCTC would not interfere with legitimate forms of expression, vigilance 
should be urged with regard to, for example, journalists or political 
commentators who may have received funding from the legal cannabis 
industry to write articles encouraging the use of cannabis products. This 
tactic has previously been attempted by the tobacco industry.138
Legal or political constraints on marketing controls
Article 13 of the  FCTC  does,  however,  recognise  that  in  some  instances 
a comprehensive  ban  on  TAPS  would  violate  a  country  or  jurisdiction’s 
constitution. In such cases, it still requires restrictions on TAPS that are as 
comprehensive as possible within constitutional constraints.
Again, this concession could equally be made for restrictions on cannabis 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship (CAPS), and would likely be 
necessary given that in some countries precedents have been set with 
regard to tobacco and alcohol marketing. The US Supreme Court, for 
example, has ruled that tobacco companies have a right to at least some 
form of advertising for their products under the First Amendment of the 
Constitution.139
138 Maguire, K. and Borger, J. (2002) Scruton in media plot to push the sale of cigarettes, The Guardian, 
24/01/02. www.theguardian.com/media/2002/jan/24/advertising.tobaccoadvertising.
139 For more information see: Gostin, L. O. (2002) Corporate Speech and the Constitution: The Deregulation of 
Tobacco Advertising, American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 92, No. 3, pp. 352-355.
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However, although the so-called ‘commercial free-speech’ of tobacco 
companies has been deemed worthy of legal protection in the US, TAPS 
is increasingly being subjected to restrictions. Among other things, the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which became law 
in 2009, prohibits event sponsorship by tobacco companies as well as 
brand-name non-tobacco promotional items.140
Thus in countries or jurisdictions where commercial free-speech laws are 
likely to be in conflict with future CAPS regulation, there is potentially 
still significant scope for restrictions on cannabis marketing, even if 
evidence suggests these will be of more limited effectiveness compared 
to comprehensive bans.
In addition to legal constraints, there may be political opposition to 
effective CAPS regulation. Touching as it does on issues of freedom 
of expression, such regulation will inevitably be resisted by libertarian- 
leaning politicians or policymakers. However, this viewpoint is unlikely 
to have much traction with the wider public. The distinct nature of 
drug risks relative to most other commodities, and the particular need 
to protect vulnerable groups from exposure to these risks, would for 
most people be considered sufficient justification for restricting standard 
commercial freedoms.
140 US Food and Drug Administration (2013) Overview of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act: Consumer fact Sheet www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
ucm246129.htm.
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Current cannabis advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
(CAPS) regulation around the world
Uruguay
In Uruguay, all forms of publicity, indirect publicity, promotion or 
sponsorship of cannabis products are prohibited. 
Colorado
Colorado’s regulation is primarily aimed at ensuring children and young 
people are not exposed to CAPS. As a result, while advertising is permitted 
in adult-oriented newspapers and magazines (which essentially means all 
newspapers and most magazines), mass-market campaigns that have a 
“high likelihood of reaching minors” are prohibited. This extends to online 
advertising: ‘pop- up’ advertisements are banned, but ‘banner ads’ are 
permitted on adult-oriented sites. 
 
Given that cannabis retail outlets are adult-only, restricted to just selling 
cannabis products or accessories, branding on packaging is allowed as 
children are unlikely to be exposed to it. However, packaging cannot include 
any health or physical benefit claims, which are also forbidden in other forms 
of advertising or merchandising. 
Washington
As with Colorado’s restrictions, protecting children and young people from 
CAPS is the stated priority in Washington. There, retailers are not allowed 
to put products on display to the general public, such as through window 
fronts, and no licensee is allowed to advertise cannabis or cannabis-infused 
products in any form or through any medium within 1,000 ft. of school 
grounds, playgrounds, child care, public parks, libraries, or game arcades 
that allow minors to enter. Advertisements on public transit vehicles or 
shelters, or on any publicly owned or operated property, are also banned. 
  Section 2
 169A Practical Guide
 
Medical cannabis industry in the US
Marketing activities that promote medical cannabis products have for the 
most part not been subject to regulation, with television, radio and print 
advertising commonplace in many states. The city of Denver, Colorado, has, 
however, imposed some restrictions on medical cannabis marketing, banning 
outdoor advertising in the form of billboards, posters and bus benches, as 
well as prohibiting windshield leafleting. 
Netherlands
Dutch ‘coffee shops’ are not allowed to advertise; the only form of promotion 
that occurs is the use of Rastafari imagery, palm leaf images, using trade 
names such as ‘Grasshopper’, and the words ‘coffee shop’ to identify the 
cafes. The ban on advertising therefore acts more as a moderating influence, 
rather than preventing the coffee shops from distinguishing or promoting 
themselves at all. 
Spain
While Spain’s cannabis social clubs are mostly run on a strictly non-profit 
basis, there have been moves by some to commercialise the operations. On 
the whole, however, CAPS does not occur, as those who run the clubs, as 
well as the members themselves, have no financial incentive to increase 
cannabis consumption through marketing.
Establishing a legally regulated market for cannabis will require a wide 
range of policy decisions to be made and new legal, policy and institutional 
structures to be established. It is important to define the political level 
at which such choices should be made and legislation be imposed, 
and to determine which existing or new institutions should be given 
k Institutions for regulating cannabis markets
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responsibility for decision-making, 
implementation and enforcement of 
the various aspects of regulation.
In principle, these challenges do 
not significantly differ from similar 
issues in other arenas of social policy and law related to currently legal 
medical  and  non-medical  drugs ,  the  regulatory infrastructure  around 
alcohol and tobacco again being most obviously relevant. On this basis, 
the proposal outlined below suggests how new cannabis legislation and 
decision-making could be integrated into and managed by different kinds 
of  political  bodies , international (global  and  regional  agencies),  domestic 
(federal and devolved), and various tiers of local government (state, county, 
municipality, etc.). These  suggestions  are inevitably  generalisations ,  the 
precise contours of decision-making structures will be shaped by the 
political realities of individual jurisdictions.
This hierarchical decision-making structure means that tensions will 
inevitably emerge when lower-level decision-making authorities choose 
to go against the will of higher-level authorities, or vice versa. Examples 
of such tensions have been seen with Uruguay’s cannabis regulation 
model breaching the UN drug conventions; the Washington and Colorado 
State models being implemented in conflict with US federal law; and an 
array of local initiatives, such as proposed cannabis regulation models in 
Copenhagen (Denmark), 60 municipalities in the Netherlands, Mexico 
City  (Mexico),  and  Basque  country  (Spain) , that  are challenging national 
government positions. In a scenario in which the global, federal or state 
governments are showing little inclination to lead on cannabis reform, 
these tensions are an inevitable manifestation of a bottom-up leadership 
process, rather than a long-term structural challenge. Such challenges 
will eventually lead to reform at federal and UN level, at which point 
any tensions will be dramatically reduced, even if, to some extent, they 
remain part of the landscape.
Establishing a legally regulated 
market for cannabis will require 
a wide range of policy decisions 
to be made and new legal, 
policy and institutional structures
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International
There is a clear and important role for the various UN legal structures and 
agencies. Key functions for the UN would be:
• Overseeing issues that relate to international trade, 
particularly issues around the provision and transit of 
cannabis-based medicines. International trade and border issues 
would also naturally come within the purview of relevant regional 
agencies such  as  the  European  Union,  or  the  North  American  Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), or emerging regional or bilateral cannabis trade 
agreements (for more, see Cannabis tourism, p.205)
• Assuming responsibility for more general oversight of 
relevant human rights, labour laws, development and security 
issues. This role would, however, inevitably transform from one of 
overseeing a global prohibitionist system to one more like the UN role 
with regard to alcohol and tobacco, with UN agencies providing the 
foundation, ground rules and legal parameters within which individual 
States, or groups of States, can or should operate. This role would 
include oversight and guidance on sovereign State rights, as well as 
responsibilities to neighbours and the wider international community
• Acting as a hub of research on cannabis health issues and 
best practice in cannabis policy and law. This research and 
advisory  role  would  mirror  the  WHO’s  existing  role  regarding tobacco 
and alcohol policy,141 and would work in partnership with equivalent 
regional and national research bodies, such as the EMCDDA. At a 
later stage this analysis and best practice guidance could potentially 
be formalised in an international agreement similar to the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control142
141 For more on WHO’s work on tobacco, see: www.who.int/topics/tobacco/en/.
142 World Health Organization (2003) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2003/9241591013.pdf.
The practical detail of regulation
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Aside from the necessary bureaucratic and legal reforms, the change 
in focus from punitive enforcement towards pragmatic public health 
management clearly indicates that lead responsibility for cannabis- 
related issues should move from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
to the World Health Organization and sit alongside its existing role for 
alcohol and tobacco.
It is likely that the UN-level renegotiation of international law that 
cannabis reforms will necessitate will involve reconsidering issues around 
the right to privacy, the right to freedom of belief and practice, the right to 
health, and proportionality in sentencing. These are likely to have global 
implications in terms of ending or calling for an end to the criminalisation 
of use, possession for personal use, and potentially cultivation for personal 
use. It is important to make clear, however, that reforms of international 
law that demand an end to the criminalisation of cannabis users, and 
that introduce flexibility for States to explore regulatory models, will not 
mandate either the nature of non-criminal penalties, or the establishment 
of legally regulated availability. Such decisions will remain in the hands 
of individual governments (see Cannabis and the UN drug conventions, 
p.211).
National government
Individual jurisdictions will need to determine their own cannabis 
regulation policies and legal frameworks within the international legal 
parameters, rights and responsibilities established by the UN, and other 
international bodies or federal governments to which they belong.
Any new overarching parameters agreed at the UN level would set 
basic standards of justice and human rights, with implications for the 
use of punitive sanctions against drug users. In contrast to the current 
prohibitionist framework, these parameters would neither impose nor 
preclude particular options relating to legal access and supply, or internal 
domestic drug markets. This is not, however, necessarily the case with 
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regard to conflicting laws between different levels of government within 
countries. For example, the regulatory options available to US states that 
have legalised cannabis have been curtailed because it remains illegal at 
the federal level. As a result, state employees cannot be required to be 
directly involved in cannabis production or supply because they could 
have federal criminal charges brought against them.
At the national level, responsibility for decision-making and enforcement 
of regulation most naturally sits alongside comparable institutional 
frameworks for alcohol and tobacco. This responsibility, as at the UN 
level, logically sits with the government department responsible for 
health , rather than  the more  common criminal  justice lead in  place under 
the old prohibitionist models.
That said, it is important to be clear that cannabis policy and regulation, 
as with alcohol and tobacco regulation, involves a range of agencies 
and government departments. For example, criminal justice agencies 
(including police and customs) will still have a key role in enforcing 
any new regulatory framework, because those who operate outside it 
will still be subject to punitive sanctions; departments of foreign affairs 
and trade will oversee international trade issues and trading standards; 
departments of education will be involved in public and school-based 
education and prevention programs, and treasury departments will be 
involved in tax collections and budgeting.
So while the lead role would sit under the health department, some form 
of national-level entity or coordinating body with a cross-departmental 
brief will be essential. This could involve cannabis regulation becoming a 
new  responsibility  for  an  existing  agency ,  as  has  happened  in  Washington 
State, where regulatory decision-making has been delegated to the State 
Liquor  Control  Board,  or  the responsibility  of  a  new, dedicated  agency, 
as is the case in Uruguay, where the legislation establishes an Institute for 
the Regulation and Control of Cannabis.
The practical detail of regulation
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Local/municipal
The micro-level detail and decision-making around how regulatory 
frameworks are implemented and enforced at the local level will 
largely fall to  local  or  municipal  authorities , although  some  may  remain 
 with national agencies. These local responsibilities will include most 
decisions around the licensing of vendors and retail outlets, as well as 
inspectorate and policing priorities.
This localised decision-making should provide democratic opportunities 
for local communities to have an input into licensing decisions, as 
they often do with alcohol sales and venue licensing. The prospect of 
‘NIMBYism’ (‘Not In My Back Yard’ opposition) is a realistic one that will 
need to be dealt with sensitively. It may well be that some communities 
democratically determine that they do not wish to have legal cannabis 
available from retail outlets within their geographical boundaries - even 
 if  possession  and  use  is  legalised  nationally  and  legal supply is available 
in neighbouring communities. This has happened for alcohol in ‘dry’ 
counties in the US and Australia, and also with cannabis stores at the 
county level in US states such as Colorado, and ‘coffee shops’ in different 
Dutch municipalities. Other local jurisdictions may welcome such 
outlets, while most will merely tolerate them under certain conditions.
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Section 3
Key challenges
a Cannabis-impaired driving
Challenges 
• Finding an enforcement  approach  that  minimises  cannabis-impaired 
driving and associated risks, and at the same time avoids non-impaired 
drivers being unjustly penalised
Analysis 
• The  risks  associated with  driving while  impaired , to the  driver, 
passengers and other  road users , make  it an  offence in all jurisdictions, 
and justify a hierarchy of punitive legal sanctions for offenders
• The  degree  to which  cannabis consumption  impacts  on  driving 
risk remains difficult to establish precisely, but it is clear that acute 
intoxication impairs driving safety, with the level of impairment related 
to dosage and time since consumption
• The  relationship  between  blood THC levels  and impairment  is  less 
clearly defined than the equivalent relationship for alcohol
• There  is  some dispute  in the  scientific literature  regarding  the  threshold 
limit beyond which THC levels in the blood represent an unacceptable 
level of impairment (which could then be used to trigger or inform legal 
176  How to Regulate Cannabis:
  Section 3
sanctions). Proposals range from blood serum THC concentrations of 
1-2 nanograms  per  millilitre  of  blood  (ng/ml)  through  to  16-20ng/ml
• If thresholds  are  too  low,  non-impaired  drivers  will  potentially  be 
penalised; too high and impaired drivers may escape penalties
Recommendations 
• There  is a  simple and clear  message: People  should not drive while 
significantly impaired by cannabis and should, as with alcohol or other 
drugs, expect a proportionate punitive legal sanction if they are caught 
doing so
• In  this  context, clearly highlighting  behaviours  that are likely  to result 
in  penalties  for  impairment , and how this  can  be  measured becomes 
important for both public education and for defining enforcement 
parameters
• Given  the lack  of  scientific consensus regarding  a  blood  THC 
concentration that correlates with an unacceptable level of impairment, 
per se limits that automatically trigger a legal sanction when exceeded 
are inadvisable.
• Due  to  the  distinctive  way  in  which  cannabis  is  processed  by  the  body, 
the use of per se laws is likely to lead to prosecutions of drivers with 
residual levels of THC in their blood but who are nonetheless safe to 
drive
• Blood  testing  should  only  be  carried  out following a driving  infraction or 
once evidence of impairment has been derived from a standardised field 
sobriety test that has been validated for cannabis-induced behaviour. 
Blood tests should be employed simply to  confirm that  a driver  has 
recently used cannabis (and that cannabis use is therefore the likely 
cause of the failure of a field sobriety test). The results of a blood (or any 
other body fluid) test should not, on their own, trigger a legal sanction
• Establishing  a  threshold THC  level beyond which prosecutors 
can reasonably assume that a driver has recently used cannabis is 
problematic, but a blood serum THC concentration in the range  7-10ng/
ml)  appears  to  be  a  sensible point  at  which  such a threshold might be 
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set. This should, however, be reviewed in the light of any emerging 
evidence, and the possibility of two or more thresholds associated with 
different burdens of proof could also be considered
• The  greatly  increased risks  of  driving  while  under  the  influence  of 
both alcohol and cannabis simultaneously means that in such cases 
prosecutors should consider lower blood THC and alcohol levels as 
sufficient evidence of recent use
• While  some  elements  of  current  standardised  field  sobriety  tests  are 
effective in detecting cannabis-induced impairment, research and 
funding should be devoted to the development of a comprehensive field 
sobriety test that is sufficiently sensitive to identify all levels of such 
impairment
Driving while impaired, for any reason, involves avoidable but potentially 
serious risks to the driver, any passengers they may have, and other road 
users and pedestrians. The degree of risk involved means that impaired 
driving is considered a punishable offence in all jurisdictions, one usually 
subject to a hierarchy of punitive sanctions depending on the seriousness 
of  the  offence or  harm  caused,  often  ranging  from civil  sanctions  such  as 
fines or disqualification from driving for a fixed period of time, through to 
more serious penalties resulting in a criminal record and/or imprisonment.
Most familiar are the policy and law issues around alcohol-impaired 
driving , which is tested to a generally accepted level of accuracy using 
inexpensive ‘breathalyser’ technology that measures blood alcohol 
content.143 Other causes of impairment, generally less well catered for 
by both technology and law, include consumption of certain prescription 
drugs, currently illegal drugs including cannabis, poor physical health and 
condition of the driver (most obviously tiredness and impaired vision), 
and certain mental health issues.
143 Positive breathalyser tests are usually then confirmed with a more accurate blood test.
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Studies have long shown that cannabis use 
impairs, in a dose-related fashion, various 
cognitive processes associated with safe 
driving, such as attentiveness, vigilance, 
and psychomotor coordination (although 
evidence of its effects on reaction time is 
mixed). These findings have been borne 
out in experimental settings such as driving 
simulator or on-road tests,144 which have  demonstrated  that cannabis 
 has a clear , although  modest , negative impact on driving performance.145 
However, despite these findings, evidence on the question of whether 
such impairments translate into real-life road accidents has been less 
clear-cut.
Unlike experimental studies , which  are more likely to  downplay any 
impairing effects because test subjects are aware  of  being observed , 
epidemiological studies use population data to establish actual crash 
risk and so can offer a better indication of how, in reality, drivers will 
be affected by cannabis consumption. Such studies have, however, 
historically produced mixed results, with some finding that cannabis use 
was associated with an elevated risk of collision, but others not. These 
discrepancies have been attributed to various methodological challenges 
inherent in this area of research, including difficulties in obtaining 
sufficiently large sample sizes, the problem of accurately measuring levels 
of impairment (as opposed to simply measuring whether an individual 
has used cannabis recently), and the need to rule out confounding 
variables such as age, sex, and poly-drug use (in particular alcohol use).146 
144 Berghaus G. and Guo B. (1995) Medicines and driver fitness — findings from a meta-analysis of 
experimental studies as basic information to patients, physicians and experts, in Kloeden, C, and McLean, 
A. (eds.) Alcohol, Drugs, and Traffic Safety T95: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on 
Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety, Adelaide: Australia, pp.295–300.
145 Smiley A., Cannabis: On-Road and Driving Simulator Studies, in Kalant H. et al. (1999) (eds.) The Health 
Effects of Cannabis, Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation, pp.173–191.
146 For more on the conflicting evidence from epidemiological studies, as well as their methodological 
challenges, see: Mann et al. (2008) Cannabis use and driving: implications for public health and transport 
policy, EMCDDA
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Combined use of alcohol and cannabis
While cannabis use has an adverse effect on the psychomotor skills necessary for 
safe driving, this effect is significantly worse when the drug is combined with alcohol. 
There is significant evidence,147 148 that alcohol has an additive effect on the crash risk 
of those who have also consumed cannabis — in other words, the effects of using 
both drugs are the sum of the effects of using either on its own.
Some studies have found that cannabis-impaired drivers, unlike those driving 
under the influence of alcohol, have an awareness of their impairment and 
are able to compensate for this by, for example, driving more slowly or leaving 
more space between other cars.149 150 Using cannabis with alcohol, however, 
reduces or eliminates the ability to use such strategies effectively. When used 
together, the two drugs cause impairment even at doses which would be 
insignificant were they of either drug alone. This far greater level of risk therefore 
necessitates a stricter regulatory response (see Recommendations, p.191).    . 
 
However, as more rigorous epidemiological studies are now being 
conducted, the emerging evidence convincingly suggests that recent 
cannabis consumption does increase collision risk. A meta-analysis of 
the most robust studies available on this issue found that acute cannabis 
consumption almost  doubled  a  driver’s  risk  of  being  involved in  a  serious  
crash,151 with this risk being most evident in the most methodologically 
147 Ramaekers et al. (2004) Dose related risk of motor vehicle crashes after cannabis use, Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, Vol.73, pp.109–119.
148 Sewell R. A. et al. (2009) The effect of cannabis compared to alcohol on driving, American Journal on 
Addictions, Vol.18, pp.185–193
149 Smiley, A., Cannabis: On-Road and Driving Simulator Studies, in Kalant, H. et al. (eds.) (1999) The Health 
Effects of Cannabis, Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation, pp.173–191.
150 Robbe, H. and O’Hanlon, J. (1993) Marijuana and actual driving performance, Washington, DC: US 
Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
151 Asbridge, M. et al. (2012) Acute cannabis consumption and motor vehicle collision risk: systematic review 
of observational studies and meta-analysis, British Medical Journal, Vol.344.
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sound studies. Other recent reviews of the epidemiological literature 
have produced similar findings.152
In light of the growing body of research demonstrating the increased 
risks of driving under the influence of cannabis (DUIC), and in keeping 
with  this  guide’s  emphasis  on  using  regulation to  promote responsible 
consumption, there is a clear need to ensure that sufficient legal and 
policy measures are in place that are effective at minimising such risks.
Defining and testing impairment
The key challenges are how to establish the degree to which cannabis 
consumption impairs driving, and how then to legally designate or 
classify a driver as sufficiently impaired to have committed a DUIC 
offence. There are three ways in which this has been done for both 
cannabis and alcohol:
• Making  a  behavioural  assessment  of  the driver using recognised criteria 
for impairment (sobriety testing)
• Testing  body  fluids  (urine, saliva, blood  or a combination of these)  and 
applying a zero tolerance ‘per se’ law - i.e. the  presence of any amount 
of a given drug is an automatic offence
• Testing  body fluids  and applying a  per se law based on an established 
threshold quantity of a given drug that is deemed to correlate with an 
unacceptable level of impairment
There are shortcomings associated with each of these approaches.
152 See for example: Li, M. C. et al. (2012) Marijuana use and motor vehicle crashes, Epidemiologic Reviews, 
Vol.34, No.1, pp.65–72, and EMCDDA (2012) Driving under the influence of drugs, alcohol and medicines in 
Europe – findings from the DRUID project.
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Behavioural assessments
Behavioural assessments  of intoxication,  often called roadside  or  field 
sobriety tests, are more likely to be incorrectly administered due to 
human error and, while sensitive to heavy impairment, are less effective 
in detecting modest impairments that could still be a legally significant 
factor in road accidents. A further problem, particularly with more 
modest or borderline levels of impairment, is that the results of even 
more sophisticated computer-based impairment tests would arguably 
need to be compared against a non-impaired, baseline measurement of 
the individual being tested, using the same assessment criteria, if relative 
impairment from cannabis consumption were to be established. Some 
people are just not particularly good at impairment test tasks, even 
though they are acceptably safe drivers, and may register a false positive.
While some individual components of standard field sobriety tests, 
such as the one-leg-stand test, have been shown to be fairly consistent 
predictors of cannabis-impaired behaviour,153 154 a comprehensive test is 
yet to be developed and approved. Further research is therefore needed 
in this area, but even the best roadside impairment testing is unlikely to 
be robust enough to form the sole basis of a legal sanction in many cases. 
As a result, such testing should be complemented by a more scientific 
assessment (e.g. a blood test) that can establish whether recent cannabis 
use has occurred, and is therefore the probable cause of any apparent 
impairment. This may be supported by other physical evidence of 
cannabis  use , such  as  joint  butts  or  smoking paraphernalia.
153 W.M. Bosker, et al. (2012) A placebo-controlled study to assess standard field sobriety tests performance 
during alcohol and cannabis intoxication in heavy cannabis users and accuracy of point of collection 
testing devices for detecting THC in oral fluid, Psychopharmacology, Vol.223, No.4, pp.439–446.
154 Stough, C. et al. (2006) An Evaluation of the Standardised Field Sobriety Test for the Detection of 
Impairment Associated With Cannabis With and Without Alcohol, Australian Government Department of 
Health and Aging, Canberra.
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Zero tolerance laws
Zero tolerance per se cannabis laws, on the other hand, are by their nature 
too sensitive, penalising the presence of any active drug ingredient or its 
by-products  (known  as  ‘metabolites’), regardless  of  whether they  have in 
fact caused impairment. This is a particular concern with cannabis, as the 
drug’s main psychoactive ingredient, THC,  quickly passes  out of the  blood 
and into fat cells in the body, from where it is gradually released over time. 
Hence although the impairing effects of cannabis will have typically worn 
off roughly three hours after inhalation,155 for infrequent users THC is still 
often  detectable by blood  tests  8-12  hours  after smoking.156 In heavy users, 
this window of detection can last for several days.157
Similar effects  are observed  for THC’s primary  metabolites. In  infrequent 
users, blood tests can usually detect 11-hydroxy-THC,  a psychoactive 
metabolite,  up to  around  6 hours after  inhalation.  But  one  of  THC’s  non- 
psychoactive metabolites, 11-carboxy-THC, can be detected in blood 
serum for several days in occasional users and for several weeks in heavy 
users158  (11-carboxy-THC  is  also  the main metabolite used by  urine  tests 
to indicate cannabis use, and in heavy users can be detected even longer, 
several months after consumption, via this method of testing159).
Consequently, depending on the method of testing used, THC and its 
metabolites can be detected days or even weeks after use, long after any 
impairing effect has completely dissipated. In contrast, alcohol is not 
stored by the body, meaning its presence is a better indicator of recent use 
and thus impairment.
155 Sewell R. A. et al. (2009) The effect of cannabis compared to alcohol on driving, American Journal on 
Addictions, Vol.18, No.3, pp.185–93.
156 Huestis M. A. et al. (1992) Blood cannabinoids. I. Absorption of THC and formation of 11-OH-THC and 
THCCOOH during and after smoking marijuana, Journal of Analytical Toxicology, Vol.16, No.5, pp.276–82.
157 Karschner E. L. et al. (2009) Do Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol concentrations indicate recent use in 
chronic cannabis users?, Addiction, Vol.104, No.12, pp.2041–2048.
158 Musshoff F. and Madea, B. (2006) Review of biological matrices (urine, blood, and hair) as indicators of 
recent or ongoing cannabis use, Therapeutic Drug Monitoring, Vol.28, No.2, pp.155–163.
159 Ibid
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Fixed threshold limits
A per se law associated with a threshold blood THC limit above zero 
is potentially more reasonable, since it could at least in theory be set 
high enough to implicate recent users, while avoiding incriminating 
non-impaired drivers who give a positive test due to their having used 
cannabis at some point during the previous few weeks.
The challenge then comes in trying to determine the threshold THC 
limit beyond which a driver is impaired to such an extent that he or 
she presents an unacceptable level of risk. To this end, one study has 
proposed a  blood  serum THC concentration limit  in  the range  of 7 -10 
nanograms per millilitre of blood (ng/ml).160 This, it is suggested, would 
safely avoid misclassifying sober drivers, as at 5ng/ml driving skills are 
impaired to roughly the same extent as an individual with a blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC)  of  0.5g/l (the standard per se limit for alcohol in most 
jurisdictions),  and 10 hours  after  smoking, THC concentrations typically 
decline to below this level in occasional and even frequent cannabis users.
However, this threshold is not universally accepted. One prominent 
study has proposed that a lower blood serum THC concentration of 
3.8ng/ml in fact produces impairment equivalent to that observed at 0.5g/
l BAC.161 Furthermore, many studies have attempted to establish a precise 
threshold beyond which an elevated crash risk occurs and, at present, 
little consensus has emerged from the scientific literature. Estimates 
 range  from blood serum THC  concentrations of as  low as 1 ng/ ml, to as 
160 Grotenhermen, F. et al. (2007) Developing limits for driving under cannabis, Addiction, Vol.102, No.12, 
pp.1910–1917. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17916224.
161 EMCDDA (2012) Driving under than influence of drugs, alcohol and medicines in Europe - findings from 
the DRUID project
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 high as  16 ng/ml,  with a  number  of  studies proposing limits  at various 
points in between.162 163 164 165
The lack of agreement on an empirically sound non-zero per se threshold 
is in large part because the effects of cannabis relative to blood THC 
content  vary  far  more  between  individuals  than  do  the effects  of 
alcohol - particularly between heavy and novice users.
Establishing an empirical basis for a non-zero per se limit is further 
complicated by  the distinctive pharmacokinetic profile  of  THC. Blood 
serum THC levels are at their highest up to approximately fifteen minutes 
following cannabis inhalation, yet maximum levels of impairment occur 
after this period, when THC begins to leave the blood and is absorbed 
by the body. Following inhalation THC levels in the blood rise rapidly, 
typically reaching  a  peak value  of  more  than 100ng/ml 5  to  10  minutes 
after  inhalation before  falling rapidly  to  between 1  and  4ng/ml within 
 3 - 4 hours. Thus cannabis-induced impairment can be at its peak while 
levels of THC in the blood are still relatively low. This is unlike blood 
alcohol concentration, which does positively correspond to levels of 
impairment.
The lack of close correspondence between blood THC levels and 
impairment has been acknowledged by the US National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), which in 2004 declared:
162 Ramaekers, J. G. et al (2009) Neurocognitive performance during acute THC intoxication in heavy and 
occasional cannabis users, Journal of Psychopharmacology, Vol.23, No.3, pp.266–277.
163 Grotenhermen, F. et al. (2005) Developing Science-Based Per Se Limits for Driving Under the Influence 
of Cannabis (DUIC): Findings and Recommendations by an Expert Panel, Marijuana Policy Project, 
Washington, DC.
164 Ramaekers, J. G., Commentary of Cannabis and Crash Risk: Concentration Effect Relations, in 
Transportation Research Board of the National Academies (eds.) (2006) Transportation Research Circular: 
Number E-C096, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, pp.65–66.
165 Drummer, O. H. et al. (2004) The involvement of drugs in drivers of motor vehicles killed in Australian 
road traffic crashes, Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol.36, No.2, pp.239–248.
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“It is inadvisable to try and predict effects based on blood THC concentrations 
alone, and currently impossible to predict specific effects based on THC-COOH 
[a non-psychoactive metabolite of THC] concentrations. It is possible for a person 
to be affected by marijuana use with concentrations of THC in their blood below 
the limit of detection of the method.”166
Serum levels of ethanol (solid squares) lag behind subjective effects (open squares) 
because tolerance develops very quickly. Subjective effects of THC (open circles 
lag behind serum levels (solid circles) because THC moves into the brain more 
slowly than alcohol does. (BAL=Blood Alcohol Level).167 
166 US Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2004) Drugs and Human 
Performance Fact Sheets. www.nhtsa.gov/People/injury/research/job185drugs/drugs_web.pdf.
167 Graph is taken from: Sewell, R.A. (2010) Is It Safe to Drive While Stoned? Cannabis and Driving An Erowid 
Science Review, Erowid, and uses graphs/data adapted from Portans I. et al. (1989) Acute Tolerance to 
Alcohol: Changes in Subjective Effects Among Social Drinkers, Psychopharmacology, Vol.97, pp.365–369; 
Cocchetto, D. M. et al. (1981) Relationship Between Plasma Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol Concentration 
and Pharmacologic Effects in Man, Psychopharmacology, Vol.75, pp.158–164; and Huestis M. et al. (1992) 
Blood Cannabinoids. I. Absorption of THC and Formation of 11-OH-THC and THCCOOH During and 
After Smoking Cannabis, Journal of Analytic Toxicology, Vol.16, pp.276–282.
 0 30 60 90 120
   Time (minutes)
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
40
30
20
10
0
40
30
20
10
0
THC
ng/mL
THCBAL
ng/dL
BAL
Subjective effects
Figure 3
186  How to Regulate Cannabis:
  Section 3
Blood testing
The actual process of blood testing also potentially confounds the use of 
per se limits (see Box, below,  for more  on why blood , rather than  saliva 
or urine , should  be  tested).  Collecting  whole  blood  or  serum samples is 
an invasive medical procedure, one that can generally only be performed 
legally by trained medical personnel. Samples also need to be transported 
and stored in special low-temperature conditions to prevent degradation 
and avoid any risk of infection.
There are early indications that an alternative method of collecting 
blood samples, dried blood spot analysis (DBS), could offer a solution 
to this problem, as it is less invasive and produces results with a level of 
precision that does not significantly differ from that of traditional blood 
testing methods. DBS uses capillary  blood taken  from a  finger  or  heel 
prick and can be carried out by non-medical personnel. A spot of whole 
blood is dried onto a custom-made card, which is then folded and left to 
dry at room/ambient temperature for three hours.168
Although DBS has the  potential to be a  more practical  method  of field 
testing of blood THC levels, law enforcement officers are currently 
unable to collect blood samples at the scene in a timely manner, 
meaning that there is often a significant delay between when a driver is 
stopped and when he or she is actually tested. This delay is problematic 
due again to the complex pharmacokinetic profile of THC, meaning 
it is not possible to  accurately  infer  an individual’s  previous level  of 
impairment from the results of a blood sample taken potentially as long 
as several hours later.169
  
168 The potential of DBS to be used in roadside drug testing is discussed in: EMCDDA (2012) Driving under the 
influence of drugs, alcohol and medicines in Europe – findings from the DRUID project, pp.36-37.
169 Wille, S. M. et al. (2010) Conventional and alternative matrices for driving under the influence of cannabis, 
Bioanalysis, Vol.2, No.4, pp.791–806.
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Drug testing — different fluids, different results
Blood
Blood testing can be used to analyse the concentration of THC and its 
metabolites in either whole blood or of blood serum, however the latter 
contains approximately twice the THC concentration of the former. Hence if 
a driver was found to have a THC blood serum concentration of 10ng/ml, he 
or she would have a whole blood THC reading of around 5ng/ml. While the 
presence of metabolites can be detected by blood tests for several weeks 
after cannabis consumption, THC is detectable for a shorter period of time. 
In occasional users, THC can be measured in blood serum for around 8–12 
hours after cannabis use,170 with this detection window lasting longer for 
moderate and heavy users — sometimes for several days.171 
 
Despite promising methodological advances in blood testing (see Blood 
testing, p.178), drawing blood for analysis is an invasive procedure and 
should only be carried out by a trained medical professional. Because blood 
tests are difficult to administer, they are generally only used once a road 
accident has taken place, rather than in routine checks. Delays between 
when a driver is stopped and when a blood test is actually performed can 
also complicate measurements of impairment. 
 
Despite these shortcomings (as well as the lack of scientific consensus on 
a specific THC blood serum concentration that correlates with impairment), 
the NHTSA acknowledges that, “[i]n terms of attempting to link drug 
concentrations to behavioral impairment, blood is probably the specimen of 
choice.” 
170 US Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2013) ‘Cannabis / 
Marijuana (Δ 9 -Tetrahydrocannabinol, THC)’. www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/job185drugs/
cannabis.htm.
171 US Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2003) State of Knowledge 
of Drug-Impaired Driving, Chapter 3. www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/stateofknwlegedrugs/ 
stateofknwlegedrugs/pages/3Detection.html
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Urine
Urinalysis is the most widely used method of drug testing, particularly in 
workplaces. Despite being a relatively non-invasive form of testing (although 
there are long standing privacy concerns about samples being collected 
under direct observation), standard urine tests are of little use in the 
enforcement of DUIC laws as they can only identify whether an individual 
has previously used cannabis — not whether an individual is impaired due to 
cannabis consumption. 
 
This is because, rather than looking for THC, urinalysis only looks for the 
presence of THC metabolites, which can take at least several hours to 
become detectable in urine. As the NHTSA has stated: “[This d]etection time 
is well past the window of intoxication and impairment.”172 In addition, once the 
detection period comes into effect, it lasts for such a long time that urine 
tests pose a significant risk of registering false positives. 
 
Saliva
Saliva testing is quick, non-invasive, and looks for the presence of ‘parent 
drugs’ (in this case THC), rather than metabolites. Saliva testing can also 
only detect THC up to several hours after use, therefore making it a better 
indicator of recent consumption and thus impairment. But while these 
advantages mean such tests may in the future be used effectively for 
measuring cannabis-related impairment, the accuracy of saliva testing is 
at present highly limited. Hence a large-scale, EU-commissioned project 
assessing nine on-site saliva testing devices concluded that not one could be 
recommended for roadside screening of drivers.173 One of the key problems 
associated with the use of such devices is that only a minute amount of THC 
is excreted into saliva, making it difficult to detect. Some countries, however, 
do already employ saliva testing, although as is the case in France, such tests 
172 US Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2004) Drugs and Human 
Performance Fact Sheets, p.9. www.nhtsa.gov/People/injury/research/job185drugs/drugs_web.pdf
173 Verstraete, A. G. and Raes, E. (eds.) (2006) Rosita-2 Project: Final Report. www.rosita.org/members/docs/
Rosita2%20Final%20report%20May2006.pdf
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are usually only preliminary, and prosecution is based on the results of a 
subsequent blood test. 
 
Despite these issues, it could be argued that per se limits may simply 
have to be tolerated given the widespread acceptance of their use 
in policing drunk driving. Such limits could certainly be useful in 
political terms, at least in the short term, allowing policy makers 
and politicians to demonstrate that they are a taking a hard line with 
those who drive under the influence of cannabis. Per se limits also 
make it easier for law enforcement to detect and process such drivers, 
and for prosecutors to convict them. Neither of these arguments are 
legitimate justifications for a potentially unjust system.
The pharmacological properties of cannabis do present unique challenges 
that  simply  do  not  exist  with  regard  to  alcohol above all,  the  possibility 
of THC being detectable for an extended period after consumption, long 
after any  psychomotor  impairment  has  passed.  But even  if  policy  makers 
decide that some prosecutions of non-impaired cannabis users are a price 
worth paying for safer roads, current evidence suggests that per se limits 
are not actually an effective means of achieving them. Research into US 
states that have legalised cannabis for medical use and also enforce per 
se THC limits has found no evidence that they reduce traffic fatalities.174
It must be accepted that, although appealing in their simplicity, per 
se limits are simply not appropriate as a blanket policy covering all 
instances of drug impaired driving. Many psychoactive  pharmaceuticals  
such as various antidepressants and anti-anxiety drugs , cause a degree 
of impairment far greater than that associated with THC,175 yet none 
of these are subject to per se limits of any kind. To enforce such limits 
174 Rees, D. and Anderson, D. M. (2012) Per Se Drugged Driving Laws and Traffic Fatalities, IZA Discussion 
Paper No.7048. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189786
175 EMCDDA (2012) Driving under the influence of drugs, alcohol and medicines in Europe – findings from the 
DRUID project, p.21.
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would be impractical and most likely arbitrary given the wide variations 
in effects that these drugs can have on different users.
DUIC and opposition to reform
It is important to make clear that 
driving while impaired by cannabis 
consumption should be an offence 
regardless of the legal status of the 
drug (in terms of its production, 
supply or possession). But although 
legalising and regulating cannabis will 
not alter the fundamental nature of 
the DUIC offence, it may change the 
political context in which responses 
to it are devised. DUIC laws are likely 
to be reviewed in any given jurisdiction as the transition towards legally 
regulated markets takes place (as has happened in Washington and 
Colorado, for example). Opponents of such reforms have often focused 
on DUIC accidents following any such transition.176 
Nevertheless, the emotive and politicised discourse that pervades this 
issue means there may well be a greater acceptability for potentially 
unfair zero-tolerance or fixed threshold per se laws for cannabis-impaired 
driving, and a risk of disproportionately harsh sentencing for offenders. 
Caution will be needed to make sure that decisions are driven by evidence, 
not political imperatives.
176 This is despite there being some evidence that making cannabis legally available can reduce traffic 
fatalities, as people substitute the drug for alcohol, leading to fewer drunk drivers on the road. See: Rees, 
D. and Anderson, D. M. (2011) Medical Marijuana Laws, Traffic Fatalities, and Alcohol Consumption, IZA 
Discussion Paper No.6112. http://ftp.iza.org/dp6112.pdf
Driving while impaired by 
cannabis consumption 
should be an offence 
regardless of the legal 
status of the drug (in 
terms of its production, 
supply or possession)
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Recommendations
Given this array of technical challenges, and the tensions between 
exercising a precautionary principle and the potential for injustice 
relating to over-zealous enforcement, we make the following set of 
recommendations for what a workable DUIC enforcement policy 
could look like. It should, however, be noted that the constraints and 
complexities of various  jurisdictions’ legal systems, and the  differences 
between them, mean it is difficult to make policy prescriptions that will be 
applicable everywhere. Hence these recommendations should be viewed 
more as general guiding principles, than as concrete and comprehensive 
policy responses to the problem of cannabis-impaired driving.
• A  fair and pragmatic policy  would be  one centred around  effect-based 
standards. Behavioural impairment,  rather  than  the mere presence 
of a given level of THC in blood or other body fluids, must therefore 
be demonstrated in order for an administrative or criminal sanction 
to  be  applied. Blood  THC  concentration would  none the less  still be 
measured to enable prosecutors to establish recent ingestion of cannabis. 
A positive test would therefore function as supporting evidence of 
impairment, rather than an automatic trigger for the application of a 
penalty
• Initial evidence  of  impairment, and thus the  probable cause required 
for a subsequent blood test, should ideally be derived from the failure 
of a reliable and accurate field sobriety test that has been validated 
for cannabis use. While some of these tests are still in their infancy 
and will require development, they present a more promising avenue 
of research and are a more worthwhile target for investment than 
impairment testing based on body fluid analysis. Additional evidence 
of impairment from an actual driving infraction may also be used to 
support prosecutions
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• Although per se limits are not recommended, they are clearly an 
attractive option for policy makers given that several US states,  
including Washington, have chosen to implement them. In light of their 
appeal, it is worth urging those jurisdictions that are intent on enforcing 
such limits to exercise care in setting them sufficiently high so as to 
not ensnare non-impaired drivers. It is therefore important for policy 
makers and prosecutors to be aware of the evolving evidence base in 
this area, and be committed to adjusting policy accordingly. The use of 
zero-tolerance per se laws is strongly discouraged
 Establishing recent use
• Evidence  shows that  heavy  cannabis  users  are  likely  to  have  residual 
levels of THC in the blood long after they have consumed cannabis 
and long after any impairment has dissipated. The challenge therefore 
lies in setting an empirically sound blood THC limit beyond which 
prosecutors can reasonably assume that a driver has recently used 
cannabis and that this was therefore the most likely cause of the 
observed impairment  (rather  than, say,  a  driver’s  general  poor  
coordination or a simple human error)
• As more  studies are conducted and  more meta-analyses are  performed, 
a  clearer  picture of where to  set this limit  should  emerge. Based on 
the best currently available evidence, it would appear that prosecutors 
might reasonably assume a driver who fails a field sobriety test and is 
also found  to  have a  blood serum THC  concentration  of  around 10ng/ 
ml was driving while impaired due to recent cannabis use. Such a limit 
should, however, be subject to regular review in light of emerging 
research
• In  light of consistent findings that the  use of cannabis  in conjunction 
with alcohol has an additive effect on crash risk, consideration should 
be given to separate, lower blood THC and blood alcohol limits in cases 
where both intoxicants are detected
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 Enforcement
• DUIC  laws,  how they  will be enforced, and the penalties  for  DUIC 
offences should be as clearly defined as possible in order to avoid 
misunderstandings among cannabis users or law enforcers over what is 
and what is not allowed
• Penalties for different DUIC  offences should be  determined by local 
jurisdictions, with equivalent DUI alcohol sentencing reasonably 
providing a guide. Consideration should be given to ensuring 
proportionality of sentencing, and granting sentencing judges the 
flexibility to take aggravating and mitigating circumstances into account 
within clear  guidelines. Mandatory  minimums  should be avoided ; they 
are invariably politically driven rather than evidence-based
• While  the  use of cannabis-based medicines  should not be  an excuse for 
driving while impaired, it could be a mitigating factor for decisions on 
both DUIC prosecutions and sentencing. Clear guidance on this issue 
should be established for both cannabis-based medicine users and for 
sentencing judges
• Consideration should also  be given to  the  observed  margins  of  error  in 
blood  testing  procedures , forensic  testing  services  should  themselves be 
subject to regular testing to establish variability with identical samples 
(for an individual service and between rival services). These error 
parameters need to be appropriately incorporated into the enforcement 
framework
• Enforcement of  DUIC  laws  should  be  supported  by  public  education 
campaigns that explain the risks of DUIC, as well as how DUIC laws 
work. There is good evidence from experiences with alcohol to show 
that such  public education , supported by  clearly  understood  and fairly 
but  vigorously applied enforcement practices - is  effective  at reducing 
levels of DUI and related accidents. If done well, it should be possible, 
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as has happened with alcohol, to foster a culture in which DUIC 
 is widely  regarded as unacceptable.  Basic messages , which would 
 naturally need to  be  tailored  for local  or  target  audiences , could include:
• Driving under  the  influence of  cannabis  increases  the  risk  of  injury 
or death , to  you  and  other road  users
• Driving  under  the  influence of cannabis  is illegal and can  result  in 
serious penalties
• If you are using cannabis, regard it as you  would  alcohol: arrange 
for a designated driver or use public transport or a taxi
• Don’t  let your friends  use  cannabis and  drive
• You  are unsafe to  drive  and likely  to  fail  a  blood test  for at  least 
three hours after smoking cannabis. This unsafe period can be much 
longer if you have used heavily, eaten cannabis edibles such as 
brownies, or consumed cannabis with alcohol or other drugs 
 Evaluation
• As with any  new or revised policy  and  legal  frameworks, it  will  be 
important to monitor how effective DUIC laws and their enforcement 
are at actually achieving a reduction in injuries or deaths stemming 
from cannabis impairment. At the same time, unintended negative 
consequences of the law also need to be monitored. These include: the 
potentially expanded use of intrusive testing procedures, false positives/ 
negatives resulting from insufficiently robust testing technology or 
methodology, and unjust punitive sanctions against non-impaired 
drivers who have consumed cannabis in previous weeks
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b The interaction of regulatory systems for 
medical and non-medical uses of cannabis
Challenge 
• Making  a clear distinction  between  the political and regulatory 
challenges associated with medical and non-medical cannabis products, 
and ensuring that the parallel and overlapping research and policy 
development processes support rather than hinder each other
Analysis 
• The emerging evidence and  support for medical cannabis  has  made 
cannabis less politically threatening in many jurisdictions, and combined 
with medical cannabis regulation acting as a ‘proof of concept’ has helped 
promote reform of non-medical cannabis policy
• Pursuing the two  reform processes  in  tandem  has  arguably  been 
politically effective, particularly in the US, but it also carries some 
political risks
• In  the context of highly politicised debates around both  access to 
medical cannabis and regulation of non-medical cannabis, the two 
issues have often become unhelpfully conflated and confused
Recommendations 
• Unless there  is  a  specific  reason  to  explore  the  crossover,  it  is   best  to 
separate, as far as possible, the issues and political campaigning relating 
to the reform of non-medical cannabis policy and the issues relating to 
cannabis-based medicines
• It  is  important to  make  clear that this report  is  not  making 
recommendations on how to regulate medical cannabis products
The debate around access to medical cannabis (or ‘cannabis-based medicines’, 
a more useful term here as it incorporates a wider range of products) 
196  How to Regulate Cannabis:
  Section 3
has long been intertwined with the debate around the legalisation and 
regulation of cannabis for non-medical or recreational uses. The same 
is true, albeit to a lesser extent, with regard to the many potential uses 
of the cannabis/hemp plant for food, fuel, fabric, construction materials, 
plastics and so on.
This guide is not considering or making recommendations on policy for 
cannabis-based medicines (or industrial hemp products), except where it 
relates to recent developments in policy for the regulation of non-medical 
cannabis. These are certainly important issues, but are a largely separate 
debate; indeed the key point we wish to make here is to emphasise this 
separation.
This is in no way dismissive of the issue. The medical use of cannabis 
has a long history and has been subject to extensive research, and 
while generalisations are difficult (given the range of products, medical 
conditions being treated, and quality of research), this substantial and 
growing evidence base clearly demonstrates how many cannabis-based 
medicines have established or potential uses in treating a range of medical 
conditions.
This being the case, it is important that the often polarised and emotive 
politics concerning non-medical cannabis do not interfere with research 
into cannabis-based medicines or doctor and patient access to them. 
Unfortunately, such interference has tended to characterise the post-
war period, and to this extent there is a clear crossover between the two 
issues. 
However, from Transform’s perspective this  is a reason to  try  and 
decouple the issues, rather than bring them closer together. In the US 
in particular, medical and non-medical cannabis debates have become 
increasingly interwoven at the coalface of the cannabis law reform 
debate, and some have accused medical cannabis campaigners of in fact 
having a primary agenda of normalising and legalising cannabis for non-
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medical use. There is, of course, nothing sinister or inconsistent about 
supporting reform on both fronts, and most of the high-profile cannabis 
reform groups do so, seeing the issues as being mutually supportive in 
two key ways.
Firstly, highlighting some of the beneficial medical uses of cannabis has 
helped make it appear less socially threatening, undermining the ‘reefer 
madness’ scaremongering of the past. This has undoubtedly helped 
increase support for non-medical cannabis reforms to some extent.
Secondly, medical cannabis developments, particularly in the US (but 
also elsewhere around the world), have helped to advance non-medical 
cannabis reform by demonstrating how cannabis can be legally produced 
and made available in a responsible and regulated fashion. Indeed this 
guide has drawn quite extensively on the lessons of legally regulated 
medical cannabis production and supply.
But with the progress  that both of these closely  related policy  areas  have 
helped to promote, also come some conceptual problems and political 
risks.
While challenging some of the historical misconceptions about the risks 
of recreational cannabis use is important, using the medical benefits of 
cannabis to do so is an unhelpful conceptual error. The efficacy and risk 
profile of cannabis-based medicines for certain medical conditions has, 
for the most part, little or no bearing on the risks posed by cannabis 
to recreational users. They are quite different things; conflating the two 
does not stand up to scrutiny, and reform advocates can leave themselves 
vulnerable to criticism when they do so.
The lessons from medical cannabis regulation that can be applied to 
non-medical cannabis regulation are less problematic, but there are 
still vulnerabilities here, and care should be taken when discussing or 
implementing them. One challenge is that in the absence of a clear 
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international legal framework , or in the US, a federal regulatory model , 
the  implementation and  practice of  medical cannabis regulation has 
varied enormously, so generalisations are usually unhelpful. Some 
models have very usefully demonstrated what effective, controlled 
production and responsible prescribing or retailing can look like. 
Elsewhere, medical cannabis regulation has been inadequate, leading to 
over-commercialisation and irresponsible sales practices and promotions. 
So when talking about learning from medical cannabis models it is 
important to point to lessons from both the good practice and the 
mistakes that have been witnessed. We should not hesitate to be critical 
of poor regulation or irresponsible retailing.
The fact that in some jurisdictions a proportion of medical cannabis 
provision was clearly being used non-medically is something that needs 
to be addressed carefully. On the one hand the outcome of de facto legally 
produced, supplied and consumed cannabis may be viewed as a positive, 
not least as it has not had any disastrous consequences. On the other hand 
many will be intrinsically uncomfortable at the dishonesty involved; even 
if often of a ‘nudge, wink’ variety, the undermining of regulatory systems 
for medicines and the potential threat to the probity of the medical 
profession is something many are understandably defensive about. The 
debate about means and ends is one for history - given this guide is about 
how to regulate cannabis, we are merely highlighting the issue as a risk 
in the unfolding debate, and as a consideration for policy makers when 
exploring the evidence of what would work best in their jurisdictions.
Our default position is that unless there is a very specific crossover 
between the respective issues relating to medical and non-medical 
cannabis, they are probably best kept separate. As regulatory models for 
both uses of cannabis continue to advance this may become less of a 
challenge  in  the  future ,  and many  of  the  specific  problems may  prove 
largely unique to the US political environment and the evolution of the 
debate in that country. In the Netherlands, for example, where prescribed 
medical cannabis effectively appeared after the drug became de facto 
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legally available via the coffee shop system, it is, compared to the US, a 
political non-issue
Challenge 
• Integrating controls over the  production, supply  and  use of synthetic 
drugs that mimic the effects of cannabis within a system of legal 
cannabis regulation
Analysis 
• Synthetic  cannabinoids  make up  a  significant proportion of  the  number 
of new psychoactive substances (NPS) produced as legal alternatives to 
more ‘traditional’, illegal drugs
• The  risks  of  synthetic cannabinoid use are  considerably  higher  than 
those associated with cannabis use. This is due to: a lack of research 
into the effects of such drugs on humans, some evidence that they may 
be more potent and toxic than real cannabis, wide variations in the 
products that contain them, and misleading or inaccurate ingredient 
listings
• Although  the  prevalence  of  synthetic cannabis  use  has  increased 
significantly in recent years, it is still relatively low in most countries
Recommendations 
• Under  a  system of legal cannabis regulation, drugs  that  mimic  the 
effects of cannabis would not automatically be made legally available
• Any  synthetic cannabinoid products would be  subject to a default 
prohibition and required to undergo testing in order to establish their 
risk profile. If such products did not meet defined safety criteria (and 
c Synthetic cannabinoids
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being less risky than real cannabis could serve as a sensible benchmark), 
they would remain prohibited and their production and supply would 
be subject to penalties. Penalties for the possession/use of synthetic 
cannabinoids would be removed
• Such  drugs  are  unlikely  to  pose a significant regulatory  challenge  if 
cannabis is made legally available. The current, rather small population 
of synthetic cannabinoid users will only decrease further given that an 
overwhelming majority prefer real cannabis over synthetic alternatives. 
For those who have become heavy, problematic or dependent users 
of such substances appropriate tailored harm reduction and treatment 
responses should be available
• The  use  of  synthetic  cannabinoids  is  a  direct result  of  cannabis 
prohibition, with the market for these drugs emerging purely to meet 
the existing high levels of demand for the drug they seek to imitate
Recent years have seen a significant growth in the manufacture, sale and 
use of  products containing synthetic cannabinoid  receptor agonists more 
commonly known as ‘synthetic cannabinoids’. Of the 73  new  psychoactive 
substances identified  by  the EMCDDA  in  2012, 30 were  found  to  contain 
such chemical compounds.177 This increasingly wide range of synthetic 
cannabinoid products all serve (or at least are  intended  to serve) the  same 
 purpose -  namely, to mimic  the effects of real cannabis. Typically sprayed 
onto a smokable herbal mixture, synthetic cannabinoids are functionally 
similar to the active ingredient of cannabis, THC, binding to the same 
cannabinoid receptors in the brain.
Synthetic  cannabinoids  such as  JWH-018, JWH-073 and  CP 47,497-C6 
are the active ingredients of many products marketed under more 
consumer-friendly names such as ‘Spice’ and ‘K-2’. The relative increase 
in the variety and popularity of such products is mostly attributable to 
177 EMCDDA (2013) Synthetic cannabinoids in Europe. www.emcdda.europa.eu/topics/pods/synthetic-
cannabinoids
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their initially being a legal, but not necessarily  safe, alternative  to  actual 
cannabis that was easily available (yet subject to virtually no regulatory 
control) via online and high street retailers. Synthetic cannabinoids are 
not yet prohibited by the UN drug conventions. However, as use and 
awareness of them has grown, many have been prohibited under  various 
countries’ national drug control  legislation.178
Risk profile
While there is an established body of knowledge regarding the 
pharmacology and toxicology of cannabis and THC, there is little similar 
information about synthetic cannabinoids or the products that contain 
them. Only a few formal human studies have been published, although 
there is evidence to suggest that some synthetic cannabinoids have a 
higher potency and neurotoxicity than THC.179 This, combined with 
the considerable variability of synthetic cannabinoid products, both in 
terms of the type and quantity of substances present, means there is a 
higher potential for overdose than with cannabis. Different synthetic 
cannabinoids also have different risk profiles so generalisations become 
more problematic.
Compounding risks is the lack of information about what is actually 
contained in many of these products. The plant material that is combined 
with synthetic cannabinoids to create a smokable herbal mixture may be 
dangerous in itself: the packaging for  some ‘Spice’ products, for example, 
has an ingredient list that features a range of potentially psychoactive 
plants whose pharmacological or toxicological properties are not well 
known. Despite this, analysis of ‘Spice’ has revealed that it does not in 
178 For a list of countries and the synthetic cannabinoids they now classify as controlled substances, see: 
UNODC (2011) Synthetic cannabinoids in herbal products, pp.14-15.  
www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/Synthetic_Cannabinoids.pdf
179 Hermanns-Clausen, M. et al. (2013) Acute toxicity due to the confirmed consumption of synthetic 
cannabinoids: clinical and laboratory findings, Addiction, Mar, Vol.108, No.3, pp.534–544. www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmed/22971158
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fact contain most of its stated ingredients.180 They may have been listed 
simply as a marketing ploy, to give the impression that ‘Spice’ is a natural 
herbal product, when in fact its effects are widely understood to be due 
solely to the added synthetic cannabinoids, which are not reported on 
the label.
Prevalence of use
The relative paucity of information on synthetic cannabinoids extends 
to levels of use. The limited amount of survey data available, however, 
suggests that in most countries, particularly those in Europe, prevalence 
of synthetic cannabinoid use is very low. The exception is the US, where 
at least among young people, prevalence appears to be relatively high 
(although declining). The most recent US prevalence data comes from 
the 2014 US Monitoring the Future survey of students, with last year 
prevalence for 17- to 18-year-olds of 5.8% in 2014, down from 7.9% in 
2013 and 11.3% in 2012.181 
In contrast, in  the  UK, the British Crime Survey (for England and Wales) 
covering 2014/2015 found a total of 0.9% of adults (16–59) had used 
novel psychoactive substances (NPS) in the last year, of which 61% had 
used synthetic cannabinoids.182 In Spain, a large 2012 national survey on 
drug use among students aged 14–18 also identified low levels of use of 
‘Spice’ products, with prevalence rates of 1.0% for last year use.183
Again, despite the current lack of research into this emerging drug market, 
initial indications are that most users strongly prefer natural cannabis to 
180 EMCDDA (2009) Understanding the “Spice” phenomenon. www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/
thematic-papers/spice
181 EMCDDA (2016) ‘Analysis: synthetic cannabinoids in Europe’ http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/topics/pods/
synthetic-cannabinoids
182 UK Home Office (2015), ‘Tables for drug misuse: Findings from the 2014 to 2015 CSEW’, https://www.gov.
uk/government/statistics/tables-for-drug-misuse-findings-from-the-2014-to-2015-csew
183 Spanish Observatory on Drugs (2012), Survey on drug use among Secondary School Students in Spain 
2012 (ESTUDES).
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synthetic cannabinoids, with the former described as producing a more 
pleasant high and the latter associated with more negative effects.184
Regulatory response
Many synthetic cannabinoids are currently banned under domestic drug 
laws, and under a system of legal cannabis regulation their legal status 
would not automatically change. In fact, we recommend that within a 
legal regulatory framework to control cannabis, no new, functionally 
similar substance would be made available without at least a basic level 
of risk evaluation.
Manufacturers would be required to demonstrate that any synthetic 
cannabinoid products they wish to sell are low-risk, with regulators 
having the power to prohibit any that were shown to pose an 
unacceptably high risk to consumers (being lower-risk than real cannabis 
could be a sensible benchmark). While all penalties for the possession/use 
of such products would be removed, proportionate penalties (whether 
administrative or criminal) for unauthorised production or supply would 
still be enforced. When cannabis is made available through a legally 
regulated market, a default prohibition on the production or supply of 
any synthetic cannabinoid products is 
therefore justified.
A regulatory system of this kind has 
already been implemented in New 
Zealand,  where  the  manufacturers 
of  all  novel  psychoactive  substances , 
not just synthetic cannabinoids, are 
required to demonstrate the safety 
of their products before they can 
184 Winstock, A. R. and Barratt, M.J. (2013) Synthetic cannabis: a comparison of patterns of use and effect profile 
with natural cannabis in a large global sample, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, Vol.131, No.1-2, pp.106–111.
We recommend that with a 
legal regulatory framework 
to control cannabis, no 
new, functionally similar 
substance would be made 
available without at least a 
basic level of risk evaluation
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be legally sold under strict conditions. Products deemed to pose more 
than a low risk will remain prohibited. The aim of such regulation is to 
protect users by guiding them towards safer products whose risks have 
been properly established.185 The new law remains in place, but has run 
into political opposition and a number of technical challenges – crucially, 
how	 to	 establish‘“low-risk” harm thresholds without using animal 
testing (which is specifically prohibited). So while New Zealand is the 
only country in the world with a comprehensive piece of legislation for 
regulating NPS for non-medical use (with certain synthetic cannabinoids 
seen as the most likely first candidates for consideration), currently no 
NPS are regulated under the system. 
Although New Zealand  has developed a pragmatic approach to dealing 
with existing synthetic cannabinoid demand and established markets, 
the need for such regulation will naturally diminish once cannabis has 
been made legally available. Demand for synthetic cannabis  is already 
low and would only shrink further: users would have no incentive to 
buy imitation cannabis when they can simply purchase the real thing. 
Remaining challenges are likely to include use in prisons and for people on 
probation subject to testing (as synthetic cannabinoids are not identified 
by conventional tests), and for the small population of heavy users who 
are not interested in substituting back to cannabis.
Crucially, it is important to acknowledge the role of the the current 
prohibitionist legal environment in driving  the emergence of synthetic 
cannabinoids and other NPS in the first place. Where there is demand for 
a particular drug or drug effect, there will also be a profit opportunity. And 
 this  opportunity ensures  demand will always  be met , whether legally or 
illegally. The frequent banning of NPS that occurs in many countries will 
never be effective as long as there is no means by which the pre-existing 
demand for drugs can be met. Without some form of legally regulated 
185 New Zealand Government (2013) New Zealand Psychoactive Substances Act. www.legislation.govt.nz/act/
public/2013/0053/latest/DLM5042921
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drug supply, banning NPS simply results in a game of cat and mouse, 
whereby once a new drug is discovered and prohibited, manufacturers 
simply adapt and produce another substance that gets around existing 
legislation - or if a blanket ban is introduced the market will simply be 
displaced to entirely criminal control. And, as appears to be the case with 
synthetic cannabinoid products, the effects of these new and increasingly 
obscure substances are likely to be poorly understood and may in fact be 
more dangerous than ‘traditional’, illegal drugs.
 
Challenge 
• Identifying  and  minimising  potential problems  associated with  cross-
border trade between jurisdictions with differing regulatory approaches 
to cannabis
Analysis 
• More  traditional destination  tourism  related to cannabis  is  relatively 
non-problematic and can bring economic benefits for the destination
• More  localised  cross-border  trade  between  jurisdictions that  have  legally 
regulated cannabis and those that maintain cannabis prohibition may 
present a greater problem, but is likely to be a relatively small-scale 
phenomenon
• Border enforcement  responses are  likely  to  be expensive,  ineffective  and 
counterproductive
• Rationing sales  and/or  restricting  access  to markets  to  residents  only 
(with membership or ID-based access controls) may help moderate 
cross-border trade, but if overly restrictive may incentivise a parallel 
criminal market
d ‘Cannabis tourism’
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Recommendations 
• Cannabis  tourism  is a  problem  that can only really  be addressed  by 
legalising and regulating cannabis on both sides of a border
• In  the  absence of this,  it  is a challenge  that has  no  obvious  solution; 
enforcement responses will make things worse, and while localised 
market regulation may moderate the problem, it is unlikely to eliminate 
it
• Realistically, it  is  a  problem  to  be tolerated and managed pragmatically. 
The focus should be on responding to any real social harms that emerge, 
rather than targeting cannabis users through punitive enforcement 
measures
• For the  most  part, this  is  likely  to remain  a  marginal and  localised 
problem and should not be overstated in the policy debate
The potential problem of ‘drug tourism’ is often raised by opponents 
of cannabis regulation, frequently implying that post-reform, legions 
of cannabis users from other jurisdictions will descend on any newly 
legalised market, bringing an array of social problems with them. This 
proposition is generally ill-defined, and often heavy with misplaced 
hyperbole that taps into a rather unpleasant streak of prejudice against 
people who use drugs, foreigners, youths and ‘otherness’ more generally. 
However, experiences with some pioneering cannabis regulation models 
(most obviously in the Netherlands), as well as experiences with alcohol 
and tobacco, demonstrate that there is potential for real problems to 
emerge when jurisdictions that share borders adopt different regulatory 
approaches to drug markets, particularly when this difference is as stark 
as legal vs. prohibited.
When thinking about this problem, it is first important to try and put the 
likely scale of the potential challenges in perspective. Cannabis is already 
cheaply and easily available in most jurisdictions via the illegal market. 
In this context, relatively few cannabis users would expend significant 
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resources travelling to neighbouring 
jurisdictions, let alone travelling further 
afield, just to buy or consume cannabis. 
Of those who would do so, experience 
from the Netherlands suggests they 
are comprised of two fairly distinct 
groups, associated with quite different 
challenges.
The first  are those who are  drawn  to 
 the Netherlands’ cannabis coffee shops, 
primarily in Amsterdam. For this group, it is not the access to cannabis 
per se that is the attraction , they will mostly be existing cannabis users 
and have access to the drug at home , but the novelty and exoticism of the 
coffee shops themselves (for those who have never experienced a range 
of cannabis products legally available in a licensed venue), specifically in 
the context of a vibrant and beautiful European capital. Surveys suggest 
 that  roughly 1  in 3  visitors  to Amsterdam visit a coffee shop during their 
stay, and approximately 1 in 6 visit the city specifically because of the 
coffee shops.186 The question then is what are the costs and benefits of 
this ‘cannabis tourism’?
The main cost is the potential for social nuisance. However, among such 
visitors problems are marginal, with issues that do arise largely confined 
to  a relatively  contained  and  manageable  area  in  and around  the  city’s 
red light district. In fact, most problems are related to alcohol rather 
than cannabis consumption. Cannabis users are rarely violent, and these 
‘cannabis tourists’, if they can really be called that, are only temporary 
visitors, staying for a few days at most.
186 Amsterdam Tourism and Convention Board (2012) Amsterdam Visitors Survey 2012. http://www.
iamsterdam.com/ebooks/ATCB_Amsterdam_Bezoekersonderzoek__2012/magazine.html#/spreadview/0/
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jurisdictions via the illegal 
market. In this context, 
relatively few users 
would expend significant 
resources travelling to 
neighbouring jurisdictions
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The obvious benefit from such tourism is increased revenue, not just 
for the cannabis coffee shops, but for the hotels, shops, restaurants, and 
other businesses that make up the local tourist economy. This benefit 
is a substantial one, and it explains why the authorities in Amsterdam 
have resisted the imposition of the residents-only ‘wietpas’ scheme (see 
below).  For them, cannabis tourism  is  not a problem,  it is a net benefit. A 
comparison can easily be made with similar forms of legal ‘drug tourism’, 
such  as  tours  of Amsterdam’s famous  Heineken  beer  factory, Scottish 
whisky distilleries or vineyards in France or the Napa Valley. Indeed, 
tourist boards routinely promote cities on the basis of their drinking 
establishments. Here again, it is not the drug itself that is the primary 
draw (people can buy Heineken or Californian wines in their local 
supermarket, just as coffee shop  tourists  can buy  cannabis on their local 
street corner) but  the cultural environment.
The second, and potentially more problematic, form of cannabis tourists 
are those who cross borders between prohibitionist and legalised 
cannabis jurisdictions for the sole purpose of procuring the drug. The 
Netherlands again provides a useful example of this phenomenon, with 
buyers  visiting from  neighbouring countries  (mostly  Belgium, Germany, 
and France) simply to buy cannabis from the coffee shops and then return 
home. This process has been facilitated by the nature of the European 
Union, which has meant that border controls are either largely tokenistic 
or non-existent.
The scale of this problem again needs to be put into perspective. The 
advantage of being able to buy cannabis from a Dutch coffee shop rather 
from a  local  illegal  market  in  Belgium or Germany  has  its limits: people 
will only be willing to travel so far, especially given the restrictions on 
sales (5 grams) from any one retailer. The phenomenon is therefore 
largely contained to those Dutch cities with coffee shops near the border, 
such as Maastricht, and the area foreign tourists come from does not 
stretch far into mainland Europe.
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The problems created for these cities should also not be overstated. In 
some  cases, complaints have  been quite parochial, such  as  a lack of city 
centre parking due to a high number of coffee shop visitors. There have 
also been issues with some aggressive unlicensed dealers who, spotting 
a market opportunity, have gravitated towards these locations in order 
to sell to cross-border visitors outside the constraints of the coffee shop 
system , for  example,  on  the lay-bys  of  major  roads between  the border 
and coffee shops in the destination cities. Despite the money that such 
visitors contribute to the economy via coffee shop sales, the fact that they 
mostly purchase cannabis and then leave, reduces local economic benefits 
(relative  to  the  more conventional tourists who visit Amsterdam’s coffee 
shops, for example).
As a response to this problem, the Dutch government has introduced the 
‘wietpas’ scheme, which requires that access to coffee shops be restricted 
to residents of the Netherlands. Not all municipalities with coffee shops 
have  implemented this policy, indeed, Amsterdam  has chosen not to . 
Where the scheme has been implemented, and even where total number 
of visitors seeking to buy cannabis is reported to have fallen, there have 
been dramatically increased problems with social nuisance relating to the 
street dealers who have moved in to sell to visitors no longer allowed 
access to the coffee shops. Clearly, part of the problem with the wietpas, 
aside from the overtly political dimension of the decision-making process, 
is that it was an attempt to reverse-engineer a ‘solution’ into an already 
well-established market. Rather than eliminating the market, it has largely 
displaced it from licensed and taxed premises to illicit street markets.
The town of Venlo, in the south of the Netherlands, made the decision 
to move some coffee shops closer to the border, situating them in a less 
residential area. This significantly reduced levels of social nuisance caused 
by drug tourists. Maastricht has had plans to do the same, while in some 
neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, coffee shops employ street-based staff 
to minimise public disturbance.
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By  contrast, Uruguay’s  model  of cannabis  regulation  is unlikely  to allow 
such problems to emerge. For example, by enforcing a residents-only 
restriction on cannabis sales from the outset, there will be no expectation 
from cross-border visitors that they will have access to the new legal 
market .  In  addition, a system of rationed availability via licensed 
pharmacies is much more functional and intrinsically less attractive to 
potential visitors than the Dutch coffee shop system.
The extent of issues relating to Washington, Colorado, and other US 
legalisation states and cannabis tourism from other states, remains to be 
seen, but may be more of a challenge. Not only are there greater near-
border populations to contend with, and relatively few border controls, 
but non-residents are allowed access to markets which are also far more 
sophisticated in terms of available products. That said, in Colorado, sales 
to non-residents were initially limited to a lower volume than for residents. 
However, it is notable that in 2016 this allowance was equalised at one 
ounce per transaction for both residents and non-residents.
Similar problems have long been witnessed at borders between 
jurisdictions that maintain alcohol prohibition and those that do not, 
and the reality is that relatively little can be done to reduce them. The 
cost-benefit analysis of instructing border customs officials to use 
increasingly heavy-handed enforcement responses looks no better than 
with enforcement responses to drug markets historically. It would be 
expensive, interdiction is likely to be marginal at best, and there would be 
various negative impacts, above all a counterproductive expansion in the 
criminalisation of small-time users and buyers. In the context of US state 
or internal EU borders, it would also potentially represent a dramatic 
change in the nature of what are currently very open borders, with wider 
cultural and economic impacts.
Rationing sales to small-scale purchases for personal use may serve to 
moderate the problem, and residents-only or membership club-based 
sales could also help if put  in  place  from  the  outset.  But caution  is needed 
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with these options: any model that restricts legal-market access in too 
arbitrary a fashion is likely to lead to parallel illegal markets emerging 
to fill the void, with all the attendant negative consequences that would 
involve.
In conclusion, this is a relatively marginal problem, but one that is 
inevitable while cannabis prohibition continues in some jurisdictions. 
The  obvious  solution , for  once  a genuine ‘ silver  bullet’ ,  is  of course  to 
legalise and regulate on both sides of the border. Until this happens, a 
degree of pragmatic tolerance combined with cross-border coordination 
and intelligent regulation of emerging markets will help moderate any 
problems.
e) Cannabis and the UN drug conventions
Challenge 
• Addressing the political and procedural dilemmas in reforming the 
outdated, inflexible and counterproductive international drug control 
system to make it ‘fit for purpose’
• Weighing up the pros and cons of different courses of action in the 
context of each jurisdiction’s domestic and geopolitical priorities
• Designing a new international system rooted in the core UN principles 
of security, development and human rights that is flexible enough to 
allow for national innovation; capable of regulating international trade 
and business interests to ensure safety, protection of minors, labour 
rights and other concerns; and able to balance national concerns and 
priorities with responsibilities to neighbouring countries
• Negotiating a highly differentiated political landscape in which some 
members of the international community remain committed to punitive 
prohibitions, while others are keen to explore alternative regulatory 
models
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• If taking unilateral or collective action to reform cannabis laws at a 
national level in advance of reforms to the international framework; 
identifying the potential political risks (and how to mitigate them), and 
the necessary careful legal analysis, clarity and transparency of goals and 
justifications that will be required
Analysis 
• The history of international cannabis controls is a story of the drug’s 
ill-considered inclusion in the international drug control system at the 
beginning of the last century. This was driven by a range of political 
agendas tangential or entirely unrelated to a proper understanding of 
the drug and its use. As a result, many countries that, at the time, were 
experiencing no issues relating to cannabis approved the system from a 
position of limited experience or information
• There is now an urgent need for evidence-based reform of the 
international cannabis control system, in order to reflect current realities. 
Specifically: the long-term counterproductive failure of prohibitionist 
policy models, expanding global cannabis markets, and the emergence 
of actual or de facto market regulation models in a growing number of 
national and sub-national jurisdictions
• There will remain a need for an international control system to oversee 
trade and legal issues as they emerge in a post-prohibition environment. 
Reform of the international system is needed to allow flexibility for 
States, or groups of States, to explore regulation models
• There are various formal mechanisms by which the drug control 
treaties can be reformed: they can be formally modified, amended, or 
terminated; they can fall into irrelevance and disuse; and/or can be 
superseded by new treaties
• Cannabis reforms and further-reaching system-wide reforms will need 
to be driven by a group or groups of like-minded States collectively 
pressing for change, the Organization of American States ‘Pathways’ 
scenario provides one realistic template of how this may play out
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• Action by national and sub-national jurisdictions is already challenging 
the system and driving the debate on reform at the multilateral level
• If States wish to move beyond the ‘soft defections’ – such as 
decriminalising possession (and potentially home growing and cannabis 
social clubs) – which are allowable under the treaties, there are a range 
of mechanisms through which reforms to the treaty framework can 
occur:
• Amendments to the treaties are allowed but generally require a 
consensus – creating an effective power of veto on the necessary 
reforms for prohibitionist member states
• The treaties can also be modified; following a recommendation 
from the WHO, individual substances can be rescheduled (or 
removed from the treaties altogether) by vote at the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs
• Treaty law also allows for groups of states to modify a treaty 
between themselves – with states not party to the group 
modification remaining bound by the original treaty obligations. 
Such inter se treaty modification is an under-explored option, but 
one that offers a potential way forward for a grouping of like-
minded reform states unable to find a broader consensus 
• For individual states, the simplest option from a legal perspective is 
to withdraw from the treaties – but this would likely incur significant 
political costs, and could also be seen as undermining the wider treaty 
system
• An alternative approach is to withdraw and immediately re-accede with 
a reservation on the specific articles that mandate cannabis prohibition. 
Many states have reservations on articles within the drug treaties, and 
there is a specific precedent for this with Bolivia’s recent denunciation 
and re-accession with a reservation on traditional use of coca
• The challenges of these options may lead States to decide to proceed 
with domestic reforms in a situation of treaty non-compliance; as has 
been the case with the US, Uruguay and Canada – raising a set of new 
challenges on how to resolve the tensions such a move creates
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• While open non-compliance with international legal obligations 
is undesirable, the system is not served by dogmatic adherence to 
dysfunctional laws; respect for the rule of law demands that harmful 
and ineffective laws are challenged
Recommendations 
• States that are considering a legally regulated system for cannabis will 
need to weigh up legal and political pros and cons of different options 
in the context of their own domestic and geopolitical priorities. The 
political landscape of this debate is shifting rapidly
• States should make efforts to promote a high level dialogue on how 
to resolve the tensions that are emerging between the need for reform, 
and obligations under an outdated and malfunctioning treaty regime; 
supporting the creation of an expert advisory group, persuing formal 
treaty reform mechanisms (which will stimulate dialogue even if 
unsuccessful), and engaging in informal dialogues with like-minded 
states
• Unilateral domestic reforms, or reforms between groups of States are 
encouraged, but should run in parallel with multilateral dialogue and 
reform processes; this demonstrates a clear desire to resolve emerging 
challenges
• If reforms move a State into a situation on temporary non-compliance – 
the challenges raised should be minimised by:
• Acknowledging temporary ‘principled non-compliance’ and providing 
reasoning for doing so, rooted in the health and welfare of citizens, 
and wider UN Charter commitments
• Avoiding sidestepping or denial of non-compliance by offering 
implausible legal justifications
• Actively promoting multilateral debate and reform efforts in parallel 
with any domestic reforms
• Establishing a cannabis regulation model that clearly establishes 
public health and wellbeing as a central goal, operates under a 
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national agency, and minimizes negative impacts for neighbouring 
States
• Ensuring a framework for comprehensive monitoring and 
evaluation with regular reporting to national legislatures and 
relevant UN agencies and stakeholders
• All reform efforts and high level dialogue will be facilitated by collective 
action of like-minded reform States, working in coordination rather 
than isolation
Introduction
The international drug control system, in the form of the three UN drug 
 conventions (1961, 1971, and 1988), presents a  challenge to any jurisdiction 
seeking to explore regulated cannabis markets. The conventions represent 
a long-established consensus which very specifically prohibits the 
regulation of cannabis markets for anything other than medical and 
scientific purposes.
As developments in cannabis policy have progressively weakened this 
consensus (with recent legalisation moves in Uruguay, Canada and the 
US representing a decisive break), the question of how individual States 
should meet the challenge the treaties represent has come to the fore. This 
section lays out the key options for multilateral reforms of the treaties, and 
the options for unilateral action by individual States, or collective action 
between groups of States. Challenges to the underlying prohibitionist 
tenets of the drug treaties are a relatively new phenomenon. As a result, 
there remain significant uncertainties around the legal technicalities and 
political repercussions of some courses of action. Any jurisdiction, or 
grouping of jurisdictions, approaching this issue will need to weigh up the 
pros and cons of different courses of action in the context of their own 
domestic and geopolitical priorities.
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An obvious tension exists between, on the one hand, respect for 
international law and the preservation of a wider treaty system built on 
consensus, and, on the other, the need to challenge a failed legal structure 
in ways that inevitably undermine consensus. There is no easy answer 
to this, and change will inevitably involve political and diplomatic 
wrangles that most would wish to avoid. However, a growing number of 
jurisdictions have weighed up the costs of prohibition against the benefits 
of legal regulation, and are willing to endure the political costs (albeit costs 
that are reducing rapidly) involved in shifting policy approaches.
It is important to stress that no laws are written in stone, and all treaties 
contain mechanisms for their reform. Indeed, the ability to reform laws is 
key to maintaining their viability, relevance and effectiveness. A process of 
reforming the international drug control system to allow greater flexibility 
for jurisdictions to explore alternatives to prohibition, is essential if the 
system is to survive and become ‘fit for purpose’ in the future.
Background to international cannabis controls
The history of how cannabis came to be included in the international drug 
control system has important implications for how policy will develop 
in the future.187 At the turn of the last century patterns of cannabis use 
bore  little  resemblance  to  the  global  ubiquity  of  the drug today and 
correspondingly, knowledge about and concern with cannabis as a policy 
issue was highly localised. More pressing issues about how to address 
emerging markets in opiate and cocaine-based products dominated 
international debate (soon to  be  formalised within the  League  of  Nations, 
the forerunner to the United Nations). Cannabis was drawn into these 
discussions  at  the  1912  Hague  International Opium Convention only  due 
to pressure from a small number of countries with concerns relating to 
North African cannabis markets, chief among them being Egypt.
187 See Further reading, p.233.
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While this initial effort did not result in cannabis being brought 
under international controls, the issue was raised again at the second 
International  Opium Convention of  1924 in  Geneva, at  the  urgings  of 
South Africa , which  had  prohibited  cannabis (or ‘dagga’) among Indian 
immigrants in  the  1870s,  extending the  prohibition nationally in  1922.
During this period there were, in fact, a variety of policy responses 
to cannabis across the world. These included early experiments with 
prohibitions in and around Egypt,188 as well as early efforts to regulate 
legal markets in India, Morocco and Tunisia. Related to the Indian 
experience, there had also been a remarkably detailed and nuanced policy 
analysis  in  the  form  of  the  seven-volume, 3,281-page  Indian Hemp Drugs 
Commission Report of 1895,  commissioned by  the  UK  Parliament. It  is 
striking  how  closely  many of the  Commission’s  recommendations, even 
though written  118 years ago,  echo  the  rationale  espoused  in  this  book:
1 Total prohibition of the cultivation of the hemp plant for narcotics, and of the 
manufacture, sale, or use of the drugs derived from it, is neither necessary nor 
expedient in consideration of their ascertained effects, of the prevalence of the 
habit of using them, of the social and religious feeling on the subject, and of the 
possibility of its driving the consumers to have recourse to other stimulants or 
narcotics which may be more deleterious
2 The policy advocated is one of control and restriction, aimed at suppressing the 
excessive use and restraining the moderate use within due limits
3 The means to be adopted for the attainment of these objects are :
a adequate taxation
b prohibiting cultivation, except under license, and centralizing cultivation
c limiting the number of shops
188 Perhaps the first punitive cannabis prohibition was a penalty of three months’ imprisonment imposed by 
Napoleon on his soldiers in 1800, following his invasion of Egypt, fearful that it would provoke a loss of 
fighting spirit. The cultivation, importation and use of ‘hashish’ was prohibited in Egypt in 1868, and in some 
near neighbours, including Greece in 1890, that also had higher levels of use.
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d limiting the extent of legal possession... the limit of legal possession [of Ganja 
and charas] or any preparation or admixture there of [would be] 5 tolas 
(approximately 60 grams), Bhang, or any preparation or admixture thereof, 
one quarter of a ser (a quarter of a litre)189
The careful analysis of the Indian Hemp Commission, however, did 
not  feature  in  the  deliberations  of  the  1924  Geneva  Opium  Convention, 
remaining unmentioned even by the UK representative. Discussions 
were instead driven by a hard-line Egyptian delegate who asserted that 
cannabis was “at least as harmful as opium, if not more so”, and that “the 
proportion of cases of insanity [in Egypt] caused by the use of hashish varies from 
30 to 60%”. If it were not included on the list of controlled drugs alongside 
opium  and cocaine it would,  he stated, “become a terrible menace to the 
whole world”.190 His heated rhetoric caused a stir among other delegates 
with little or no domestic knowledge of the drug. While the Egyptian 
push for a total prohibition was prevented (notably due to the efforts 
of the UK, the Netherlands, and India) the first international cannabis 
controls (a prohibition of exports to countries where it was illegal) were 
ultimately  included in the 1925 International Opium Convention.
Cannabis had also increasingly become an issue in the US during the 
1920s,  closely  associated with hostile  attitudes  to  Mexican  immigrant 
labour and their use of ‘marijuana’. This simmering xenophobia 
combined with the prohibitionist/temperance sentiments of the time 
fuelled pressure for moves towards first state-level, then federal and 
international prohibitions  in 1937  and 1961 respectively.  The  political 
destiny of international cannabis controls was effectively guaranteed 
when  the  US fully  entered  the  fray  in  the  mid-1930s, decisively  wielding 
its global superpower might to ensure its desired prohibitionist outcome. 
The  political approach  adopted by the  central  figure  of  Harry  J.  Anslinger, 
189 ‘Ganja’ is a term used for cannabis, ‘charas’ is a type of cannabis resin, and lower-potency ‘bhang’ is a 
preparation of the cannabis leaves and flowering tops, often consumed in a beverage. 
190 UNODC (2009) A century of international drug control pp.54–55. www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf
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who  headed the newly founded   Federal  Bureau  of  Narcotics  from 1930 
until 1962, is reflected in the  language  he  often  publicly adopted , even 
more extreme than his Egyptian ‘reefer madness’ forbears. In testimony to 
 the  House  of  Representatives in 1937  he  stated  that:
“Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, jazz musicians and entertainers. 
Their satanic music is driven by marijuana, and marijuana smoking by white 
women makes them want to seek sexual relations with Negroes, entertainers 
and others. It is a drug that causes insanity, criminality, and death — the most 
violence-causing drug in the history of mankind.”191
After World  War II, the US, under Anslinger’s guidance,  consolidated 
its hegemonic grip on the emerging international drug control 
framework under the new United Nations, and during the 1950s a 
new ‘single convention’ to consolidate the, now numerous, international 
drug control agreements began to take shape. These dynamics were 
strongly shaped by the  hyperbolic  narratives  of  cannabis’s  role  in 
 fuelling  crime, violence and insanity, promoted by Anslinger and key 
allies, including the influential  Secretary  of  the WHO  Expert  Committee 
on Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction,  Pablo  Osvaldo  Wolff.  Wolff’s 
 writings  were  long on hyperbole and short on evidence. Cannabis, 
according to one Wolff pamphlet, “changes thousands of persons into 
nothing more than human scum”, hence: “this vice should be suppressed at any 
cost”. Cannabis was labelled “weed of the brutal crime and of the burning 
hell”, and an “exterminating demon which is now attacking our country”.192 
 
Other voices  challenging  some  of  this  anti-cannabis  rhetoric  did 
 emerge , notably the ‘La Guardia’  report  of  1944193 (to which, in 
191 Quoted in: Gerber, R. (2004) Legalizing Marijuana : Drug Policy Reform and Prohibition Politics, Greenwood 
Press, p.9.
192 Goode, E. (1970) The Marijuana Smokers, pp.231–32, Basic Books www.drugtext.org/The-Marijuana-
Smokers/chapter-9-marijuana-crime-and-violence.html
193 LaGuardia, F. (1944) The La Guardia Committee Report, New York: USA. Summary here: www.drugtext.org/
Table/LaGuardia-Committee-Report/ Full text here: http://hempshare.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/
laguardia.pdf
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fact, the Wolff pamphlet quoted above was a response). This report 
was commissioned by  the  Mayor  of  New  York,  Fiorello  La  Guardia, 
 to provide  an  impartial scientific review of the city’s  cannabis 
 use, particularly among its  black and  Hispanic  populations.  It  was 
	the	 	result	 	of	 	five	 	years‘	 	study	 by	 an	 interdisciplinary	 committee	
comprised of physicians, sociologists, psychiatrists, pharmacists and 
city health officials. It challenged many of the prevailing narratives 
around cannabis and addiction, crime and violence stating that: 
 
 
and that:
“The use of marihuana does not lead to morphine or cocaine or heroin addiction.” 
 
But the science and pragmatism of voices such as the Indian Hemp 
Commission and the La Guardia report,  built  on  more  objective  evidence-
based analysis, was progressively overwhelmed and marginalised by the 
political ideologies and agendas of the US and others. Ultimately this 
led to the prohibitionist grouping winning the inclusion of cannabis 
alongside heroin and  cocaine  in  the  1961  UN Single  Convention. 
Cannabis  was deemed to  have  no  medical  value , and placed  in  the 
 strictest schedule IV, which requires signatories to “prohibit the production, 
manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession of or use of any such drug 
except for amounts which may be necessary for medical or scientific research only”. 
 
Remarkably, the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD), 
the body charged by the 1961 and 1971 Conventions with the scientific 
“There [is] no direct relationship between the commission of crimes of violence 
and marihuana...marihuana itself has no specific stimulant effect in regards to 
sexual desires” 
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and medical review of scheduling proposals,194 has never engaged in 
a formal review of cannabis’ place within the Convention. As the 
Committee itself noted in 2014, “Cannabis and cannabis resin has not been 
scientifically reviewed by the Expert Committee since the review by the Health 
Committee of the League of Nations in 1935.”195
Lessons and ways forward
An important observation in this process is that the vast majority of 
signatories to this convention knew little of cannabis use or policy during 
the decades when the prohibitionist framework was formulated. States 
either accepted the narrative supplied by those pushing for an absolute 
ban, or declined to spend political capital pushing back against this 
outcome on an issue that was, at that time, a marginal concern at most. 
There was some limited dissent (notably from India regarding lower- 
194 See C. Hallam, D. Bewley-Taylor & M. Jelsma, M., Scheduling in the International Drug Control System, 
Transnational Institute-International Drug Policy Consortium, Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, 
No. 25, June 2014, https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr25_0.pdf.
195 Cannabis and cannabis resin: Information Document, WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, 
36th Meeting, Geneva, 16-20 June 2014. Also see E. Danenberg, L.A. Sorge, W. Wieniawski, S. Elliott, L. 
Amato, and W.K. Scholten, ‘Modernizing methodology for the WHO assessment of substances for the 
international drug control conventions’, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 2013, 131 (3): 175-181; available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. drugalcdep.2013.02.032.
United Nations building in Vienna — home of the UNODC    
Steve Rolles
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potency ‘bhang’ cannabis preparations), but it only served as a minor 
moderating influence on some details.196
It is also important to remember that the political dynamics that resulted 
in a total global prohibition on cannabis were not only playing out almost 
entirely  behind  closed  doors,  but  also  in  a  period  of  time  between  50 and 
100 years  ago , in  which  the  social,  political  and cultural  landscape bore 
almost no resemblance to the world we live in today. Cannabis use has 
increased  dramatically  since  this  time ,  the UNODC estimates, probably 
conservatively, that as many as 180 million people use it worldwide,197 
including  in  many  parts  of  the world where  little  or  no cannabis use 
existed in  1961.
The long-term failure of cannabis prohibition to achieve its stated goal of 
eradicating the drug, combined with the serious and growing ‘unintended’ 
negative consequences198 that have resulted from the attempt to do so, 
mean that today, ignorance can no longer provide an excuse for failure 
to explore alternatives to prohibition. There is an urgent need for the 
international drug control framework more broadly to be reformed, and 
its legal instruments renegotiated, to make it ‘fit for purpose’. As even the 
head of the UNODC has conceded:
“There is indeed a spirit of reform in the air, to make the [UN drug] conventions fit 
for purpose and adapt them to a reality on the ground that is considerably different 
from the time they were drafted.”199
196 Interestingly, the ‘bhang’ issue led to the leaves and seeds of the cannabis plant being left out of the 1961 
convention, which only makes reference to the flowering tops (or buds as they would more commonly be 
referred to now). This raises the possibility, albeit a somewhat impractical one, that other countries could 
in theory legally produce, sell and consume cannabis products which are derived from the leaves, if the 
flowering tops were disposed of.
197 UNODC (2013) 2013 World Drug Report. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_
Report_2013.pdf
198 Rolles, S. et al. (2012) The Alternative World Drug Report, the Count the Costs Initiative. http://
countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf
199 Costa, A. (2008) Making drug control “fit for purpose”: Building on the UNGASS decade, UNODC. www.
unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/CND-UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP17.pdf
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Reforms to allow experiments with models of legal market regulation are 
likely to be the driver of such a renegotiation, but it is important to be 
clear that cannabis reforms do not operate in isolation. In fact, they are 
likely to be the challenge to the system that precipitates a wider structural 
reorientation in how drug markets in different societies are managed at 
an international level. The challenge is to reform the international drug 
control infrastructure to remove barriers to individual or groups of States 
exploring regulation models for some currently illicit drugs, without 
destroying the entire edifice, much of which is unquestionably beneficial. 
For example, regulation of the international pharmaceutical trade is vitally 
important , and  has  obvious implications  for  cannabis-based  medicines 
in the future. Furthermore, the consensus and shared purpose behind 
the need to address the problems associated with drug misuse that the 
conventions represent also holds great potential for developing and 
implementing more effective responses at an international level, guided 
by the principles and norms of the UN. (See Institutions for regulating 
cannabis markets, p169.)
Dissatisfaction with the implications of cannabis’ status within the treaty 
system is not a new phenomenon. Numerous national and sub-national 
jurisdictions have, right from the outset, questioned and increasingly 
moved away from the punitive prohibitions on cannabis encouraged by 
the Conventions. This has manifested in successive waves of what might 
be regarded as ‘soft defection’, whereby authorities tried to remain within 
the flexibility afforded by the treaty framework,200 but deviate from the 
prohibitive norm at the heart of the regime. 
As early as the 1970s, and despite President Richard Nixon’s initiation of 
a “war on drugs”, a number of U.S. states formally decriminalised cannabis 
possession for personal use. At around the same time, Dutch authorities 
200 For a discussion of flexibility within the drug control treaties see D. Bewley-Taylor and M. Jelsma, The UN 
Drug Control Conventions: The Limits of Latitude, Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, No. 18, 
March 2012.https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr18.pdf, and D. R. Bewley-Taylor, (2012) International 
Drug Control: Consensus Fractured. Cambridge University Press
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re-evaluated cannabis policies, leading to the development of the current 
cannabis ‘coffee shop’ system. The International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB, the “independent, quasi-judicial expert body” overseeing 
implementation of the treaties) has long criticized the Dutch model 
as falling outside the bounds of the Conventions (although without 
providing the detailed legal reasoning behind that criticism).201
A second wave of reforms — which has been referred to as a “quiet 
revolution” of decriminalisation — has occurred more recently in multiple 
Latin American and European countries and within Australian states and 
territories.202 The cannabis social clubs movement in Spain has since 
pushed the limits of what is tolerated under a decriminalisation model 
further towards de facto legal production and supply (see p.65).203
In addition, a range of medical cannabis systems has emerged in many 
parts of the world, notably in more than 20 U.S. states. These systems 
have often been the focus of INCB criticism. While the INCB is on firm 
ground regarding its criticisms related to the 1961 Single Convention’s 
requirements to establish national-level agencies in charge of medical 
cannabis, the INCB exceeds its mandate when questioning the medical 
usefulness of the substance.
Tensions also exist in relation to the traditional and religious use of 
cannabis. Acknowledging the challenges of eradicating the culturally and 
religiously ingrained use of cannabis within many societies, the Single 
Convention included a transitional reservation, allowing signatories to 
abandon such use gradually within 25 years of the Convention coming 
201 See www.incb.org/incb/en/about.html. On the INCB’s position on the Dutch ‘coffeeshops’ and cannabis 
policies more generally, and see D. Bewley-Taylor, T. Blickman and M. Jelsma, The Rise and Decline of 
Cannabis Prohibition. The History of Cannabis in the UN Drug Control System and Options for Reform, 
Transnational Institute: Amsterdam/Global Drug Policy Observatory: Swansea, March 2014, pp. 32-42.
202 Eastwood, N., Fox, E., and Rosmarin, A. and Eastwood, N. (20163) A quiet revolution: drug decriminalisation 
in practice across the globe, Release. www.release.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf/publications/A%20
Quiet%20Revolution%20-%20Decriminalisation%20Across%20the%20Globe.pdf
203 Murkin, G., Cannabis social clubs in Spain: legalisation without commercialisation, 2015 http://www.tdpf.
org.uk/blog/cannabis-social-clubs-spain-legalisation-without-commercialisation
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into force.204 With this deadline having quietly passed in 1989, it is clear 
that, unlike the more formalized policy shifts mentioned above, many 
countries — particularly in the “global south” — are choosing to “turn a 
blind eye” to the cultivation and use prohibited under the Conventions.205 
Furthermore, within the context of a greater appreciation of indigenous 
and religious rights, some countries, such as Jamaica, are finding 
themselves in an increasingly difficult position vis-à-vis the relationship 
between national legal instruments, the international drug control 
conventions, and other UN treaties on human and indigenous rights.206
Meanwhile at the multilateral level, recent sessions of the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs (CND)— the UN’s central policy making body on drug 
issues — have seen some Member States, including Argentina, the Czech 
Republic, Ecuador, and Mexico, call openly for a re-evaluation of some 
aspects of the current treaty framework.207
The tensions around cannabis within the treaty framework have come 
most dramatically to the fore in the Americas, with recent passage of 
laws that explicitly legalise and regulate cannabis for non-medical, non-
scientific uses, a policy that is expressly forbidden by the UN drug treaties. 
The successful ballot initiatives in 2012 in the U.S. states of Colorado and 
Washington to establish legally taxed and regulated cannabis markets 
204 Article 49, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; India, Nepal, Pakistan, and later Bangladesh made use 
of that transitional exemption with regard to cannabis.
205 See for example the situation in Morocco. D. Bewley-Taylor, T. Blickman and M. Jelsma, The Rise and 
Decline of Cannabis Prohibition: The History of Cannabis in the UN Drug Control System and Options 
for Reform, TNI/GDPO, March 2014, pp. 12-13. Also of note in this regard is India. Beyond the use of ‘bhang’ 
(cannabis leaves) that is permitted within the Single Convention, there remains widespread cultivation and 
use of cannabis within many parts of the country. See R. Bhattacharji, View from the Ground: Heading for 
the Hills; Cannabis in Malana, http://gdpo.swan.ac.uk/?p=365.
206 For example, in a September 2015 report prepared as contribution to the 2016 UNGASS, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights noted that: “Indigenous peoples have a right to follow their traditional, cultural 
and religious practices. Where drug use is part of these practices, the right of use for such narrowly defined purposes 
should in principle be protected, subject to limitations provided for in human rights law.” www.unodc.org/documents/
ungass2016//Contributions/UN/OHCHR/A_HRC_30_65_E.pdf.
207 See, for example, International Drug Policy Consortium, The 2015 Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its 
Special Segment on Preparations for the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World 
Drug Problem: Report of Proceedings, May 2015, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/cnd-
proceedings-report-2015.pdf.
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have been followed by initiatives in Alaska and Oregon. Other states, 
including California — the world’s seventh largest economy — are likely 
to follow imminently.
At the national level, in December 2013, Uruguay became the first 
country in the world to legally regulate its cannabis market, with the 
passage of Law 19 granting the government control over the import, 
export, cultivation, production, and sale of cannabis through the newly 
established Institute for the Regulation and Control of Cannabis (Instituto 
de Regulación y Control del Cannabis, IRCCA).208 Even more recently, 
Canada’s new government was elected in 2015 pledging to legalize and 
regulate cannabis for non-medical, non-scientific use, and announced at 
the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs, that 
it will introduce legislation in Spring 2017. And, with varying levels of 
political support, legislative proposals for cannabis regulation are also 
under consideration in Guatemala, Italy, Mexico, and Morocco.
Clearly, tensions in the treaty regime around cannabis are long-standing 
and growing. The international community, including the UN drug 
control bureaucracy, has been well aware of these tensions for some 
time. Indeed, in a 2008 report, “Making Drug Control Fit for Purpose,” the 
Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) wrote 
that “Cannabis is the most vulnerable point in the whole multilateral edifice. In 
the Single Convention, it is supposed to be controlled with the same degree of 
severity as cocaine and the opiates. In practice, this is seldom the case, and many 
countries vacillate in the degree of control they exercise over cannabis.”209
Since then, “soft defections” with regard to cannabis policy have given way 
to direct breaches of the Conventions’ ban on cannabis for non-medical 
208 For a description of Uruguay’s cannabis regulation law, including its passage, contents, objectives, and 
challenges, see Walsh, J.,  and Ramsey, G.,(2016) “Cannabis Regulation in Uruguay: Major Innovatives, 
Major Challenges” Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Walsh-Uruguay-
final.pdf
209 Costa, A. (2008) Making drug control “fit for purpose”: Building on the UNGASS decade, UNODC. www.
unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/CND-UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP17.pdf
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or non-scientific purposes. As more jurisdictions appear likely to enact 
reforms to legalise and regulate cannabis, these treaty tensions have 
become the “elephant in the room” in key high level forums, including the 
2016 UNGASS on drugs — obviously present, but studiously ignored in 
the official discourse (albeit not in informal discussions).
Different countries and international agencies have different reasons for 
seeking to avoid directly engaging the question of what to do about these 
tensions. But the kinds of treaty breaches that may have seemed merely 
hypothetical only a few years ago are already a reality today, and will not 
simply disappear. Governments and the UN system should give serious 
consideration to options for managing these policy shifts in ways that can 
help to modernize the drug treaty regime itself, and to thereby reinforce 
the UN pillars of human rights, development, peace and security, and the 
rule of law.
Options for change
A difficult dilemma has thus entered the international drug policy 
arena. There is no doubt that recent policy developments with regard 
to cannabis regulation have moved beyond the legal latitude of the 
treaties. But initiating a formal procedure to review or amend the current 
treaty framework, however, would immediately trigger an avalanche of 
political frictions with some of the most powerful countries in the world. 
Indeed, even as many governments continue to tout the supposed global 
consensus on drug policy, officials are quite aware of the significant and 
growing policy differences among drug treaty Member States; to the 
extent that a truly global consensus ever existed, it is now fractured, and 
there is no new consensus to take its place.
Under such conditions, it is not difficult to understand why many 
countries would prefer to avoid or delay confronting the treaty questions 
raised by cannabis regulation. Indeed, such concerns go far in explaining 
the attraction of the legally fallacious — but politically potent — stance 
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that the drug treaties as they stand are flexible enough to accommodate 
the regulation of cannabis markets for non-medical use. 
Different countries have different reasons for finding appeal in the notion 
of treaty flexibility. During the March 2016 negotiations in Vienna of the 
UNGASS Outcome Document, different strands of support for the idea 
of flexibility converged around language declaring that new challenges 
“should be addressed in conformity with the three international drug control 
conventions, which allow for sufficient flexibility for States parties to design 
and implement national drug policies according to their priorities and needs…” 
(Emphasis added).210 The same language was able to serve different, even 
contradictory, purposes. 
The wording of “sufficient flexibility” originates from the European Union 
(EU) common position on the UNGASS, where it was accompanied by 
the EU’s commitment to “maintain a strong and unequivocal commitment to 
the UN conventions.” For the EU then, flexibility applies to policies such 
as harm reduction, decriminalisation of possession and cultivation of 
cannabis for personal use, and alternatives to incarceration, but certainly 
not to cannabis regulation, which the EU considers as falling outside the 
scope of policy options allowed under the treaties. 
However, for governments for whom it would be politically convenient 
to maintain that cannabis regulation fits within the boundaries of the 
Conventions — especially the United States — “sufficient flexibility” could 
be read as covering cannabis regulation. During the negotiations, that 
paragraph also received support from countries at the other end of the 
policy spectrum, including Russia and China. After all, they argued, the 
Single Convention also says that “a Party shall not be, or be deemed to be, 
precluded from adopting measures of control more strict or severe than those 
provided by this Convention” (article 39); the treaties therefore provide 
210 United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/CN.7/2016/L.12/Rev.1, 22 March 2016, https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V16/017/77/PDF/V1601777.pdf?OpenElement.
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countries with “sufficient flexibility” to continue with forced treatment or 
the death penalty. Attempts to rein in that line of argumentation achieved 
only a vague reference in the paragraph that national policies need to be 
consistent with “applicable international law.”
For countries like Jamaica or the Netherlands, implications of the term 
are very different. In those cases, where the principle of legal regulation 
enjoys broad political support, the fact that regulation would contravene 
international treaty obligations is considered an impediment for its 
implementation. As such, agreeing to language about “sufficient flexibility” 
amounts to taking a political stance against cannabis regulation, because, 
with a concern for international law, it is based on an understanding (an 
accurate understanding, and one shared by the INCB) that the UN drug 
conventions expressly disallow legal regulation. 
Lest there be doubt about the INCB’s views, INCB President Werner Sipp 
directly addressed the issue of flexibility in his keynote speech at the 
March 2016 session of the CND, as the UNGASS document was under 
negotiation. Some proponents of new laws that permit the non-medical 
use of cannabis, he said, “...pretend that the flexibility of the conventions allows 
such regulations. In fact, the debate on flexibility is at the core of the general debate 
on future drug policy because it regards the possibilities and the limitations of the 
Conventions. Undoubtedly, there exists flexibility in the Conventions—but not in 
each and every respect.” For example, Sipp explained, there is “no obligation 
stemming from the conventions to incarcerate drug users having committed minor 
offences,” and they “provide for flexibility in the determination of appropriate 
sanctions.” However, there is “no flexibility in the conventions for allowing and 
regulating any kind of non-medical use” (Emphasis in the original).211 
The UNGASS document negotiators — in settling on language with 
such different and even contradictory meanings to different sets of 
211 Statement by Mr. Werner Sipp, President, International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Fifty-ninth 
session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 14 March 2016, http://www.incb.org/incb/en/news/
speeches/2016/ungass_cnd.html.
230  How to Regulate Cannabis:
  Section 3
countries — did achieve what most countries wanted: a way to avoid 
opening a debate on the adequacy of the treaties themselves. 
The fact remains, however, that the accelerating process of national 
reforms has already moved cannabis policies beyond the boundaries of 
what the Conventions can legally accommodate. To move the debate 
forward, the following discussion aims to illuminate the available options 
for countries to ensure that their new domestic cannabis laws and policies 
are aligned with their international obligations, thereby modernizing the 
global drug control system in ways consistent with international law and 
the overarching purposes of the UN system. 
Mindful of the political tensions evident during the 2016 UNGASS process, 
it is important to emphasize that treaty reform does not necessarily 
require negotiating a new global consensus. This discussion therefore 
distinguishes four categories of reforms, acknowledging that the different 
options are often overlapping and not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
 
I. Treaty reform that applies to all signatory states, requiring 
consensus approval;
II. Treaty reform that applies to all signatory states, requiring 
majority approval;
III. Treaty reform that applies to a selective group of states; and
IV. Treaty reform that applies to an individual state.
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I. Treaty reform that applies to all signatory states, requiring 
consensus approval
Treaty Amendment 
 
Any State party can notify the UN Secretary General of a proposed 
amendment, including the reasoning behind the move. The Secretary 
General then communicates the proposed amendment and the reasons 
for it to the State parties and to the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), which can decide to:
• Convene a Conference of all the Parties (COP) of the treaty to consider 
the amendment;
• Ask the Parties if they accept the amendment; or
• Take no action and wait to see whether any State party submits any 
objection. 
In the event of no Party rejecting the amendment within 18 months 
(24 months for the 1988 Convention), the amendment is automatically 
accepted. In the case of the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, the amendment 
then immediately comes into force for all Parties (that is, no objections 
equals acceptance), while in the case of the 1988 Convention, the 
amendment only comes into force for those parties that “deposited with 
the Secretary-General an instrument expressing its consent to be bound by that 
amendment” (that is, explicit notification of acceptance is required).212 In 
the event State parties register objections to a proposed amendment, 
ECOSOC can decide to:
• Still approve the amendment (in which case it would not be applicable 
to the objecting states);
212 Treaty amendments that are adopted through this procedure do not apply to parties that have registered 
objections in the case of the 1961 and 1971 conventions, or those that have not notified their explicit consent 
in the case of the 1988 Convention. 1961 Convention (as amended) Article 47; 1971 Convention Article 30; 
1988 Convention, Article 31.
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• Reject it (if multiple objections are raised that argue convincingly that 
such an amendment would compromise the object and purpose of the 
treaty); or
• Convene a COP to consider the amendment.
In addition, ECOSOC may also submit proposed amendments to the 
General Assembly for consideration.213 Moreover, the General Assembly 
even has the power to discuss and adopt amendments to UN conventions 
by simple majority vote.
In theory, all three UN drug control conventions could be amended using 
these procedures. While many consider this to be a politically unlikely 
scenario for the foreseeable future, it is important to recall that the 1961 
Single Convention was amended with the 1972 Protocol, after a COP 
was convened and agreed to substantial treaty changes. At that stage, the 
U.S. government argued that it was “time for the international community to 
build on the foundation of the Single Convention, since a decade has given a better 
perspective of its strengths and weaknesses.”214 Notably the latitude under the 
1961 Single Convention with regard to alternatives to incarceration — 
which has been the focus of many recent debates — only exists due to a 
treaty amendment agreed in the 1972 Protocol.215
For historical perspective, it is also useful to recall that many decisions in 
the process of negotiating the drug treaties were taken by majority vote. 
The false perception that the UN drug control system has always relied 
on full consensus is a more recent construct, intended to reinforce an 
213 In accordance with Article 62, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter.
214 United Nations, “Memorandum of the United States of America Respecting its Proposed Amendments to 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,” E/CONF.63/10, in United Nations Conference to Consider 
Amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 Geneva, 6–24 March 1972: Official Records, 
vol. 1, New York: UN, 1974, pp. 3–4.
215 Article 36 of the amended 1961 Convention reads: “Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or 
punishment or in addition to conviction or punishment, that such abusers of drugs shall undergo measures of treatment, 
education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration.” See: D. Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, Regime 
change: Re-visiting the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, International Journal of Drug Policy, 
Volume 23, 2012, pp. 72–81.
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image of universal agreement even as tensions were becoming ever more 
visible. Moreover, in the event that treaty amendments are approved, 
States can opt not to become part of the amended agreement. As the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) makes clear: 
“The amending agreement does not bind any State already a party to the treaty 
which does not become a party to the amending agreement.” (Article 40.4).  As 
such, States that do not wish to be bound by the treaty as amended may 
retain the older obligations.
Most modern treaties, including the 2000 Transnational Organized 
Crime Convention (UNTOC), the 2003 Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC), and the 2003 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) have an inbuilt COP mechanism that requires them to 
undergo periodic reviews and enables them to evolve and modernize if 
necessary. The international drug control treaty regime, however, with 
its roots predating the UN, lacks such a periodic review mechanism — 
which helps to explain its outdated nature and resistance to reform. The 
challenge of modernizing the drug control regime via a COP mechanism 
is further complicated by the fact that that the regime consists of three 
separate treaties, all of which would require amendment. A more 
rational course of systemic evolution could be to try and resolve the 
inconsistencies between the 1961 and 1971 Conventions by merging 
them, together with the precursor controls under the 1988 Convention, 
into a new Single Convention that featured:
• A structured periodic review mechanism;
• An improved scheduling procedure, striking a better balance between 
assuring availability of controlled substances for legitimate uses versus 
preventing abuse;
• A more tolerant and legally consistent approach to traditional, spiritual, 
and non-problematic social uses; and
• Incorporation of the other elements from the 1988 drug treaty into the 
subsequent treaties addressing organized crime and corruption, with 
which the 1988 drug treaty is already closely aligned.
 How to Regulate Cannabis:
Discussions on more substantive reforms of this nature have 
yet to occur formally, although they have been suggested in the 
Organization of American States’ 2013 report Scenarios for the Drug 
Problem in the Americas.216 
II. Treaty reform that applies to all signatory states, requiring 
majority approval
Resheduling/Modification
As noted above, cannabis first entered the international drug control 
system under the League of Nations on dubious procedural grounds, 
and its current placement in schedules I and IV of the Single Convention 
has never been properly reviewed by the WHO Expert Committee.217 
This is in itself sufficient reason to question on procedural grounds the 
legitimacy of the current classification of cannabis. 
The 1961 Single Convention allows for the WHO or any State party to 
initiate, at any time, the modification process that could reschedule a 
specified drug or delete it from the Conventions. The WHO is the only 
body mandated to make scheduling recommendations, which must 
subsequently be agreed by the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND). Modifying schedules does not require consensus; these are the 
only decisions the CND takes by vote. New substances are routinely 
scheduled in this way, and the treaty system is thus constantly being 
modified. In the case of cannabis, scheduled under the Single Convention, 
a rescheduling decision would be taken by a simple majority of its 
“members present and voting.”218 Delta-9-THC (the main active ingredient 
216 OAS, Scenarios for the Drug Problem in the Americas, 2013 http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/
Scenarios_Report.PDF.
217 E. Danenberg, L.A. Sorge, W. Wieniawski, S. Elliott , L. Amato, W.K. Scholten, “Modernizing methodology 
for the WHO assessment of substances for the international drug control conventions,” in Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, Volume 131, Issue 3, pp. 175-181,1 August 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
drugalcdep.2013.02.032.
218 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, E/CN.7/2014/10, 2014, p. 18.
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in cannabis, or dronabinol, as the pharmaceutical extract is known), is 
scheduled as a ‘psychotropic substance’ under the 1971 Convention, where 
a rescheduling decision requires a two-thirds majority; in fact, dronabinol 
has been recommended for de-scheduling several times already.219 
For cannabis, however, this process is further complicated by the fact 
that it (along with coca and opium) is also mentioned explicitly in 
specific articles within the 1961 and 1988 Conventions. Re-scheduling 
or de-scheduling cannabis may therefore not be sufficient to allow for 
fully regulated markets along the lines of the changes now being enacted 
in various jurisdictions today. Most likely, some form of amendment, 
modification, or reservation to those treaties would also be required.
III. Treaty reform that applies to a selective group of states
“Inter Se” treaty modification
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) also allows 
for the option to modify treaties between certain parties only, offering 
in this context an intriguing and under-explored legal option somewhere 
between selective denunciation and a collective reservation (see below). 
According to Article 41 of the VCLT, “Two or more of the parties to a 
multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between 
themselves alone,” as long as it “does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties 
of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations” and it is 
not “incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the 
treaty as a whole.” 
In principle, both conditions could be met. It would require that the 
agreement include a clear commitment to the original treaty obligations 
vis-à-vis countries not party to the inter se modification agreement, 
219 For more details on scheduling, see: Hallam, C., Bewley-Taylor, D., & Jelsma, M., (2014)“Scheduling in the 
international drugcontrol system,” Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies No. 25, TNI/IDPC http://
idpc.net/publications/2014/06/scheduling-in-the-international-drug-control-system
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especially concerning prevention of trade or leakage to prohibited 
jurisdictions. All the provisions in the treaties — including those pertaining 
to cannabis — would remain in force vis-à-vis the treaty’s State parties 
that are not part of the inter se agreement. Over time, such an inter se 
agreement might evolve into an alternative treaty framework to which 
more and more countries could adhere, while avoiding the cumbersome 
(if not impossible) process of unanimous approval of amendments to the 
current regime.220
In theory, modification inter se could be used by a group of like-minded 
countries that wish to resolve the treaty non-compliance issues resulting 
from national decisions to legally regulate the cannabis market, as 
Uruguay has already done, and Canada appears poised to do. Such 
countries could sign an agreement with effect only among themselves, 
modifying or annulling the cannabis control provisions of the UN 
conventions. This could also be an interesting option to explore in order 
to provide a legal basis justifying international trade between national 
jurisdictions that allow or tolerate the existence of a licit market of a 
substance under domestic legal provisions, but for which international 
trade is not permitted under the current UN treaty obligations.
The drafters of the 1969 VCLT considered the option of  inter se  modification 
as a core principle for international law, and the issue was discussed at 
length at the International Law Commission in 1964: “The importance of 
the subject needed no emphasis; it involved reconciling the need to safeguard the 
stability of treaties with the requirements of peaceful change.”221 From the very 
beginning, the evolutionary nature of treaties was seen as fundamental 
to the UN system — a system in which all Member States “undertake to 
respect agreements and treaties to which they have become contracting parties 
without prejudice to the right of revision,” according to the Egyptian delegate 
220 M. Jelsma, UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence on Drug Policy, 
Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, 2016, http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jdpa.ahead-of-print/jdpa-2015-
0021/jdpa-2015-0021.xml.
221 International Law Commission (ILC), Summary Record of the 745th Meeting: 15 June 1964, A/CN.4/SR.745, 
in: Yearbook of the International Law Commission: 1964, vol. 1, New York: UN, 1965, p. 144, paragraph 49.
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at the time. He underscored that it was therefore “equally important to 
ensure that arbitrary obstacles were not allowed to impede the process of change. 
There had been many instances in the past of States, by their stubborn refusal to 
consider modifying a treaty, forcing others to denounce it.” 222
A leading authority on international treaty law, Jan Klabbers, describes 
the inter se option as “perhaps the most elegant way out,” but also notes that 
though inter se modification is based on an ancient principle of international 
law, “practical examples are hard to come by.”223 It seems this is essentially 
uncharted legal territory. However, a good case could be made that the 
increasing tensions between cannabis policy trends and the frozen drug 
treaty system provides a clear example of circumstances for which this 
exceptional option was designed and deemed to be of crucial importance. 
Indeed, though its use has been rare, the inter se option has been 
understood since the outset of the UN system as a means of reinforcing 
treaty regimes, not undermining them. Where regimes are exceptionally 
resistant to reform, and therefore liable to become brittle and antiquated, 
an option such as inter se modification could actually strengthen the 
regime by demonstrating that it is capable of modernization.
IV. Treaty reform that applies to an individual state
A. Withdrawing from the Treaties
In light of the outdated nature of the drug control treaties and the seemingly 
insurmountable procedural and political obstacles to modernizing them, 
the question is often raised why countries should not simply withdraw 
from the UN drug control treaty regime. The option exists for any 
signatory Member States to withdraw from the treaties via the process of 
222 Ibid., paragraph 53.
223 J. Klabbers, “Treaties, Amendment and Revision,” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, December 2006, pp. 1084-1089 http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1483.
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denunciation; treaty exit would technically ‘solve’ the problems of breach 
or non-compliance from a legal perspective. 
However, as mentioned, a key reason reform states may wish to 
remain party to the UN drug control treaties is that they also regulate 
the global trade in drugs for licit medical purposes, including substances 
on the WHO list of essential medicines. Inadequate access to controlled 
medicines is already a severe problem in most developing countries, and 
withdrawing from the INCB-administered global system of estimates and 
requirements operating under the UN drug control conventions could risk 
making it even worse.
For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential 
trade agreements, denunciation would also risk triggering economic 
sanctions. Being State party to all three of the drug control conventions is 
a condition in a number of preferential trade agreements or for accession 
to the European Union. The U.S. government — though now more 
likely to be lenient towards cannabis reforms elsewhere due to the 
changes underway within U.S. borders — still maintains the disciplinary 
certification mechanism, and withdrawal from the drug control treaties 
altogether would almost certainly lead to decertification and sanctions. 
Denunciation can therefore have serious political and economic 
implications, especially for less powerful and poor countries. Even for 
countries that are less economically vulnerable, simply withdrawing 
from the drug treaties could carry the risk of reputational costs in key 
international fora. 
B. Selective Denunciation 
The 1969 VCLT stipulates that a historical “error” (Article 48) or a 
“fundamental change of circumstances” (rebus sic stantibus, Article 62) are 
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valid reasons for a Member State to revoke its adherence to a treaty.224 
However, recourse to the rebus sic stantibus doctrine and the option 
of “selective denunciation” are rarities in international law. The Beckley 
Foundation’s Global Cannabis Commission report concluded in 2008 
that “taking this path might be less legally defensible than denunciation and re-
accessions with reservations” (see below), which would have the same end 
result.225 And for a group of countries, the option of an inter se agreement 
seems to be the more elegant way out, with similar effect.
C. Denunciation followed by Re-accession with a Reservation
At the moment of signing, acceding, or ratifying a treaty, states have 
the option to make reservations regarding specific provisions, as many 
countries in fact did in the case of all three drug control treaties.226 
Reservations or other formal unilateral “interpretive declarations” are meant 
to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty for 
the reserving state.
Under the procedure of treaty denunciation followed by re-accession 
with a reservation, a country can withdraw itself from the treaty entirely, 
with the intention of rejoining with specific reservations. In the case of 
the 1961 Convention, if one third or more State parties object, the country 
would be blocked from re-acceding.227 Denunciation and re-accession 
224 According to one commentary, “[I]f the fundamental situation underlying treaty provisions becomes so 
changed that continued performance of the treaty will not fulfil the objective that was originally intended, the 
performance of those obligations may be excused.” See M. Leinwand, ‘The International Law of Treaties 
and United States Legalization of Marijuana’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Volume 10, 1971, pp. 
413-441.
225 R. Room, W. Hall, P. Reuter, B. Fischer, S. Lenton, and A. Feilding, (convener), Cannabis Policy: Moving 
Beyond Stalemate, Global Cannabis Commission, The Beckley Foundation, 2008, p. 155.
226 Reservations can be found in the UN Treaty Collection database, https://treaties.un.org/.
227 The 1988 Convention does not contain specific rules for reservations and is therefore governed by the 
general rules established in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, specifically articles 19-23, 
which do not establish a threshold of objections. Usually that means that reservations are accepted without 
having any effect for objecting State parties.
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with a reservation is recognized as a legitimate procedure, although its 
practice has been limited to exceptional cases.228 
In the case of the drug treaties, there is a recent precedent: in 2011, 
Bolivia notified the UN Secretary-General that it had decided to exit the 
Single Convention, taking effect in January 2012, intending to re-accede 
with reservations regarding coca. The INCB condemned the move, and 
15 countries—including every member of the G8 — submitted formal 
objections. But the number of objections fell far short of the 62 (one third 
of all State parties to the Convention) that were needed to block Bolivia 
from re-acceding. In early 2013, Bolivia’s re-adherence to the treaty was 
formally accepted, with reservations upholding the right to allow in 
its territory traditional coca leaf chewing, the use of the coca leaf in its 
natural state, and the cultivation, trade, and possession of the coca leaf 
to the extent necessary for these licit purposes. (Bolivia had initially tried 
to amend the treaties, but was blocked by a small number of objections.) 
The procedure thus successfully resolved the legal tensions, at least for 
Bolivia, between the 1961 Single Convention’s obligation to abolish its 
indigenous coca culture, versus Bolivia’s legal obligations under the 2007 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and its national 
Constitution to protect it.
A reservation by which a state would exempt itself from implementing 
the Convention’s obligations for cannabis could therefore be attempted 
following the same treaty procedure, but there are differences to be 
taken into account. The main legal issue relates to article 19 of the VCLT, 
which requires that a reservation must not be “incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty.” Those overall aims of the Single Convention are 
expressed in the preamble’s opening paragraph regarding concern about 
“the health and welfare of mankind” and the treaty’s general obligation to 
limit controlled drugs “exclusively to medical and scientific purposes.” Making 
228 L.R. Helfer, Not fully committed? Reservations, risk and treaty design, Yale Journal of International Law, 
Volume 31, 2006.
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a reservation exempting a particular substance from the treaty’s general 
obligation to limit drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes 
is explicitly mentioned in the Commentary on the Single Convention 
as an option that could be procedurally allowable, for coca leaf as well 
as for cannabis.229 While the absence of any accompanying cautionary 
text seems to imply that exemption by means of a reservation of a 
specific substance from the general obligations would not in itself 
constitute a conflict with the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole, 
this would certainly be an important legal discussion to be had in the 
context of crafting reservations. The same issues would arise with an 
inter se agreement (see above), which comes close to a form of “collective 
reservation.”
Implementing cannabis regulation in situations of treaty non 
compliance
The treaty reform options described above — with their varying procedural 
and political considerations — all assume a decision on the part of at least 
one State to proactively alter its relationship to the current treaties with 
respect to cannabis. States might alternatively opt to sidestep the treaty 
questions that arise in the context of their cannabis reforms, or assert that 
the changes underway within their countries are allowable under the 
treaties as they stand, therefore denying that treaty reform options of any 
sort ought or need to be considered. Another option — acknowledging 
the fact of temporary non-compliance and working toward an eventual 
realignment of domestic law and treaty obligations — would open the 
door to deliberately pursuing some set of treaty reform options. These 
two further options are explored below. 
Sidestepping or denying issues of non-compliance
229 United Nations, Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, New York, 1973, p. 476.
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The first two States to proceed with development and implementation of 
formal non-medical cannabis markets are the United States and Uruguay. 
Their situations are very different and they have provided contrasting 
commentaries on the implications of their moves, while both arguing 
that policy shifts within their borders do not put them in breach of the 
UN drug control conventions. 
Uruguay has argued its policy is fully in line with the original objectives 
that the drug control treaties emphasized, but have subsequently failed to 
achieve — namely, the protection of the health and welfare of humankind. 
Uruguayan authorities have specifically argued that the creation of a 
regulated market for adult use of cannabis is driven by health and security 
imperatives and is therefore an issue of human rights. As such, officials 
point to wider UN human rights obligations that need to be respected, 
specifically appealing to the precedence of human rights principles over 
drug control obligations. As the first country courageous enough to take 
the step of regulating cannabis for all uses, it is enormously significant 
that Uruguay has explained its reform with reference to its overarching 
human rights obligations under international law.230 Moreover, while 
reluctant to acknowledge its cannabis regulation model represents non-
compliance with the drug treaties, Uruguay has noted that it creates 
legal tensions within the treaty system that may require revision and 
modernization. At the 2013 CND session, for example, Diego Cánepa, 
head of the Uruguayan delegation, declared: “Today more than ever we need 
the leadership and courage to discuss if a revision and modernization is required 
of the international instruments adopted over the last fifty years.” 231
230 In 2015, Uruguay co-sponsored a UN Human Rights Council resolution calling upon the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) to prepare a report “on the impact of the world drug problem 
on the enjoyment of human rights.” Uruguay’s contribution to UNHCR’s preparations laid out the country’s 
stance regarding the primacy of human rights: “We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the human rights 
system, underscoring that human rights are universal, intrinsic, interdependent and inalienable, and that is the 
obligation of States to guarantee their priority over other international agreements, emphasizing the international 
drug control conventions.” See Junta Nacional de Drogas, Impact of the World Drug Problem in the 
exercise of Human Rights, 15 May 2015, http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Drug%20Policy/
AportedeROUalaUNGASS2016enDDHHENG.pdf.
231 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Intervención del Jefe de Delegación de Uruguay, 56° Período de Sesiones 
de la Comisión de Estupefacientes, Prosecretario de la Presidencia del Uruguay, 11 March 2013.
  Section 3
 243
Section title running head
A Practical Guide
U.S. officials, for their part, have argued that since the cultivation, trade, 
and possession of cannabis taking place in multiple U.S. states remain 
criminal offenses under U.S. federal law, the Federal Government 
as State party to the Conventions is not in breach. This is despite 
the Federal Government’s decision to accommodate the state-level 
developments, provided they proceed within certain parameters.232 A 
recent U.S. discourse, promoted by Ambassador William Brownfield 
(Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs), maintains that the extant treaty framework possesses sufficient 
flexibility to allow for regulated cannabis markets.233 This argument is 
strained by any reasonable understanding of the treaties and their overtly 
prohibitionist object and purpose — and appears to reflect political 
expediency rather than convincing legal reasoning.234 A good case can 
be made that the main objective of Ambassador Brownfield’s flexibility 
argument is to “prevent clear treaty breaches of state-level cannabis legalization 
initiatives from triggering an open international debate on treaty reform.”235 
Nevertheless, such a debate is now inevitable, not least since the INCB 
has made clear statements that both Uruguayan and U.S. cannabis 
regulation models are not in compliance with the treaties, and Brownfield 
has himself acknowledged the INCB’s authority in determining whether 
or not State parties are in compliance.236 
An argument has also been made (although not by any State parties) that 
legal regulation is possible within the bounds of the treaties by interpreting 
232 See memo from Deputy US. Attorney General James M. Cole, August 2013, https://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
233 “Fatal Attraction: Brownfield’s Flexibility Doctrine and Global Drug Policy Reform,” The Huffington Post, 
11 November 2015,http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/damon-barett/drug-policy-reform_b_6158144.html.
234 For more in-depth discussion of the U.S. stance that the treaties are flexible enough to encompass legal 
regulation of cannabis, see Bennett, W., Walsh, J.  (2014) “Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity 
Modernize International Drug Treaties,” Brookings and WOLA, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuana-legalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/
cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf.
235 See M. Jelsma, ‘UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN-System-Wide Coherence on Drug 
Policy, Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jdpa.ahead-of-print/jdpa-2015-
0021/jdpa-2015-0021.xml.
236 “Trends in Global Drug Policy,” Roundtable with William R. Brownfield, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, 8 
March 2016. http://fpc.state.gov/254116.htm.
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the Conventions’ “scientific purposes” language to include experimentation 
with alternative regulatory options, so long as these are researched. This, 
however, misunderstands the meaning of “scientific purposes” within the 
treaties, confusing the uses to which substances may be put with the 
scientific or evidence base for policy. It also takes the phrase out of its 
context, both within the article concerned and the treaty as a whole, 
contrary to basic Vienna Convention rules on interpretation.237
Proceeding in “Principled non-compliance”
Rather than attempting to argue why legally regulating cannabis would 
not constitute a compliance problem with the 1961 and 1988 Conventions, 
States that wish to proceed with legal regulation could instead openly 
acknowledge that doing so would result in non-compliance. Crucially, 
this option requires that the State sets out its reasons for national policy 
reform, how this affects compliance, and in particular why this is necessary 
for the realization of other international legal and policy commitments. 
Moreover this situation of non-compliance should be seen and presented 
as temporary, with the aim of ensuring the realignment of the country’s 
new domestic laws and practice with its treaty obligations as part-and-
parcel of the reform initiative. The State should, in parallel, request 
multilateral discussions to resolve the situation, for example through 
supporting an expert advisory group on the reform of the conventions,238 
and supporting a later Conference of the Parties (COP). Pending those 
developments, the State would carry on in conformity with its remaining 
237 See, for example, All Party Parliamentary Group for Drug Policy Reform, “Guidance on Drug Policy: 
Interpreting the UN Drug Conventions,” https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016//Contributions/
Civil/APPG_for_Drug_Policy_Reform/Guidance_print_copy.pdf. Also see John Collins, “Development 
First: Multilateralism in the Post-’War on Drugs’ Era,” and Francisco Thoumi, “Re-examining the ‘Medical 
and Scientific’ Basis for Interpreting the Drug Treaties: Does the ‘Regime’ Have Any Clothes,” in London 
School of Economics, After the Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug 
Policy, pp. 9-29, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/LSE-IDEAS-After-the-Drug-Wars.
pdf.
238 See TNI “UNGASS 2016: Background memo on the proposal to establish an expert advisory group,” 
November 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016//Contributions/Civil/Transnational_
Institute/Background_memo_November_UNGASS_2016_final.pdf.
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commitments under the treaties, report as usual to the INCB, and report 
to the CND on the outcomes of its policies.
Clearly, open non-compliance with international legal obligations is not 
desirable, but all of the reform options set out in this chapter are driven by 
necessity. The problem here is not that countries are opting for regulatory 
approaches. Rather, outmoded and unworkable treaty provisions are the 
problem that gives rise to the need for a temporary and transitional period 
of principled non-compliance. In this context the recognition of the fact 
that a State can no longer fully comply with the Conventions’ obligations 
regarding cannabis need not be seen as disrespect for the rule of law. To 
the contrary, it confirms that treaty commitments matter. Indeed, treaty 
non-compliance as domestic laws and practice change is a fairly common 
feature of regime evolution and modernization.239 Waving away worries 
about non-compliance by resorting to dubious legal justifications is much 
more an expression of disrespect for international law. Many governments 
reforming their cannabis laws are doing so based on health, development, 
human rights, security, or other grounds, and out of a concern for the 
international legal commitments made in these areas, the realization of 
which has been negatively affected by the implementation of the drugs 
conventions. As the Global Commission on Drug Policy has argued: 
“Unilateral defections from the drug treaties are undesirable from the perspective 
of international relations and a system built on consensus. Yet the integrity of that 
very system is not served in the long run by dogmatic adherence to an outdated 
and dysfunctional normative framework. The evolution of legal systems to account 
for changing circumstances is fundamental to their survival and utility, and the 
regulatory experiments being pursued by various states are acting as a catalyst for 
this process. Indeed, respect for the rule of law requires challenging those laws that 
are generating harm or that are ineffective.”240 
239 J.K. Cogan, “Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law,” Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, 
2006, pp. 189-210.
240 Global Commission on Drug Policy, Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work, 2014, http://
www.gcdpsummary2014.com.
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Moreover, what we can now see is that it is not the case that States 
will face significant condemnation from the international community for 
cannabis reforms that are increasingly common practice across the world. 
Opting for reform and acknowledging non-compliance can help set the 
stage for treaty reform options that can be implemented collectively 
among like-minded States, such as the inter se option.
Discussion and recommendations
More and more States are acknowledging the powerful arguments for 
questioning the treaty-imposed prohibition model for cannabis control. 
For a range of reasons, multiple forms of soft defection, non-compliance, 
decriminalisation, and de facto regulation have persisted in countries 
where traditional use is widespread, and have since blossomed around 
the world to almost every nation or territory where cannabis has become 
popular in the past half century.
Decades of doubts, soft defections, legal hypocrisy, and policy 
experimentation have now reached the point where de jure legal regulation 
of the whole cannabis market is gaining political acceptability, even if 
it violates certain outdated elements of the UN Conventions. Tensions 
are likely to further increase between countries pursuing regulatory 
approaches and those strongly in favor of defending the status quo as 
well as the UN drug control system and its specialized agencies.
In the untidy conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty 
reforms versus the movement towards a modernized global drug control 
regime, the system will likely go through a further period of  legally 
dubious interpretations and questionable justifications for growing 
numbers of national and sub-national reforms. And the situation is 
unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached and a group of like-
minded countries is ready to engage in the challenge to reconcile the 
multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and disputes.
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The inevitability of further cannabis reforms looks set to be the issue 
that opens the debate around the UN drug control treaty system, and 
questions around potential regulation models for other drugs are likely 
to appear on the table sooner or later. In fact, that debate has already 
started with regard to coca leaf and other psychoactive plants, and has 
regularly surfaced in the context of responses to New Psychoactive 
Substances (NPS). While the arguments driving the current dynamic 
towards cannabis regulation do not all apply in the same way to other 
controlled substances, ongoing reforms focused on cannabis are not the 
end of the story, but are likely to act as the catalyst for reviewing the 
efficacy of the international drug control system for other substances as 
well. Such a situation must be taken into account as discussions around 
cannabis develop. 
Indeed, the question now appearing on the international policy agenda 
is no longer whether or not there is a need to reassess and modernize 
the UN drug control system, but rather when and how. The question 
is if a mechanism can be found soon enough to deal with the growing 
tensions and to transform the current system in an orderly fashion into 
one more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and one that is more 
compatible with basic scientific norms and modern UN standards. Key 
elements of an effective strategy for moving forward should include: 
Promoting high level dialogue on resolving the tensions between
emerging State practice and outdated and counterproductive treaty
obligations
 
States seeking to explore, develop, or actively implement cannabis 
regulation models will all face different legal and political challenges, 
domestically and internationally. Whatever reforms are undertaken, 
States should ensure that the issue is explored, rather than ignored, in key 
multilateral fora. Leadership from reform-minded States in promoting 
this debate will be vital. There are a number of ways in which this 
dialogue can be informed and encouraged:
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• Supporting proposals for an expert advisory group to consider issues 
around emerging challenges — including cannabis regulation — and 
modernization of the international drug control framework, and make 
recommendations to inform the UN debate in the lead up to 2019, 
when a new UN Political Declaration and Plan of Action are due to 
be adopted. Such proposals are already being actively promoted by a 
number of State parties.241
• Proceeding with formal mechanisms for reforming the treaty system 
— such as amendment, modification, reservation options, or more 
substantive change. Even if not initially successful, such actions will 
both ensure the question of treaty modernization is meaningfully 
considered within established fora, and demonstrate the desire of 
reform states to resolve tensions and potential non-compliance issues 
using established legal mechanisms.
• Convening informal drug policy dialogues or intergovernmental 
conferences for like-minded States to discuss shared concerns and 
dilemmas outside of the institutional framework of the UN and regional 
structures such as the OAS and EU, and perhaps prepare resolutions for 
consideration in the CND and other UN or regional fora.
Pursuing Domestic Reforms in parallel with Multilateral dialogue
and reform processes 
 
Modernization of the treaty framework to accommodate the needs of 
reform States is now seemingly inevitable as the number of dissenting 
States grows. Unless the treaty system can begin to prove itself capable 
of modernizing, it risks drifting into irrelevance, affecting not only 
241 For example, in May 2105, Jamaica also called for the establishment of an “expert advisory group” during 
the “UN General Assembly High-Level Thematic Debate in Support of the Process towards the 2016 
UNGASS,” http://www.undrugcontrol.info/images/stories/documents/JamaicaStmt-HLTD-NY07052015.
pdf. Similarly, as part of its August 2015 input to the UNGASS process, Uruguay called for the creation of 
a “consultative group of experts,” http://www.infodrogas.gub.uy/images/stories/pdf/uy_ungass_2016_esp-
eng.pdf. And during the 59th session of the CND in March 2016, Colombia called for the creation of an 
“expert-level group,” https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_59/
Statements/08_Colombia_English.pdf.
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those elements that are clearly outmoded and ripe for reform, but 
also elements upon which relative consensus still exists. Achieving 
formal multilateral reforms, however, is likely to entail a difficult and 
protracted process. Until these are concluded, reforms in the short term 
are likely to involve multiple States moving into technical, transitionary 
non-compliance. The challenges this raises can be minimized by:
• Avoiding sidestepping or denial of non-compliance by offering implausible 
legal justifications.
• Acknowledging temporary “principled non-compliance” and providing 
reasoning for doing so, rooted in the health and welfare of citizens, and 
wider UN charter commitments.
• Actively promoting multilateral debate and reform efforts (as above) in 
parallel with domestic reforms.
• Establishing a cannabis regulation model - as outlined in this guide - that 
clearly establishes public health and wellbeing as a central goal; operates 
under a national agency; minimizes negative impacts for neighboring 
States; and is supported by a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation 
framework — that reports back to relevant UN agencies.
Pursuing Collective Action
 
Any attempts to promote high-level dialogue, explore domestic reform, 
or achieve reforms of the multilateral framework will be facilitated 
by collective action of like-minded reform States working towards a 
common cause. By building on the diversity of the various countries, 
such an alliance of reform-minded States can lay the groundwork for a 
more effective approach to cannabis policy that, over time, can prove 
itself and attract more adherents. By working in coordination rather than 
in isolation, the initial reform States can learn from one another and also 
provide leadership in opening the political space for other countries to 
move beyond prohibitionist approaches that have proven so detrimental 
to human health, development, security, and the rule of law itself.
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Prohibition
 
Uruguay
 
California*
 
Washington
 
Colorado
 
The Netherlands
 
Spain
Transform 
recommendations
General 
model
Absolute ban on pro-
duction, supply and 
possession of can-
nabis for non-medical 
use (de jure illegal)
Government-controlled 
model — similar to the Bor-
land model (see p.57.)  
(de jure legal)
Regulated private companies 
are licensed to produce and 
supply cannabis (de jure legal) 
Regulated private 
companies are licensed 
to produce and supply 
cannabis (de jure legal)
Regulated private compa-
nies are licensed to pro-
duce and supply cannabis 
(de jure legal)
Cannabis ‘coffee shop’ 
system (de facto legal)
Not-for-profit cannabis 
social clubs (de facto 
legal)
Borland regulated market model + legal provi-
sion for home growing and regulated cannabis 
social clubs (de jure legal)
Production • No production 
controls – solely 
law enforcement 
efforts to eradicate 
or intercept illicit 
production
• Cannabis is sourced 
from the illicit 
market, where it is 
produced with no 
regulatory oversight
• A handful of private 
companies are 
contracted by the 
government to produce 
cannabis
• Production is monitored 
by the government-run 
Institute for the Regu-
lation and Control of 
Cannabis (IRCCA), which 
is also responsible for 
granting production 
licences
• Production takes place 
on state land, which is 
overseen by both private 
security personnel paid 
for by the licensed pro-
ducers, as well as state 
security services (military 
or police) 
• Bureau of Marijuana Control 
within the Department of 
Consumer Affairs responsible 
for licensing/regulation of 
transportation, distribution 
and sale 
• The Dept. of Food and 
Agriculture license/oversee 
cultivation
• Dept. of Public Health 
license/oversee manufac-
turing and testing
• Large-scale licenses banned 
until Jan. 1, 2023 to prevent 
monopolies developing
• Selling without a license pun-
ishable by up to six months 
in jail, a fine up to $500, or 
both
• Production licences 
are granted by the 
State Liquor Control 
Board to individuals or 
companies that pass 
background checks and 
meet specified security 
and quality control 
criteria
• Producers must submit 
samples of cannabis 
for regular safety and 
potency testing by an 
independent laboratory 
• Producers may hold no 
more than 3 production 
and/or processor 
licences
• The state-wide area 
dedicated to cannabis 
production must not 
exceed 2 million sq ft
• Production licences are 
granted by the state’s 
Marijuana Enforcement 
Division to individuals 
or companies that pass 
background checks and 
meet specified security 
and quality control 
criteria
• For the first year of the 
new regulatory system, 
producers and sellers of 
cannabis must be part of 
the same company
• Producers must submit 
samples of cannabis 
for regular safety and 
potency testing by an 
independent laboratory
• No formal controls as 
production remains 
illegal 
• Cannabis is still 
sourced from the 
illicit market with no 
regulatory oversight. 
Some is produced 
domestically, some 
is still imported from 
traditional producer 
regions
• No licence required 
and no formal regula-
tory oversight
• Club workers or 
volunteers oversee 
production under 
an informal code of 
conduct
• Commercial producers licensed by gov-
ernment agency that acts as sole buyer and 
supplies licensed vendors
• Commercial producers can compete for the 
government tender 
• Government agency also specifies nature 
and potency of products and oversees 
monitoring of quality controls 
Preparation • No restrictions on 
the varieties of can-
nabis or cannabis 
products available
• The content of 
products is unreg-
ulated, unknown 
and highly variable. 
Adulterants are 
common in resin 
and have also been 
observed in herbal 
cannabis
• 5 varieties of cannabis 
are licensed for produc-
tion and supply
•  No restrictions on the range 
of cannabis strains or canna-
bis-infused products that are 
legally available
• Edible products to have 
standardised dosage with 
10mg maximum THC per 
serving
*  Precise details of California’s 
regulatory model are still to 
be decided at time of going 
to print
• No restrictions on the 
range of cannabis 
strains or cannabis-in-
fused products that are 
legally available
• No restrictions on the 
range of cannabis strains 
or cannabis-infused 
products that are legally 
available
• A range of cannabis 
products are legally 
available through the 
coffee shops
• Mostly herbal 
cannabis, although 
edibles, tinctures and 
other preparations are 
often available
• A range of quality- and potency-controlled 
products made available, with details deter-
mined by government regulatory body
• Product range initially an approximate 
mirror of pre-reform illicit market 
• Changes to market range introduced incre-
mentally – and carefully monitored
• Controls on available  preparations aim to 
encourage safer using behaviours
• Wider range of products available via home 
grow or cannabis social clubs 
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Prohibition
 
Uruguay
 
California*
 
Washington
 
Colorado
 
The Netherlands
 
Spain
Transform 
recommendations
General 
model
Absolute ban on pro-
duction, supply and 
possession of can-
nabis for non-medical 
use (de jure illegal)
Government-controlled 
model — similar to the Bor-
land model (see p.57.)  
(de jure legal)
Regulated private companies 
are licensed to produce and 
supply cannabis (de jure legal) 
Regulated private 
companies are licensed 
to produce and supply 
cannabis (de jure legal)
Regulated private compa-
nies are licensed to pro-
duce and supply cannabis 
(de jure legal)
Cannabis ‘coffee shop’ 
system (de facto legal)
Not-for-profit cannabis 
social clubs (de facto 
legal)
Borland regulated market model + legal provi-
sion for home growing and regulated cannabis 
social clubs (de jure legal)
Production • No production 
controls – solely 
law enforcement 
efforts to eradicate 
or intercept illicit 
production
• Cannabis is sourced 
from the illicit 
market, where it is 
produced with no 
regulatory oversight
• A handful of private 
companies are 
contracted by the 
government to produce 
cannabis
• Production is monitored 
by the government-run 
Institute for the Regu-
lation and Control of 
Cannabis (IRCCA), which 
is also responsible for 
granting production 
licences
• Production takes place 
on state land, which is 
overseen by both private 
security personnel paid 
for by the licensed pro-
ducers, as well as state 
security services (military 
or police) 
• Bureau of Marijuana Control 
within the Department of 
Consumer Affairs responsible 
for licensing/regulation of 
transportation, distribution 
and sale 
• The Dept. of Food and 
Agriculture license/oversee 
cultivation
• Dept. of Public Health 
license/oversee manufac-
turing and testing
• Large-scale licenses banned 
until Jan. 1, 2023 to prevent 
monopolies developing
• Selling without a license pun-
ishable by up to six months 
in jail, a fine up to $500, or 
both
• Production licences 
are granted by the 
State Liquor Control 
Board to individuals or 
companies that pass 
background checks and 
meet specified security 
and quality control 
criteria
• Producers must submit 
samples of cannabis 
for regular safety and 
potency testing by an 
independent laboratory 
• Producers may hold no 
more than 3 production 
and/or processor 
licences
• The state-wide area 
dedicated to cannabis 
production must not 
exceed 2 million sq ft
• Production licences are 
granted by the state’s 
Marijuana Enforcement 
Division to individuals 
or companies that pass 
background checks and 
meet specified security 
and quality control 
criteria
• For the first year of the 
new regulatory system, 
producers and sellers of 
cannabis must be part of 
the same company
• Producers must submit 
samples of cannabis 
for regular safety and 
potency testing by an 
independent laboratory
• No formal controls as 
production remains 
illegal 
• Cannabis is still 
sourced from the 
illicit market with no 
regulatory oversight. 
Some is produced 
domestically, some 
is still imported from 
traditional producer 
regions
• No licence required 
and no formal regula-
tory oversight
• Club workers or 
volunteers oversee 
production under 
an informal code of 
conduct
• Commercial producers licensed by gov-
ernment agency that acts as sole buyer and 
supplies licensed vendors
• Commercial producers can compete for the 
government tender 
• Government agency also specifies nature 
and potency of products and oversees 
monitoring of quality controls 
Preparation • No restrictions on 
the varieties of can-
nabis or cannabis 
products available
• The content of 
products is unreg-
ulated, unknown 
and highly variable. 
Adulterants are 
common in resin 
and have also been 
observed in herbal 
cannabis
• 5 varieties of cannabis 
are licensed for produc-
tion and supply
•  No restrictions on the range 
of cannabis strains or canna-
bis-infused products that are 
legally available
• Edible products to have 
standardised dosage with 
10mg maximum THC per 
serving
*  Precise details of California’s 
regulatory model are still to 
be decided at time of going 
to print
• No restrictions on the 
range of cannabis 
strains or cannabis-in-
fused products that are 
legally available
• No restrictions on the 
range of cannabis strains 
or cannabis-infused 
products that are legally 
available
• A range of cannabis 
products are legally 
available through the 
coffee shops
• Mostly herbal 
cannabis, although 
edibles, tinctures and 
other preparations are 
often available
• A range of quality- and potency-controlled 
products made available, with details deter-
mined by government regulatory body
• Product range initially an approximate 
mirror of pre-reform illicit market 
• Changes to market range introduced incre-
mentally – and carefully monitored
• Controls on available  preparations aim to 
encourage safer using behaviours
• Wider range of products available via home 
grow or cannabis social clubs 
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Prohibition
 
Uruguay
 
California
 
Washington
 
Colorado
 
The Netherlands
 
Spain
Transform 
recommendations
Potency • No THC/potency 
limits and no infor-
mation provided 
to user about the 
strength of what 
they are purchasing 
– except informally 
via illicit vendors
• The government only licences 
the production and supply of 
cannabis with a predeter-
mined THC and CBD content
• No THC/ potency 
limits, but packaging 
must indicate THC 
levels/content
• No THC/potency 
limits, but 
packaging must 
indicate THC 
levels/content
• No THC/potency limits, 
but packaging must indi-
cate THC levels/content
• No limits on the potency 
of products sold
• Informal testing and 
labelling of cannabis 
products – in particular 
for THC content – takes 
place 
• The Dutch government 
has proposed a ban on 
cannabis products with 
a THC level of over 15%, 
but this has yet to be 
implemented
• Strains of varying strength 
cultivated 
• No formal  mandatory 
potency testing
• Range of products with various 
potencies available
• Decisions on potency of retail 
products made by government 
agency (see above)
• Safer THC:CBD ratios 
• More specialist demand for 
non-retail products met via 
home growing or cannabis 
social clubs
Price • Price determined 
by the interaction of 
criminal supply and 
user demand in an 
unregulated market
• The price of cannabis is 
between 20 and 22 Uru-
guayan pesos per gram. This 
price takes into account a 
government tax, which will be 
used to fund the IRCCA, as 
well as a national campaign to 
educate  the public about the 
consequences of cannabis 
use
• Retail price is 
determined by the 
market and taxes
• Retail price is 
essentially  
determined by 
the market and 
taxes 
• Retail price is essen-
tially determined by the 
market and taxes
• No price controls in 
place, although prices 
remain relatively high 
because of higher staff, 
tax, venue etc costs 
than illegal vendors, and 
pricing in risk of arrest 
faced by producers and 
traffickers
• Users pay membership 
fees proportionate to 
their consumption, which 
are then reinvested back 
into the management of 
the clubs
• Price parameters determined 
by government agency, using 
price as tool to achieve stated 
policy aims
• Initially maintaining price at or 
near illicit market levels 
• Higher prices on more risky 
products to encourage safer 
using behaviours
• Changes in price incremental 
and based on careful impact 
monitoring
Age access 
threshold
• No age access con-
trols:  illicit dealers 
do not enforce age 
restrictions
18 21 21 21 18 18 • 18 appropriate in most places 
but decision will need to be 
shaped by local cultural and 
political environment
Purchaser 
restrictions
• Anyone can pur-
chase cannabis and 
no sales limits are 
set
• Cannabis sales are restricted 
to residents of Uruguay
• They can purchase no more 
than 40 grams per month 
(maximum 10 grams per 
week), with the volume of 
sales to individual users 
monitored via an anonymised 
central government database
• Purchasers must present a 
medical prescription or be 
registered in the database in 
order to access cannabis
•  Up to 1 ounce of 
marijuana and 
quarter ounce 
of concentrated 
marijuana would be 
legal to possess. 
• Possession on 
the grounds of a 
school, day care 
center, or youth 
center while 
children are present 
would remain illegal
• Consumption only 
in private homes or 
licensed venues
• Both residents 
and non-res-
idents of 
Washington 
may purchase 
up to 1 ounce 
of cannabis per 
transaction
• Residents of Colorado 
can purchase up to 1 
ounce of cannabis per 
transaction; non-resi-
dents are restricted to a 
quarter of an ounce per 
transaction
• Coffee shops may not 
sell more than 5 grams 
per person per day
• Some border munic-
ipalities enforce resi-
dents-only access for the 
coffee shops
• In most clubs, member-
ship can be awarded 
only upon invitation by 
an existing member, or if 
someone has a medical 
need for cannabis
• Members’ allowances 
of cannabis are typically 
limited to 2 or 3 grams 
per day
• Limits on individual transac-
tions to minimise bulk buying 
and potential re-sales 
• Residents-only or member-
ship access schemes may be 
appropriate under certain local 
circumstances
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Transform 
recommendations
Potency • No THC/potency 
limits and no infor-
mation provided 
to user about the 
strength of what 
they are purchasing 
– except informally 
via illicit vendors
• The government only licences 
the production and supply of 
cannabis with a predeter-
mined THC and CBD content
• No THC/ potency 
limits, but packaging 
must indicate THC 
levels/content
• No THC/potency 
limits, but 
packaging must 
indicate THC 
levels/content
• No THC/potency limits, 
but packaging must indi-
cate THC levels/content
• No limits on the potency 
of products sold
• Informal testing and 
labelling of cannabis 
products – in particular 
for THC content – takes 
place 
• The Dutch government 
has proposed a ban on 
cannabis products with 
a THC level of over 15%, 
but this has yet to be 
implemented
• Strains of varying strength 
cultivated 
• No formal  mandatory 
potency testing
• Range of products with various 
potencies available
• Decisions on potency of retail 
products made by government 
agency (see above)
• Safer THC:CBD ratios 
• More specialist demand for 
non-retail products met via 
home growing or cannabis 
social clubs
Price • Price determined 
by the interaction of 
criminal supply and 
user demand in an 
unregulated market
• The price of cannabis is 
between 20 and 22 Uru-
guayan pesos per gram. This 
price takes into account a 
government tax, which will be 
used to fund the IRCCA, as 
well as a national campaign to 
educate  the public about the 
consequences of cannabis 
use
• Retail price is 
determined by the 
market and taxes
• Retail price is 
essentially  
determined by 
the market and 
taxes 
• Retail price is essen-
tially determined by the 
market and taxes
• No price controls in 
place, although prices 
remain relatively high 
because of higher staff, 
tax, venue etc costs 
than illegal vendors, and 
pricing in risk of arrest 
faced by producers and 
traffickers
• Users pay membership 
fees proportionate to 
their consumption, which 
are then reinvested back 
into the management of 
the clubs
• Price parameters determined 
by government agency, using 
price as tool to achieve stated 
policy aims
• Initially maintaining price at or 
near illicit market levels 
• Higher prices on more risky 
products to encourage safer 
using behaviours
• Changes in price incremental 
and based on careful impact 
monitoring
Age access 
threshold
• No age access con-
trols:  illicit dealers 
do not enforce age 
restrictions
18 21 21 21 18 18 • 18 appropriate in most places 
but decision will need to be 
shaped by local cultural and 
political environment
Purchaser 
restrictions
• Anyone can pur-
chase cannabis and 
no sales limits are 
set
• Cannabis sales are restricted 
to residents of Uruguay
• They can purchase no more 
than 40 grams per month 
(maximum 10 grams per 
week), with the volume of 
sales to individual users 
monitored via an anonymised 
central government database
• Purchasers must present a 
medical prescription or be 
registered in the database in 
order to access cannabis
•  Up to 1 ounce of 
marijuana and 
quarter ounce 
of concentrated 
marijuana would be 
legal to possess. 
• Possession on 
the grounds of a 
school, day care 
center, or youth 
center while 
children are present 
would remain illegal
• Consumption only 
in private homes or 
licensed venues
• Both residents 
and non-res-
idents of 
Washington 
may purchase 
up to 1 ounce 
of cannabis per 
transaction
• Residents of Colorado 
can purchase up to 1 
ounce of cannabis per 
transaction; non-resi-
dents are restricted to a 
quarter of an ounce per 
transaction
• Coffee shops may not 
sell more than 5 grams 
per person per day
• Some border munic-
ipalities enforce resi-
dents-only access for the 
coffee shops
• In most clubs, member-
ship can be awarded 
only upon invitation by 
an existing member, or if 
someone has a medical 
need for cannabis
• Members’ allowances 
of cannabis are typically 
limited to 2 or 3 grams 
per day
• Limits on individual transac-
tions to minimise bulk buying 
and potential re-sales 
• Residents-only or member-
ship access schemes may be 
appropriate under certain local 
circumstances
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Uruguay
 
California
 
Washington
 
Colorado
 
The Netherlands
 
Spain
Transform 
recommendations
Vendor • Illicit dealers have no 
duty of care to their 
customers and may 
not even be aware of 
the contents of the 
cannabis they are 
selling
• Qualified pharmacists 
must hold cannabis 
commerce licences – 
which are awarded by 
the Ministry of Public 
Health – in order to 
legally sell the drug
• Penalties for breaches of 
licensing conditions, such 
as sales to minors
• No formal training of ven-
dors is required
• Penalties for breaches of 
licensing conditions, such as 
sales to minors
• No formal training of vendors 
is required
• Penalties for breaches of 
licensing conditions, such 
as sales to minors
• Vendors can be awarded a 
‘responsible vendor desig-
nation’ upon completion 
of a training programme 
approved by the state 
licensing authority
• Penalties for breaches of 
licensing conditions, such as 
sales to minors
• No formal training of vendors is 
required
• No formal training of 
vendors is required, 
although clubs 
usually employ staff 
or volunteers with a 
substantial knowledge 
of cannabis and its 
cultivation
• Vendors are required to 
adhere to licensing conditions 
and are subject to penalties 
for licence violations, such as 
fines or loss of licence
• Mandatory training require-
ments  for retail vendors, with 
additional training for vendors 
in sale and consumption 
venues
Outlet • lllicit dealers can sell 
wherever they deem 
fit
• Private producers sell 
the cannabis to the 
government, which 
then distributes the 
drug via licensed 
pharmacies to regis-
tered users
• Pharmacies are 
allowed to sell can-
nabis alongside other, 
medical drugs
• Stores cannot be located 
within 600 feet of schools 
and other areas where 
children congregate
• Outlets cannot sell goods 
other than cannabis and 
cannabis products
• Local government can ban 
outlets in their areas com-
pletely, or require additional 
licenses
• Outlets cannot sell goods 
other than cannabis and 
cannabis products
• Minors are forbidden from 
entering stores
• Stores cannot be set up 
within 1,000 ft of schools or 
other areas where children 
are likely to gather
• Retailers may own no more 
than 3 outlets and each one 
must be in a different county
• Outlets cannot sell goods 
other than cannabis and 
cannabis products
• Minors are forbidden from 
entering stores
• For the first year of the new 
regulatory system, outlets 
were required to produce at 
least 70% of what they sold
• Local governments have the 
power to decide whether to 
accept coffee shops in their 
area
• Coffee shops are not permitted 
within a 250m radius of schools
• Coffee shops are not allowed to 
sell alcohol, and are only per-
mitted to hold 500g of cannabis 
on the premises at any time
• No restrictions on 
where clubs can be 
established
• Cannabis is distrib-
uted on-site, by club 
workers, and limited 
amounts can be taken 
away for consumption
• Controls on location and 
hours of opening, determined 
in line with county or munic-
ipal government and  local 
community input
• Cannabis-only sales – no 
alcohol or other drugs. Food 
and drink sales allowed 
for retail and consumption 
venues
Tax • All revenue flows, 
untaxed, direct to illicit 
dealers and criminal 
organisations
• Tax revenue is used 
to fund the IRCCA, 
as well as a national 
campaign to educate 
the public about the 
consequences of 
cannabis use
• State excise tax 15% on retail 
sales. State cultivation taxes 
per dry weight ounce of 
$9.25 for marijuana flowers, 
and $2.75 for leaves
• Local government can also 
levy additional taxes
• Cannabis is subject to a 25% 
excise tax at three stages in 
the supply chain – when it 
is sold by the grower to the 
processor, when it is sold by 
the processor to the retailer, 
and when it is sold by the 
retailer to the consumer. On 
top of this, cannabis is taxed 
at the standard state sales tax 
rate of 8.75%
• 15% excise tax on wholesale 
price and a 10% retail sales 
tax
• $40 million of the revenue 
generated by the excise tax 
goes to school construction 
each year, with revenue 
from the sales tax being 
used to fund the new regu-
latory system
• Coffee shops do not pay VAT, 
but do pay various income, 
corporation and sales taxes
• In 2008, Dutch coffee shops 
paid €400m on sales of over 
€2bn
• CSCs pay rent tax, 
employees’ social 
security fees, corpo-
rate income tax, and 
in some cases VAT on 
products sold
• Tax models built into price 
controls (see above) 
• Tax rates locally determined
• Proportion of tax could be 
earmarked for otherwise 
non-funded social /commu-
nity spending
Marketing • No marketing con-
trols, although illicit 
vendors do not have 
access to conventional 
marketing channels 
• All forms of cannabis 
advertising, promo-
tion or sponsorship 
are prohibited
• Mandatory packaging and 
labeling requirements on all 
products
• Ban on marketing directly to 
minors, including products 
designed to  appeal to kids, 
or could easily be confused 
with candy 
• Advertising banned within 
1000 feet of where children 
congregate, and only dis-
played where around 72% + 
of the audience is 21 or over 
• Advertisements of any kind 
cannot be displayed within 
1,000 ft of schools and are 
not allowed on publicly 
owned property or transport
• Advertising is forbidden from 
promoting over-consumption
• Storefront window displays 
of cannabis products are also 
banned
• Marketing campaigns that 
have a “high likelihood 
of reaching minors” are 
banned 
• Storefront window displays 
of cannabis products are 
also banned
• Coffee shops are not permitted 
to advertise
• External signage is forbidden 
from making explicit references 
to cannabis, however signs dis-
playing the words ‘coffee shop’, 
as well as Rastafari imagery and 
palm leaves, make them easily 
identifiable 
• Product menus are generally 
kept below the counter so as to 
avoid any promotional effect
• No advertising of 
products or clubs 
themselves is per-
mitted
• Default ban on all forms of 
marketing and promotions,  
modelled on WHO Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco 
Control guidelines
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Transform 
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Vendor • Illicit dealers have no 
duty of care to their 
customers and may 
not even be aware of 
the contents of the 
cannabis they are 
selling
• Qualified pharmacists 
must hold cannabis 
commerce licences – 
which are awarded by 
the Ministry of Public 
Health – in order to 
legally sell the drug
• Penalties for breaches of 
licensing conditions, such 
as sales to minors
• No formal training of ven-
dors is required
• Penalties for breaches of 
licensing conditions, such as 
sales to minors
• No formal training of vendors 
is required
• Penalties for breaches of 
licensing conditions, such 
as sales to minors
• Vendors can be awarded a 
‘responsible vendor desig-
nation’ upon completion 
of a training programme 
approved by the state 
licensing authority
• Penalties for breaches of 
licensing conditions, such as 
sales to minors
• No formal training of vendors is 
required
• No formal training of 
vendors is required, 
although clubs 
usually employ staff 
or volunteers with a 
substantial knowledge 
of cannabis and its 
cultivation
• Vendors are required to 
adhere to licensing conditions 
and are subject to penalties 
for licence violations, such as 
fines or loss of licence
• Mandatory training require-
ments  for retail vendors, with 
additional training for vendors 
in sale and consumption 
venues
Outlet • lllicit dealers can sell 
wherever they deem 
fit
• Private producers sell 
the cannabis to the 
government, which 
then distributes the 
drug via licensed 
pharmacies to regis-
tered users
• Pharmacies are 
allowed to sell can-
nabis alongside other, 
medical drugs
• Stores cannot be located 
within 600 feet of schools 
and other areas where 
children congregate
• Outlets cannot sell goods 
other than cannabis and 
cannabis products
• Local government can ban 
outlets in their areas com-
pletely, or require additional 
licenses
• Outlets cannot sell goods 
other than cannabis and 
cannabis products
• Minors are forbidden from 
entering stores
• Stores cannot be set up 
within 1,000 ft of schools or 
other areas where children 
are likely to gather
• Retailers may own no more 
than 3 outlets and each one 
must be in a different county
• Outlets cannot sell goods 
other than cannabis and 
cannabis products
• Minors are forbidden from 
entering stores
• For the first year of the new 
regulatory system, outlets 
were required to produce at 
least 70% of what they sold
• Local governments have the 
power to decide whether to 
accept coffee shops in their 
area
• Coffee shops are not permitted 
within a 250m radius of schools
• Coffee shops are not allowed to 
sell alcohol, and are only per-
mitted to hold 500g of cannabis 
on the premises at any time
• No restrictions on 
where clubs can be 
established
• Cannabis is distrib-
uted on-site, by club 
workers, and limited 
amounts can be taken 
away for consumption
• Controls on location and 
hours of opening, determined 
in line with county or munic-
ipal government and  local 
community input
• Cannabis-only sales – no 
alcohol or other drugs. Food 
and drink sales allowed 
for retail and consumption 
venues
Tax • All revenue flows, 
untaxed, direct to illicit 
dealers and criminal 
organisations
• Tax revenue is used 
to fund the IRCCA, 
as well as a national 
campaign to educate 
the public about the 
consequences of 
cannabis use
• State excise tax 15% on retail 
sales. State cultivation taxes 
per dry weight ounce of 
$9.25 for marijuana flowers, 
and $2.75 for leaves
• Local government can also 
levy additional taxes
• Cannabis is subject to a 25% 
excise tax at three stages in 
the supply chain – when it 
is sold by the grower to the 
processor, when it is sold by 
the processor to the retailer, 
and when it is sold by the 
retailer to the consumer. On 
top of this, cannabis is taxed 
at the standard state sales tax 
rate of 8.75%
• 15% excise tax on wholesale 
price and a 10% retail sales 
tax
• $40 million of the revenue 
generated by the excise tax 
goes to school construction 
each year, with revenue 
from the sales tax being 
used to fund the new regu-
latory system
• Coffee shops do not pay VAT, 
but do pay various income, 
corporation and sales taxes
• In 2008, Dutch coffee shops 
paid €400m on sales of over 
€2bn
• CSCs pay rent tax, 
employees’ social 
security fees, corpo-
rate income tax, and 
in some cases VAT on 
products sold
• Tax models built into price 
controls (see above) 
• Tax rates locally determined
• Proportion of tax could be 
earmarked for otherwise 
non-funded social /commu-
nity spending
Marketing • No marketing con-
trols, although illicit 
vendors do not have 
access to conventional 
marketing channels 
• All forms of cannabis 
advertising, promo-
tion or sponsorship 
are prohibited
• Mandatory packaging and 
labeling requirements on all 
products
• Ban on marketing directly to 
minors, including products 
designed to  appeal to kids, 
or could easily be confused 
with candy 
• Advertising banned within 
1000 feet of where children 
congregate, and only dis-
played where around 72% + 
of the audience is 21 or over 
• Advertisements of any kind 
cannot be displayed within 
1,000 ft of schools and are 
not allowed on publicly 
owned property or transport
• Advertising is forbidden from 
promoting over-consumption
• Storefront window displays 
of cannabis products are also 
banned
• Marketing campaigns that 
have a “high likelihood 
of reaching minors” are 
banned 
• Storefront window displays 
of cannabis products are 
also banned
• Coffee shops are not permitted 
to advertise
• External signage is forbidden 
from making explicit references 
to cannabis, however signs dis-
playing the words ‘coffee shop’, 
as well as Rastafari imagery and 
palm leaves, make them easily 
identifiable 
• Product menus are generally 
kept below the counter so as to 
avoid any promotional effect
• No advertising of 
products or clubs 
themselves is per-
mitted
• Default ban on all forms of 
marketing and promotions,  
modelled on WHO Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco 
Control guidelines
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Driving • Driving under the 
influence of can-
nabis is illegal in all 
jurisdictions
• Final per se THC limits have 
not been confirmed at time 
of going to print. Blood tests 
or potentially other forms 
of testing will be used to 
establish THC levels
• Driving while 
impaired is illegal 
with no quantitative 
threshold, meaning 
prosecution relies 
heavily on the 
observation of the 
arresting officer and 
the testimony of 
expert witnesses
• Motorists barred 
from having an 
open container of 
marijuana/products
• Per se whole blood 
THC limit of  
5ng/ml is enforced, 
making anyone caught 
driving over this limit 
automatically guilty of 
driving under the  
influence of cannabis
• If a driver exceeds a limit 
of 5ng/ml THC in whole 
blood, this gives rise to a 
“permissible inference” 
that they were driving 
under the influence 
of cannabis. The limit 
therefore acts essentially 
as a guideline, encour-
aging juries to prosecute 
drivers found to have 
exceeded it, rather than 
acting as an automatic 
trigger for a penalty
• Impairment-based 
testing, with sanctions 
including suspension of 
licence (for up to 5 years), 
fines, and imprisonment 
(variable depending on 
whether bodily injury 
caused or reckless 
driving involved).  
Proposed per se 
thresholds for different 
drugs have yet to be 
established
• Impairment-based 
testing, with a range 
of criminal and 
administrative sanctions 
potentially applicable
• Clear message that canna-
bis-impaired driving is risky 
and illegal
• Effect-based standard for 
prosecutions centred around 
field sobriety testing
• Blood tests used to prove 
recent use once probable 
cause has been established
• Thresholds for blood THC 
levels subject to review in light 
of emerging evidence
Home 
growing
• Home growing is 
illegal – although in 
some jurisdictions 
it is tolerated as 
part of decriminali-
sation approach
• Home cultivation of up to 
six plants is allowed, and the 
resulting product should not 
exceed 480 grams per year
• Alternatively, residents can 
pool their allowances via 
cannabis clubs. The clubs 
are permitted to grow up 
to 99 cannabis plants each 
and must consist of no more 
than 45 registered members. 
The clubs’ yields must be 
recorded, with any excess 
reported and turned over to 
the IRCCA
• Residents permitted 
to grow up to 6 
plants for personal 
use within a private 
home, as long as 
the area is locked 
and not visible from 
a public place
• Home growing is  
prohibited
• Residents are permitted 
to grow up to 6 plants for 
personal use
• Cultivation of up to 5 
cannabis plants is consid-
ered a “low priority for 
prosecution”
• Cultivation of up to 
2 cannabis plants is 
permitted
• Home growing allowed for 
adults within certain parame-
ters
• Key aim is to protect minors 
and prevent for-profit sec-
ondary sales
• Provision for licensed cannabis 
social clubs to operate under 
formal regulation. Controls 
similar to existing informal 
guidelines for Spanish cannabis 
social clubs 
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Further information  
and contacts
Transform is available to support and inform the public debate or policy 
development and implementation process around cannabis regulation 
and wider drug policy reform issues. Please contact our UK Office
 Email   info@tdpf.org.uk
 Website http://www.tdpf.org.uk
 Tel   +44 117 325 0295
 Address  9-10 King Street, Bristol, UK, BS1 4EQ
Transform also has an office in Mexico City, as part of a joint initiative 
on drug policy reform in Latin America with México Unido Contra la 
Delincuencia
 Email  lisa@mucd.org.mx
 Tel   +52 (55) 55156759
 Address Emerson 243, Piso 7 Col.  
  Chapultepec Morales Deleg.  
  Miguel Hidalgo C.P. 11570  
  México D.F
 261A Practical Guide
Other useful organisations
There are many organisations working in the field of drug policy reform. 
Below are a some with particular relevant expertise in issues relating to 
cannabis policy:
The Beckley Foundation
 www.beckleyfoundation.org/category/policy/
	 Research	and	policy	advocacy	on	drug	law	reform	˛	including	
substantial resources on cannabis policy
Drug Policy Alliance
 www.drugpolicy.org
 Leading US-based policy advocacy organisation closely involved with all 
recent US cannabis reforms
Global Commission on Drug Policy
 www.globalcommissionondrugs.org
 High-powered commission producing publications and campaigns on 
drug policy and law reform
International Drug Policy Consortium
 www.idpc.net
 A global network promoting objective and open debate on drug policy, 
with an extensive library of resources
Marijuana Policy Project (MPP)
 http://www.mpp.org
 US-based cannabis reform advocates and campaigners
National Organisation for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML)
 www.norml.org
 US-based cannabis reform advocates and campaigners
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OSF Global Drug Policy Program
 www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/programs/global-drug-
policy-program
 Supporting umbrella body for a global network of NGOs working to 
reform drug policy
RAND drug policy research center
 www.rand.org/multi/dprc
 US-based academic think tank doing substantive research on cannabis 
policy
Regulación	Responsable	˛	Uruguay
 www.regulacionresponsable.org.uy
 Campaigning organisation supporting reforms in Uruguay
Release
 www.release.org.uk
 UK-based centre of expertise on drugs and the law 
 
Transnational Institute drugs and democracy program
 www.druglawreform.info
	 Centre	of	expertise	on	international	drug	policy	reform	˛	extensive	
library of resources
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